To Race or to Place?: An Empirical Investigation of the Efficiency of the NASCAR Points Competition

Journal of Sports Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 633-641

  Schwartz, Jeremy T ^a   Isaacs, Justin P ^a   Carilli, Anthony M ^a  

^a HAMPDEN SYDNEY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

logit analysis; NASCAR; sabotage; tournament structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 84990348137     PISSN: 15270025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1527002506294944     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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