The Economics of Professional Boxing Contracts

Journal of Sports Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 363-384

  Tenorio, Rafael ^a  

^a DEPAUL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84990380698     PISSN: 15270025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/152700250000100403     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Allen, F. (1985). Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing. Economics Letters, 17, 27-31.
2. Bizer, D., & DeMarzo, P. (1991). Labor contracts with banking (Working Paper No. 96). Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.
3. The boxing record book. (1994). Vol. 11. New Jersey: Fight Fax, Inc.
4. Cornes, R., & Sandler, T. (1986). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
5. Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
6. Fudenberg, D., Holmström, B., & Milgrom, P. (1985). Short term contracts and long term agency relationships. Journal of Economic Theory, 51, 1-31.
7. Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. (1992). Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns. Journal of Political Economy, 100, 468-505.
9. Haltiwanger, J., & Waldman, M. (1985). Rational expectations and the limits of rationality: An analysis of heterogeneity. American Economic Review, 75, 326-340.
10. Harris, M., & Holmström, B. (1982). A theory of wage dynamics. Review of Economic Studies, 49, 315-333.
11. Hart, O., & Holmström, B. (1987). The theory of contracts. In T. Bewley (Ed.), Advances in economic theory (pp. 71-155). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
12. Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91.
13. Holmström, B. (1999). Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective. Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169-182.
14. Klein, B., & Leffler, K. (1981). The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy, 81, 615-641.
15. Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 45-252.
16. Lambert, R. (1983). Long-term contracting and moral hazard. Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 441-452.
17. Lazear, E. (1979). Why is there mandatory retirement? Journal of Political Economy, 87, 1261-1284.
18. Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-864.
19. Mirrlees, J. (1976). The optimal structure of authority and incentives within an organization. Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 105-131.
20. Radner, R. (1981). Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship. Econometrica, 49, 1127-1148.
21. Radner, R. (1985). Repeated principal-agent games with discounting. Econometrica, 53, 1173-1198.
22. Reed, G. (1981). This business of boxing and its secrets. Washington, DC: New National.
23. The ring (various issues 1987-1989). New York: The Ring Publishing Corp.
24. Rogerson, W. (1985). Repeated moral-hazard. Econometrica, 53, 69-76.
25. Rubinstein, A., & Yaari, M. (1983). Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard. Journal of Economic Theory, 30, 74-97.
26. Sappington, D. (1991). Incentives in principal-agent relationships. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 45-66.
27. Sargent, T. (1987). Dynamic macroeconomic theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
28. Shapiro, C. (1982). Consumer information, product quality and seller reputation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 20-35.
29. Shavell, S. (1979). Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 55-73.
30. Stiglitz, J. (1975). Incentives, risk and information: Notes towards a theory of hierarchy. Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 552-579.
31. Yaari, M. (1976). A law of large numbers in the theory of consumer's choice under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 12, 202-217.