Knowing the structure of nature: Essays on realism and explanation

Knowing the Structure of Nature: Essays on Realism and Explanation

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-230

  Psillos, Stathis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS   (Greece)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84991834292     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230234666     Document Type: Book

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