Experimental legislation concerning technological & governance innovation – An analytical approach

Theory and Practice of Legislation

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 169-193

  Heldeweg, Michiel A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Ability space; Derogation; Experimental legislation; Legal design; Legal disruption; Legal experiments; Liberty space; Regulation; Waivers

Indexed keywords

EID: 84983791857     PISSN: 20508840     EISSN: 20508859     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/20508840.2015.1083242     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. The term legislation is meant to also include regulation (when about legal acts that present general and abstract norms). Similarly see: S. Ranchordás, Constitutional Sunsets and Experimental Legislation: A Comparative Perspective (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2015)15
2. See, as a general approach to this challenge: R. Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008)
3. For the regulation of sharing economy, see S. Ranchordás, ‘Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy’ (2015) 16 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 1
4. See Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1), p. 36
5. On these aspects, see Y. Millo and J. Lezaun, ‘Experiments in regulation. Regulatory experiments: genetically modified crops and financial derivatives on trial’ (2006) 33 (3) Science and Public Policy, 179-190
6. We assume that experimental legislation in itself is or should be of a temporary nature – see also, Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1), p. 10
7. while legislation determining the conditions of experimentation may (but need not be) be permanent; see section B(2)
8. E.g. Article 8.40a, section 1, Dutch Environmental Law Act: in prescribing the taking of certain measures, the Decree may stipulate that alternative measures may be taken, if these provide at least an equal level of protection of the environment
9. Ranchordás supra (footnote 1), explains and demonstrates the Rule of Law concerns relevant to legal experimenting
10. The latter feature in Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1)
11. The former, disruptive in business (administration) theory, was introduced by Christensen, see, inter alia
12. See J. L Bower and C. M. Christensen, ‘Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave’ (1995) 73(1) Harvard Business Review, 43-53
13. The latter, scientific paradigm shifts, is the author’s analogous use of the term ‘disruptive’, inspired by T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1962)
14. For a similar terminology: N. Cortez, ‘Regulating Disruptive Innovation’ (2014) 29(1) Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 175, 183 (‘Regulatory disruption’ occurs, then, when the ‘disruptee’ is the regulatory framework itself)
15. See: Oxford Dictionary, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/experiment [Accessed 24-02-2015]
16. Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1), pp. 42-46, lists various forms of legislative experimentation, such as ‘field experiments’
17. Leaving policy makers in a state of ‘(un)known unknowns’ or uncertainty beyond risk. See, inter alia, F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Hart, Schaffner & Marx, Boston 1921)
18. Ranchordás, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Hart, Schaffner & Marx, Boston 1921)., with a focus on legislative experiments, regards temporariness as a vital characteristic (p. 8), aside from derogation, evaluation and a limited scope of application (pp. 37-38) 15. INOGOV workshop: Climate Change Policy and Governance: Initiation, Experimentation, Evaluation (12-13 March 2015; Helsinki) See: http://www.inogov.eu/#home [Last accessed 10 May 2015]. Report forthcoming
19. See Y. Millo and J. Lezaun, supra (footnote 4)
20. Quote from Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1), p. 29 (citing Noll), p. 8 (citing Jahrreiss), p. 13 (citing US Justice Brandeis)
21. Instructions for Legislative Drafting issued by Official Journal (Staatscourant) 1992, 230
22. most recently amended 2011, 6602. On these guidelines: N.A. Florijn ‘The instructions for legislation in the Netherlands: a critical appraisal’ (2010) IV(2) Legisprudence, 171-191
23. Translation by this author from the Dutch Explanatory Memorandum to Instruction 10b of the Guidelines
24. L. Lindahl, Position and Change, A Study in Law and Logic (Synthese Library, vol. 112, Uppsala 1977) 104 21
25. See also Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1), p. 68-72
26. See: M.A. Heldeweg ‘Legal Design of Smart Rules and Regimes: Regulating Innovation’ in M.A. Heldeweg and E. Kica (eds.), Regulating Technological Innovation. A Multidisciplinary Approach (Palgrave MacMillan, Hershey 2011) 37-52
27. Also see the Explanatory Memorandum (in Dutch) related to the relevant Decree: http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/besluit_experimenten_decentrale_duurzame_elektriciteit_opwekking [Accessed 08 July 2015]
28. We assume rules to hold a maximum of one normative position, unless it includes other normative positions as related exceptions – see section C
29. Some (fundamental) norms apply to all/any person(s) in any case (i.e. at any time, place and circumstance) – e.g. prohibition of genocide or of chemical weapons
30. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 91-99
31. The other 2 subtypes of secondary rules are ‘rules of recognition’ and of ‘rules of adjudication’
32. Establishing and changing general rules by Crown decree, and granting permissions in individual cases – all within the substantive and procedural boundaries of the Electricity Act
33. These may be perceived as permission to waive legal standards or requirements, but at this stage we look at normative positions as they ‘stand alone’
34. W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning (Yale University Press, Westport 1964)
35. Lindahl, supra (footnote 20). Lindahl does not expressis verbis relate to the normative positions (a-d), as is done in the below and his approach is ‘relativistic’, in looking at one-on-one relations
36. In the following we will leave out whether a subject on either side of the relation is just one person, some persons or any person. See D.W.P. Ruiter, ‘Unital and multital legal relations’ in M.L. van Genugten & M. Harmsen (eds.), De Vorm behouden. Verslag van een levenswerk door Dick W.P. Ruiter (University of Twente, Enschede 2008) 87-129
37. Although doctrinal arrangements may differ, logically these issues would have to be dealt with following rules of conduct/first order relations that determined the relevant liberty space
38. According to normative logic, but also in the liberal state doctrine: ‘One is presumed free, unless … ’
39. More on other that legislative strong permissiveness in the below. G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action: A logical enquiry (Routledge, London 1963) esp. pp 85 ff
40. Von Wright spoke of ‘permission’ instead of ‘permissiveness, as is done here. Strong permissiveness implicates weak permissiveness (as absent obligations) but weak permissiveness can exist without strong permissiveness
41. Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1), p. 199
42. presents such an example in the Dutch dentistry sector. 37. ‘Explicit’ does and ‘implicated’ does not come with a matching weak permissiveness. The scope of this article does not allow to elaborate on underlying (complexity of) normative logic – see (inter alia) Von Wright, supra (footnote 35) and D.W.P. Ruiter, Institutional Legal Facts. Legal Powers and their Effects. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1993)
43. M. Atienza and J. R. Manero, A Theory of Legal Sentences (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1998) 96- (with quotes from Von Wright, supra (footnote 35), p. 88 f.)
44. Von Wright, supra (footnote 35), p. 88
45. Atienza and Manero, supra (footnote 38), p. 97. Note that in both examples the third party can be another legislator/regulator
46. A. Soeteman, ‘Legal Gaps’ in: IVR Encyclopedia of Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law, http://ivr-enc.info/index.php?title=Legal_gaps [Accessed August 19, 2014]
47. speaks of ‘explicit silence’. The oxymoron of ‘eloquent silence’ is inspired by: Michal Ephratt ‘The functions of silence’ Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008) 1009-1938. Note that a broad concept of legal acts (e.g. legislation) could encompass eloquent silence
48. A consequence in the realm of conditions to rules of power – assuming that eloquent silence can only pertain to the legally available yet unused ability space
49. See A. Ross, Directives and Norms (Routledge, London 1968) 108
50. As Ross has demonstrated, supra (previous footnote), some ‘substitution’ is possible whereby norm-subjects are (v.v.) included in norm-conditions and either or both in norm-object descriptions. We will ignore this to not (further) complicate the narrative
51. Such as by (systemic conditions of) hierarchical priority (‘Lex superior derogat legi inferiori’) and (mostly in absence of hierarchy), priority of specificity (‘Lex specialis derogat legi generali’), or priority of age (‘Lex posterior derogat legi priori’)
52. Encompassing all relevant cases (the set) to enable regulation (permissive with reservations) where necessary, and providing a liberty space with ‘regulatory tilt’: indicating the margins of (reasonable) discretion in tailor-made regulation. On regulatory tilt, see Brownsword, supra (footnote 2), p. 21
53. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Boston 1977) 31
54. R. Brownsword, supra (footnote 2), p. 19-20, uses similar terms: ‘plus facilitation’ and ‘with negative reservation’. Concerning reservations to experiments: e.g. the prohibition to use certain fuels or the command to monitor performance
55. On the specific use of these spaces see footnote 31. We only consider the exceptions that enlarge liberty
56. This may include converting partial permissiveness into full permissiveness (see B3 ii. and iii.)
57. Possibly with effects on the ability of lower legislators to introduce restrictions, so effectively as an immunity. See section C3 and footnote 40
58. Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1), discusses the difference between sunset clauses and (the yet to be mentioned) ‘regulatory holidays’ (pp. 17-77) 52. A major example is provided by Article 101(3) TFEU. This Article states that the prohibition of cartels (of Article 101(1) TFEU) may be declared inapplicable in a case of undertakings (that normally amount to a prohibited cartel), ‘which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.’ Monti presents a fine analysis of the regulatory holiday in EU competition law
59. see: G. Monti ‘Managing the intersection of Utilities Regulation and EC Competition Law’ The Competition Law Review (2008) 4 (2) 123-145
60. Note that in option ii. permissiveness is indeed a (non-legal!) blank canvas
61. See, without the specific terms of open and closed models, R. Brownsword & H. Somsen, ‘Law, innovation and technology: before we fast forward – a forum for debate’ Law, Innovation and Technology (2009) 1(1) 28-29
62. Merely on the basis of this being the legal order that the author knows best, with an acceptable top 10 (rank 5) position in the 2014 WJP Rule of Law index (vide: http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index [Last accessed 10-05-2015]). See footnote 52 for an EU example
63. See Ranchordás, supra (footnote 1), for many more examples from the Netherlands, Germany and the United States
64. Crisis- en herstelwet, Stb. 2010, 136 (amended). 58. ‘Besluit Uitvoering Crisis- en herstelwet, Stb. 2010, 289 (amended)
65. Article 3.12 Telecom Act, derogation for undertaking experiments by ministerial frequency permit from the requirement of rejecting requests for such permits if they conflict with the national frequency plan
66. Presently, Article 7a Electricity Act and Article 1i Gas Act, and in future, Article 11.1 of the Draft Electricity and Gas Act – especially in the area of local smart energy grids/systems – factual experiments within permanent legislation
67. Article 23.3 draft Environmental Act – experiments towards a safe and healthy environment and on improving the quality of the environment and of related decision-making (scope yet to be specified)
68. Letter of the minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 5 January 2015, ref: ‘Agenda Lokale Democratie’. Parliamentary documents 34 000 VII
69. Also triggering attention across governance studies, such as in INOGOV-context
70. See, inter alia, N. Cortez, supra (footnote 10)