CEO compensation, IOS and the role of corporate governance

Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 23-33

  Elloumi, Fathi ^a   Gueyié, Jean Pierre ^b  

^a ATHABASCA UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Directors; Investment; Remuneration; Top management

Indexed keywords

EID: 84986065032     PISSN: 14720701     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/EUM0000000005487     Document Type: Article

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