Philosophy of language and the challenge to scientific realism

Philosophy of Language and the Challenge to Scientific Realism

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-203

  Norris, Christopher ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84909306393     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203390726     Document Type: Book

References (442)

1. William P. Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996
2. D.M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)
3. J. Aronson, R. Harré and E. Way, Realism Rescued: how scientific progress is possible (London: Duckworth, 1994)
4. Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975)
5. Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986)
6. Jarrett Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984)
7. Karl Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science (London: Hutchinson, 1983)
8. Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984)
9. M. Tooley, Causation: a realist approach (Blackwell, 1988).
10. Gilbert Harman, 'Inference to the Best Explanation', Philosophical Review, Vol. 74 (1965), pp. 88-95
11. Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 1993)
12. Wesley C. Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh, PA:University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967).
13. See, for instance, J.L. Aronson, 'Testing for Convergent Realism', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 40 (1989), pp. 255-60
14. Cf. Larry Laudan, 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48 (1981), pp. 19-49.
15. See, especially, Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978) and The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Duckworth, 1991)
16. Richard L. Kirkham, 'What Dummett Says about Truth and Linguistic Competence', Mind, Vol. 98 (1989), pp. 207-24
17. Michael Luntley, Language, Logic and Experience: the case for anti-realism (Duckworth, 1988)
18. N. Tennant, Anti-Realism and Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) and The Taming of the True (Oxford University Press, 1997)
19. Timothy Williamson, 'Knowability and Constructivism: the logic of anti-realism', Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1988), pp. 422-32
20. Kenneth P. Winkler, 'Scepticism and Anti-Realism', Mind, Vol. 94 (1985), pp. 46-52
21. Crispin Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
22. Gottlob Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', in M. Black and P.T. Geach (eds), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), pp. 56-78
23. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell, 1958).
24. For a wide range of views on this topic, see Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)
25. C.J. Misak, Verificationism: its history and prospects (London: Routledge, 1995)
26. P.M. Churchland and C.M. Hooker (eds), Images of Science: essays on realism and empiricism, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1985)
27. Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)
28. 'Do We See Through a Microscope?', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 62 (1981), pp. 305-22
29. Christopher Norris, 'Anti-Realism and Constructive Empiricism: is there a (real) difference?' and 'Ontology According to van Fraassen: some problems with constructive empiricism', in Against Relativism: philosophy of science, deconstruction and critical theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 167-95 and 196-217.
30. See A.J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism (New York: Free Press, 1959)
31. and Nicolas Rescher (ed.), The Heritage of Logical Positivism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985
32. On the 'hidden-variables' theory, see David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957)
33. David Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: an ontological interpretation of quantum theory (London: Routledge, 1993)
34. Mara Beller, Quantum Dialogue: the making of a revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999)
35. James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: historical contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony (University of Chicago Press, 1994)
36. Peter Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion: an account of the de Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
37. See Barry Barnes, About Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985)
38. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976)
39. Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: what everyone should know about science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
40. Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988)
41. Steve Woolgar, Science: the very idea (London: Tavistock, 1988).
42. See, for instance, Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures: postmodern philosophers' abuse of science (London: Profile Books, 1998)
43. Noretta Koertge (ed.), A House Built on Sand: exposing postmodernist myths about science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
44. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P.H. Nidditch, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
45. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 vols (New York: Dover, 1959).
46. See entries for Hacking under Note 9, above; also M. Gardner, 'Realism and Instrumentalism in Nineteenth-Century Atomism', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 46 (1979), pp. 1-34
47. J. Perrin, Atoms, trans. D.L. Hammick (New York: Van Nostrand, 1923)
48. Mary Jo Nye, Molecular Reality (London: Macdonald, 1972).
49. See, for instance, W. Russell Brain, The Nature of Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959)
50. Rodolfo Llinas and Patricia Churchland, The Mind-Brain Continuum:sensory processes (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1996)
51. A.D. Milner, The Visual Brain in Action (Oxford University Press, 1995)
52. See, for instance, Bernard D'Espagnat, Veiled Reality: an analysis of present-day quantum concepts (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995)
53. John Honner, The Description of Nature:Niels Bohr and the philosophy of quantum physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)
54. Max Jammer, Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (New York: Wiley, 1974)
55. Alastair I.M. Rae, Quantum Physics: illusion or reality? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
56. See Note 12, above; also Christopher Norris, Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism:philosophical responses to quantum mechanics (London: Routledge, 2000).
57. See Paul Teller, An Interpretative Introduction to Quantum Field Theory (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1995)
58. Harvey R. Brown and Rom Harré (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Field Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
59. Einstein, Relativity: the special and the general theory (London: Methuen, 1954).
60. Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 76.
61. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations; also Peter Winch, On the Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
62. Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).
63. John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994)
64. Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
65. Scott Soames, Understanding Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 31.
66. Dummett, The Seas of Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 468.
67. Devitt, 'Aberrations of the Realism Debate', Philosophical Studies, Vol. 61 (1991), pp. 43-63; p. 51.
68. See, especially, Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning'; also Gregory McCulloch, The Mind and its World (London: Routledge, 1995).
69. See the various discussions of this and related issues in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (eds), The Philosophy of Mathematics: selected essays, 2nd edn (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 470-85
70. Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge University Press, 1975).
71. Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1998), pp. 36-7.
72. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964).
73. On this topic see especially J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap:to the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
74. Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: an enquiry into the perceptual foundations of science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958)
75. David Bloor, Wittgenstein: a social theory of knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)
76. Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: a sociological perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977).
77. See, for instance, Barry Barnes, About Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985)
78. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976)
79. Steve Fuller, Philosophy of Science and its Discontents (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989)
80. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: the social construction of scientific facts (London:Sage, 1979)
81. Steve Woolgar, Science: the very idea (London: Tavistock, 1988).
82. For further discussion, see Christopher Norris, Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics (London: Routledge, 2000). See also Hanson, The Concept of the Positron (Note 1, above).
83. W. Russell Brain and E.B. Strauss, Recent Advances in Neurology, 3rd edn (London: J. & A. Churchill Ltd, 1934.).
84. See especially W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 20-46
85. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1960) and Theories and Things (Harvard University Press, 1981)
86. Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized', in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York:Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 69-90; p. 83.
87. See Donald Davidson, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 183-98.
88. For a more recent and highly influential argument to similar effect, see Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
89. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).
90. See, for instance, Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978)
91. Michael Luntley, Language, Logic and Experience: the case for anti-realism (London: Duckworth, 1988)
92. Neil Tennant, Anti-Realism and Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)
93. Timothy Williamson, 'Knowability and Constructivism: the logic of anti-realism', Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1988), pp. 422-32
94. Crispin Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
95. For some interesting discussion of this issue from the standpoint of cognitive psychology, see Mark A. DeBellis, Music and Conceptualization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
96. Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1975) and Science in a Free Society (New Left Books, 1978).
97. See Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
98. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
99. See Richard Boyd, 'The Current Status of Scientific Realism', in Jarrett Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 41-82
100. Hilary Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 73.
101. See, for instance, Larry Laudan, 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48 (1981), pp. 19-49.
102. For some recent compatible though differently-angled arguments to this effect, see William P. Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996)
103. Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: how science tracks truth (London: Routledge, 1999).
104. See Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, trans. R. George (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969)
105. Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
106. See, for instance, Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: how science tracks truth (London:Routledge, 1999)
107. also - from a different but related standpoint - William P. Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
108. For some illuminating commentary, see Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
109. The best recent discussion is to be found in C.J. Misak, Verificationism: its history and prospects (London: Routledge, 1995).
110. Dummett, 'Realism', Synthèse, Vol. 52 (1982), pp. 55-112; p. 108.
111. Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
112. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
113. See also Norwood Russell Hanson, Perception and Discovery: an introduction o scientific inquiry, ed. Willard C. Humphreys (San Francisco: Freeman Cooper & Co., 1969)
114. Observation and Explanation: a guide to philosophy of science (London:Allen & Unwin, 1972)
115. Constellations and Conjectures (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973).
116. See M. Gardner, 'Realism and Instrumentalism in Nineteenth-Century Atomism', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 46 (1979), pp. 1-34
117. J. Perrin, Atoms, trans. D.L. Hammick (New York: Van Nostrand, 1923)
118. Mary Jo Nye, Molecular Reality (London: Macdonald, 1972).
119. Brian Ellis, 'What Science Aims to Do', in P.M. Churchland and C.A. Hooker (eds), Images of Science: essays on realism and empiricism, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 68.
120. See also Christopher Norris, 'Anti-Realism and Constructive Empiricism: is there a (real) difference?' and 'Ontology According to van Fraassen: some problems with constructive empiricism', in Against Relativism: philosophy of science, deconstruction and critical theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 167-95 and 196-217.
121. Nicholas Jardine, The Fortunes of Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
122. G. Maxwell, 'Theories, Perception and Structural Realism', in R. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), p. 12.
123. Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: an enquiry into the conceptual foundations of science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).
124. Christopher Norris, Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics (London: Routledge, 2000).
125. See especially David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957)
126. David Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: an ontological interpretation of quantum theory (Routledge, 1993)
127. David Z. Albert, Quantum Mechanics and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993)
128. F.J. Belinfante, A Survey of Hidden Variable Theories (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973)
129. James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: historical contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1994)
130. Peter Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion: an account of the de Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993)
131. Dipankar Home, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: an overview from modern perspectives (New York: Plenum, 1998).
132. On this issue concerning the 'completeness' or otherwise of orthodox quantum mechanics, see A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Reality be Considered Complete?', Physical Review, series 2, Vol. 47 (1935), pp. 777-80
133. Niels Bohr, article in response under the same title, Physical Review, Vol. 48 (1935), pp. 696-702
134. Bohr, 'Conversation with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein:philosopher-scientist (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1969), pp. 199-241
135. Arthur Fine, The Shaky Game: Einstein, realism, and quantum theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936)
136. J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek (eds), Quantum Theory and Measurement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
137. Mara Beller, Quantum Dialogue: the making of a revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). All further references given by 'Beller' and page number in the text.
138. See entries under Note 34, above; also Tim Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity: metaphysical intimations of modern science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993)
139. Michael Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism: a prolegomenon to the philosophy of quantum mechanics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
140. G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, 'The Logic of Quantum Mechanics', Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 37 (1936), pp. 823-43.
141. See Paul Forman, 'Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927:adaptation by German physicists and mathematicians to a hostile intellectual environment', Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, Vol. 3 (1971), pp. 1-115
142. 'The Reception of an Acausal Quantum Mechanics in Germany and Britain', in S.H. Mauskopf (ed.), The Reception of Unconventional Science, AAAS Selected Symposium, No. 25 (1979), pp. 11-50.
143. See Note 34, above; also Niels Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934)nd Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: Wiley, 1958);
144. John Honner, The Description of Nature: Niels Bohr and the philosophy of quantum physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)
145. Henry J. Folse, The Philosophy of Niels Bohr: the framework of complementarity (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985)
146. Dugald Murdoch, Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
147. Henri Poincaré, Mathematics and Science: last essays (New York: Dover, 1963), p. 91.
148. Hans Reichenbach, Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1944).
149. J.S. Bell, Interview, Omni, May 1988, p. 88
150. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: collected papers on quantum philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
151. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978).
152. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
153. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford:Blackwell, 1958).
154. For the origins of this debate, see A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Reality be Considered Complete?', Physical Review, series 2, Vol. 47 (1935), pp. 777-80
155. Niels Bohr, article in reply under the same title, Physical Review, Vol. 48 (1935), pp. 696-702
156. Bohr, 'Conversation with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: philosopher-scientist (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1969), pp. 199-241.
157. Christopher Norris, 'Ontological Relativity and Meaning-Variance: a criticalconstructive review', in Against Relativism: philosophy of science, deconstruction and critical theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 66-100.
158. See, for instance, J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek (eds), Quantum Theory and Measurement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983)
159. Nancy Cartwright, Nature's Capacities and their Measurement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
160. See A.J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1955)
161. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism (New York: Free Press, 1959)
162. Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, trans. R. George (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969)
163. C.G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (University of Chicago Press, 1972)
164. Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
165. On the causal-realist ('hidden-variables') alternative to orthodox quantum theory, see David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957)
166. David Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: an ontological interpretation of quantum theory (London: Routledge, 1993)
167. F.J. Belinfante, A Survey of Hidden Variable Theories (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973)
168. James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: historical contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)
169. Peter Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion: an account of the de Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
170. J.L. Aronson, 'Testing for Convergent Realism', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 40 (1989), pp. 255-60
171. Gilbert Harman, 'Inference to the Best Explanation', Philosophical Review, Vol. 74 (1965), pp. 88-95
172. Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 1993)
173. Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
174. See especially Henry J. Folse, The Philosophy of Niels Bohr: the framework of complementarity (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985).
175. See E.G. Beltrametti and Bas C. van Fraassen, Current Issues in Quantum Logic (New York: Plenum, 1981)
176. Martin Gardner, 'Is Quantum Logic Really Logic?', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 38 (1971), pp. 508-29
177. G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, 'The Logic of Quantum Mechanics', Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 37 (1936), pp. 823-43
178. Peter Gibbins, Particles and Paradoxes: the limits of quantum logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
179. Susan Haack, Deviant Logic: some philosophical issues (Cambridge University Press, 1974)
180. Peter Mittelstaedt, Quantum Logic (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1994)
181. Hilary Putnam, 'How to Think Quantum-Logically', Synthèse, Vol. 29 (1974), pp. 55-6.
182. See especially David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976)
183. Wittgenstein: a social theory of knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983);
184. Derek L. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: a sociological perspective (London: Macmillan, 1977);
185. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
186. Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, philosophy, and the mind (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1991).
187. See, for instance, Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978)
188. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
189. Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978);
190. Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
191. See, for instance, William P. Alson, A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
192. For some illuminating discussion of these and other cases, see Scott Soames, Understanding Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
193. See especially Dummett, Frege and Other Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
194. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1914), p. 54.
195. See, for instance, Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)
196. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980);
197. Jane Heal, Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on philosophy of language (Blackwell, 1989).
198. Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: an inquiry into the conceptual foundations of science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). All further references given by 'Hanson' and page number in the text.
199. W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 20-46; also Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
200. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
201. See also Hanson, Perception and Discovery: an introduction to scientific inquiry, ed. Willard C. Humphreys (San Francisco: Freeman Cooper & Co., 1969) and Observation and Explanation: a guide to philosophy of science (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972);
202. Sandra G. Harding (ed.) Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine thesis (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1976).
203. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), pp. 193-208.
204. See also Hanson, Constellations and Conjectures (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973).
205. See, for instance, J. Aronson, R. Harré and E. Way, Realism Rescued: how scientific progress is possible (London: Duckworth, 1994);
206. J. Aronson, 'Testing for Convergent Realism', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 40 (1989), pp. 255-60;
207. Richard Boyd, 'The Current Status of Scientific Realism', in Jarrett Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 41-82;
208. Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: how science tracks truth (London: Routledge, 1999);
209. Nicolas Rescher, Scientific Progress (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979) and Scientific Realism: a critical reappraisal (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987);
210. Peter J. Smith, Realism and the Progress of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
211. For a sceptical view see Larry Laudan, Progress and its Problems (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977).
212. For further discussion, see Bernard D'Espagnat, Veiled Reality: an analysis of present-day quantum-mechanical concepts (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995);
213. Hanson, The Concept of the Positron: a philosophical analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963);
214. John Honner, The Description of Nature: Niels Bohr and the philosophy of quantum physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987);
215. Max Jammer, Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (New York: Wiley, 1974);
216. Josef M. Jauch, Are Quanta Real? A Galilean dialogue (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973);
217. Alasdair I.M. Rae, Quantum Physics: illusion or reality? (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
218. See, for instance, William P. Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
219. This debate goes back to Einstein's famous series of discussions with Bohr concerning the 'completeness' (or otherwise) of quantum mechanics on the orthodox interpretation. See Albert Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Reality be Considered Complete?', Physical Review, series 2, Vol. 47 (1935), pp. 777-80;
220. Niels Bohr, article in response under the same title, Physical Review, Vol. 48 (1935), pp. 696-702;
221. Bohr, 'Conversation with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: philosopher-scientist (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1969), pp. 199-241.
222. Erwin Schrödinger, Letters on Wave Mechanics (New York: Philosophical Library, 1967);
223. John Gribbin, In Search of Schrödinger's Cat: quantum physics and reality (New York: Bantam Books, 1984).
224. Louis de Broglie, Physics and Microphysics (New York: Harper & Row, 1960);
225. David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957);
226. David Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: an ontological interpretation of quantum theory (London: Routledge, 1993);
227. David Z. Albert, 'Bohm's Alternative to Quantum Mechanics', Scientific American, No. 270 (May 1994), pp. 58-63;
228. F.J. Belinfante, A Survey of Hidden Variable Theories (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973);
229. James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: historical contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994);
230. Peter Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion: an account of the de Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
231. Bohm, 'A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of "Hidden" Variables', Physical Review, Vol. 85 (1952), pp. 166-93; p. 168.
232. Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1984);
233. Pierre Duhem, The Aims and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. P. Wiener (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958)
234. To Save the Appearances: an essay on the idea of physical theory from Plato to Galileo, trans. E. Dolan and C. Maschler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969);
235. Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980);
236. C.J. Misak, Verificationism: its history and prospects (London: Routledge, 1995).
237. Karl Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (London: Hutchinson, 1982);
238. Paul K. Feyerabend, Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
239. See A.J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism (New York: Free Press, 1959);
240. Nicolas Rescher (ed.), The Heritage of Logical Positivism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985).
241. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 81.
242. See van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
243. This cultural-relativist reading of Wittgenstein receives its best-known exposition in Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
244. See, for instance, Barry Barnes, About Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985);
245. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976);
246. Steve Fuller, Philosophy of Science and its Discontents (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989);
247. Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992);
248. Steve Woolgar, Science: the very idea (London: Tavistock, 1988).
249. Harry Collins, Changing Order: replication and induction in scientific practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
250. See Note 9, above; also Arthur Fine, The Shaky Game: Einstein, realism, and quantum theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
251. Einstein, Relativity: the special and the general theory (London: Methuen, 1954).
252. See J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: to the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
253. See, for instance, Richard Boyd, 'The Current Status of Scientific Realism', in Jarrett Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 41-82; also entries under Note 6, above.
254. See Notes 5, 11, and 33, above; also - for a range of causal-realist arguments - D.M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983);
255. Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975);
256. Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd edn (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996);
257. Rom Harré and E.H. Madden, Causal Powers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975);
258. Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton University Press, 1984);
259. Michael Tooley, Causation: a realist approach (Blackwell, 1988).
260. Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: an inquiry into the conceptual foundations of science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958);
261. The Concept of the Positron: a philosophical analysis (Cambridge University Press, 1963);
262. Perception and Discovery: an introduction to scientific inquiry, ed. Willard C. Humphreys (San Francisco: Freeman Cooper & Co., 1969)
263. Observation and Explanation: a guide to philosophy of science (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972).
264. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
265. See J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek (eds), Quantum Theory and Measurement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
266. For a good popularising account, see John Gribbin, In Search of Schrödinger's Cat: quantum physics and reality (New York: Bantam Books, 1984).
267. See entries for Einstein, Note 1, above; also Louis de Broglie, Physics and Microphysics (New York: Harper & Row, 1960);
268. David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957);
269. David Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: an ontological interpretation of quantum theory (London: Routledge, 1993).
270. Peter Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion: an account of the de Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 17.
271. See, for instance, Gilbert Harman, 'Inference to the Best Explanation', Philosophical Review, Vol. 74 (1965), pp. 88-95
272. Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 1993).
273. Christopher Norris, 'Quantum Worlds Without End: the multiverse according to Deutsch' and 'Should Philosophers Take Lessons from Quantum Theory?', in Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 106-33 and 134-64.
274. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
275. W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 20-46;
276. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
277. See also Sandra G. Harding (ed.), Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine thesis (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1976).
278. Hans Reichenbach, Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1944).
279. See also G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, 'The Logic of Quantum Mechanics', Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 37 (1936), pp. 823-43;
280. E.G. Beltrametti and Bas C. van Fraassen, Current Issues in Quantum Logic (New York: Plenum, 1981);
281. M. Gardner, 'Is Quantum Logic Really Logic?', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 38 (1971), pp. 508-29;
282. Peter Gibbins, Particles and Paradoxes: the limits of quantum logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987);
283. Susan Haack, Deviant Logic: some philosophical issues (Cambridge University Press, 1974);
284. Peter Mittelstaedt, Quantum Logic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994);
285. Hilary Putnam, 'How to Think Quantum-Logically', Synthèse, Vol. 74 (1974), pp. 55-61.
286. See, for instance, Richard B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953);
287. Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, trans. R. George (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969);
288. Carl Gustav Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972);
289. Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
290. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964). A propos the Kantian and other philosophical influences on Bohr's (to say the least) highly eclectic approach to these issues
291. see especially Dugald Murdoch, Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987);
292. J. Faye, Niels Bohr: his heritage and legacy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991);
293. Henry J. Folse, The Philosophy of Niels Bohr: the framework of complementarity (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985);
294. John Honner, The Description of Nature: Niels Bohr and the philosophy of quantum physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
295. See, for instance, Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987);
296. Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
297. Mara Beller, Quantum Dialogue: the making of a revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 67.
298. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, with the First and Second Introductions, trans. and ed. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
299. See Bohr, Essays 1932-1957 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge and Essays 1958-1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Vols 2 and 3 of The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr (Woodbridge, Conn.: Ox Bow, 1987).
300. See Notes 24 and 29, above; also Bohr, 'On the Notions of Causality and Complementarity', Dialectica, Vol. 2 (1948), pp. 312-19;
301. S. Diner, D. Fargue, G. Lochak and F. Selleri (eds), The Wave-Particle Dualism (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984).
302. See, for instance, Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970);
303. The Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966).
304. Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
305. For a range of views on this longstanding issue between realists and instrumentalists, see Pierre Duhem, To Save the Phenomena: an essay on the idea of physical theory from Plato to Galileo, trans. E. Dolan and C. Maschler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969);
306. M. Gardner, 'Realism and Instrumentalism in Nineteenth-Century Atomism', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 46 (1979), pp. 1-34;
307. Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics: a critical and historical account of its development, trans. T.J. McCormack (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1960);
308. C.J. Misak, Verificationism: its history and prospects (London: Routledge, 1995);
309. Mary Jo Nye, Molecular Reality (London: Macdonald, 1972);
310. J. Perrin, Atoms, trans. D.L. Hammick (New York: Van Nostrand, 1923);
311. Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: how science tracks truth (London: Routledge, 1999);
312. Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
313. Paul Forman, 'Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927: adaptation by German physicists and mathematicians to a hostile intellectual environment', Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, Vol. 3 (1971), pp. 1-115
314. 'The Reception of an Acausal Quantum Mechanics in Germany and Britain', in S.H. Mauskopf (ed.), The Reception of Unconventional Science, AAAS Selected Symposium, No. 25 (1979), pp. 11-50.
315. James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: historical contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
316. For examples of this 'strong'-sociological approach, see Barry Barnes, About Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985);
317. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976);
318. Steve Fuller, Philosophy of Science and its Discontents (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989);
319. Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992);
320. Steven Shapin, 'History of Science and its Sociological Reconstruction', History of Science, Vol. 20 (1982), pp. 157-210;
321. Steve Woolgar, Science: the very idea (London: Tavistock, 1988).
322. For a more detailed discussion see Christopher Norris, 'Sexed Equations and Vexed Physicists: the "two cultures" revisited', in Deconstruction and the Unfinished Project of Modernity (London: Athlone Press, 2000), pp. 175-201.
323. Harry Collins, Changing Order: replication and induction in scientific practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
324. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
325. Norris, Against Relativism: philosophy of science, deconstruction and critical theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997)
326. Minding the Gap: epistemology and philosophy of science in the two traditions (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).
327. See especially J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: to the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
328. On this topic see especially Hilary Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and Realism and Reason (Cambridge University Press, 1983).
329. Albert Einstein, Relativity: the special and the general theory (London: Methuen, 1954).
330. Paul K. Feyerabend, 'Reichenbach's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics', Philosophical Studies, Vol. 20 (1958), p. 50;
331. Karl Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (London: Hutchinson, 1982).
332. Van Fraassen, 'Empiricism in the Philosophy of Language', in Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker (eds), Images of Science: essays on realism and empiricism, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 255.
333. Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 102.
334. See, for instance, Robin Waterfield, Before Eureka: the presocratics and their science (Bristol: The Bristol Press, 1989).
335. See Alexandre Koyré, Newtonian Studies (New York: Chapman & Hall, 1965)
336. Zev Bechler (ed.), Contemporary Newton Research (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1982).
337. See Richard S. Westfall, Force in Newton's Physics: the science of dynamics in the seventeenth century (London: Macdonald, 1971).
338. Putnam, Pragmatism: an open question (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 53n.
339. Van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 30.
340. See, for instance, Peter Achinstein, Law and Explanation: an essay in the philosophy of science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
341. See entries under Note 72, above; also D.M. Armstrong, What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983);
342. Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986)
343. Reclaiming Reality: a critical introduction to contemporary philosophy (Verso, 1989);
344. Rom Harré, Laws of Nature (London: Duckworth, 1993).
345. See especially J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974);
346. David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973);
347. E. Sosa (ed.), Causation and Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
348. For a version of modal or 'possible-worlds' logic that pushes such speculative arguments to the limit, see David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986);
349. also - for some strikingly analogous claims with regard to the 'multiverse' interpretation of quantum mechanics - David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997). I discuss these issues further in Norris, Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism (Note 13, above).
350. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), pp. 194-6, 199, 205-6;
351. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Note 3, above).
352. For a good clear discussion, see A.J. Leggett, The Problems of Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 168-70.
353. Erwin Schrödinger, 'Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik', Naturwissenschaften, Vol. 23 (1935), pp. 807-12, 823-8 and 844-9. A full English translation by John D. Trimmer is freely available on the Internet at http://www.emr.hibu.no/lars/eng/cat/.
354. See also Wheeler and Zurek (eds), Quantum Theory and Measurement (Note 4, above).
355. See especially Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980);
356. Raymond Bradley and Norman Swartz, Possible Worlds: an introduction to logic and its philosophy (Blackwell, 1979);
357. G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, A New Introduction to Modal Logic (London: Routledge, 1996);
358. M. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979);
359. Ruth Barcan Marcus, Modalities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993);
360. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974);
361. R.C. Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1987).
362. See W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960)
363. 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 20-46.
364. Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
365. See Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978)
366. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Duckworth, 1991);
367. Crispin Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)
368. Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
369. See especially Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
370. Christopher Norris, Hilary Putnam: realism, reason, and the uses of uncertainty (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
371. See Note 5, above; also Michael Luntley, Language, Logic and Experience: the case for antirealism (London: Duckworth, 1988);
372. N. Tennant, Anti-Realism and Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) and The Taming of the True (Clarendon Press, 2002);
373. Timothy Williamson, 'Knowability and Constructivism: the logic of anti-realism', Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1988), pp. 422-32;
374. Kenneth P. Winkler, 'Scepticism and Anti-Realism', Mind, Vol. 94 (1985), pp. 46-52.
375. See Christopher Norris, Truth Matters: realism, anti-realism, and response-dependence (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002).
376. For some illuminating discussion of these and similar cases, see Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: how science tracks truth (London: Routledge, 1999).
377. See especially Richard Boyd, 'The Current Status of Scientific Realism', in Jarrett Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 41-82.
378. Cf. Larry Laudan, 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48 (1981), pp. 19-49.
379. See Gottlob Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', in M. Black and P.T. Geach (eds), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), pp. 56-78
380. Bertrand Russell, 'On Denoting', Mind, Vol. 14 (1905), pp. 479-93;
381. G.H.R. Parkinson (ed.), The Theory of Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).
382. See especially Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975);
383. Gregory McCulloch, The Mind and its World (London: Routledge, 1995).
384. See M. Gardner, 'Realism and Instrumentalism in Nineteenth-Century Atomism', Philosophy of Science, Vol. 46 (1979), pp. 1-34;
385. J. Perrin, Atoms, trans. D.L. Hammick (New York: Van Nostrand, 1923);
386. Mary Jo Nye, Molecular Reality (London: Macdonald, 1972);
387. Niels Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934).
388. Wright, 'Euthyphronism and the Physicality of Colour', European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1998), pp. 15-29; p. 18.
389. Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983);
390. 'Do We See Through a Microscope?', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 62 (1981), pp. 305-22.
391. Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).
392. See Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics (London: Watts, 1893);
393. Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980);
394. C.J. Misak, Verificationism: its history and prospects (London: Routledge, 1995);
395. P.M. Churchland and C.M. Hooker (eds), Images of Science: essays on realism and empiricism, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985);
396. Christopher Norris, 'Anti-Realism and Constructive Empiricism: is there a (real) difference?' and 'Ontology According to van Fraassen: some problems with constructive empiricism', in Against Relativism: philosophy of science, deconstruction and critical theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 167-95 and 196-217.
397. For further discussion see Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: an enquiry into the perceptual foudations of science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).
398. Van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
399. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964).
400. On this topic see especially J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: to the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
401. See, for instance, the various essays on quantum theory in Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and Realism and Reason (Cambridge University Press, 1983);
402. also - for a range of theoretical-interpretative viewpoints - Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: Wiley, 1958);
403. Bernard D'Espagnat, Veiled Reality: an analysis of present-day quantum concepts (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995);
404. John Honner, The Description of Nature: Niels Bohr and the philosophy of quantum physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987);
405. Max Jammer, Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (New York: Wiley, 1974);
406. Alastair I.M. Rae, Quantum Physics: illusion or reality? (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
407. See Paul Teller, An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995);
408. Harvey R. Brown and Rom Harré (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Field Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)
409. Christopher Norris, Quantum Theory and the Flight from Realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics (London: Routledge, 2000).
410. P.F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959)
411. The Bounds of Sense: an essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Methuen, 1966).
412. See entries under Note 49, above; also Putnam, 'Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: an inquiry into the powers of the human mind', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 91, No. 9 (1994), pp. 445-517.
413. On the rule-following 'paradox', see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), Sections 201-43;
414. Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Blackwell, 1982).
415. See especially David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957);
416. David Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: an ontological interpretation of quantum theory (London: Routledge, 1993);
417. F.J. Belinfante, A Survey of Hidden Variable Theories (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973);
418. James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: historical contingency and the Copenhagen hegemony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994);
419. Evadro Agazzi (ed.), Realism and Quantum Physics (Amsterdam Notes 197 and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1997);
420. Peter Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion: an account of the de Broglie-Bohm causal interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
421. A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Reality be Considered Complete?', Physical Review, series 2, Vol. 47 (1935), pp. 777-80;
422. Niels Bohr, article in response under the same title, Physical Review, Vol. 48 (1935), pp. 696-702;
423. Bohr, 'Conversation with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: philosopher-scientist (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1969), pp. 199-241;
424. Arthur Fine, The Shaky Game: Einstein, realism, and quantum theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936);
425. J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek (eds), Quantum Theory and Measurement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
426. See Gilbert Harman, 'Inference to the Best Explanation', Philosophical Review, Vol. 74 (1965), pp. 88-95;
427. Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 1993).
428. Paul K. Feyerabend, Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
429. See for instance Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1975).
430. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
431. William James, Pragmatism (London: Longman, Green & Co., 1907).
432. See for instance Henry J. Folse, The Philosophy of Niels Bohr: the framework of complementarity (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985);
433. John Honner, The Description of Nature: Niels Bohr and the philosophy of quantum physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987);
434. Dugald Murdoch, Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
435. See entries under Note 63, above; also Michael Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality and Realism: a prolegomenon to the philosophy of quantum mechanics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
436. Mara Beller, Quantum Dialogue: the making of a revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 179.
437. See J. Barrow and F.J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
438. For some perceptive discussion of these issues, see C.J. Misak, Verificationism: its history and prospects (Note 35, above).
439. Dummett, 'Realism', Synthèse, Vol. 52 (1982), pp. 55-112; p. 108.
440. I take the example of the duplicate solar system from Scott Soames, Understanding Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
441. Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism (Note 3, above), p. 56.
442. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.S. Pringle-Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), especially Book II, Chapter 8.