The Accountability of International Organisations: A Case Study of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 571-597

  Patel, Bimal N ^a  

^a LLM (Public International Law)   (India)

Author keywords

accountability of international organisations; Chemical Weapons Convention; disarmament; liability; monitoring mechanisms; OPCW; responsibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 84965133849     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156500000364     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. The ILA Committee on the Accountability of Intemational Organisations is now preparing a legal framework to address the issue. In fact, the main inspiration for this article has been the Committee's Taipei Conference Report (1998). It appears that the ILA's efforts will be complemented by the work of the ILC, which has identified the responsibilities of lOs as one of the topics for its long-term programme of work. R. Rosenstock, Fiftieth Session of the Intemational Law Commission, 93 American Socicty of Intemational Law I, 245 (1999). This attention supports the author's view that the issue of the accountability of lOs needs to be addressed in a comprehensive manner.
2. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established under Article VIII (I) of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 32 ILM 804 (1993), The Organisation came into effect on 29 April 1997, upon entry into force of the Convention.
3. J.B. Tucker, Verifying a Multilateral Ban on Nuclear Weapons: Lessons From the CwC, 5 The Non-Proliferation Review 2, at 81 (1998)
4. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Text available at www.opcw.org or www.un.org and at 32 ILM 804 (1993).
5. N. White, Accountability and Democracy within the UN: A Legal Perspective, 6 International Relations 13, 1-17(1997).
6. C. Bellman & R. Gerster, Accountability in the World Trade Organisation, 30 Journal of World Trade Law 31-74 (1996).
7. S. Brown & L. Fabian, Toward Mutual Accountability in the Non-Terrestrial Realms, 29 International Organisations 877-892 (1975).
8. S. Williams, Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community, in R. Keohane & S. Hoffmann (Eds.), ‘the New European Community 155-176 (1991).
9. D. Olowu, Organisational and Institutional Mechanism for Ensuring Accountability in Africa: A review, 20 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1, 329-339 (1994).
10. M. Hartwig, Die Haftung der Mitgliedstaaten für intemalionale Organisalionen 335-343 (1993).
11. Taipei Conference Report, note 1, at 15-16.
12. H. Schermers & N. Blokker, (Eds.), International Institutional Law, at 980 (1995).
13. The term “intergovernmental Organisation” has not been defined in major multilateral treaties such as the 1969 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, 8 ILM 679 (1969), the 1986 Vienna Conventions on Treaties Between States and International Organizations and Between Intemational Organizations, 25 ILM 543 (1986), and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM 1477 (1982). An intergovernmental Organisation must fulfil three requirements: (1) it must be established by an intemational agreement; (2) it must have organs; and (3) it must be established under international law. See H. Schermers, International Institutional Law 8-9 (1980).
14. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of I! April 1949, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174
15. Only in a few cases does the constitution contain a general authorisation for the Organisation to conclude treaties, but many modem constitutions authorise it to conclude treaties of a certain type. The OPCW's Executive Council possesses the power to conclude agreements or arrangements with States and 10s on behalf of the Organisation, subject to prior approval by the Conference. CWC, Art. VIll, para. 34.
16. CWC, Art. VIII, para. 23.
17. owe, Art. VIII, paras. 30-31 and 37-40.
18. CWC, Article III, para. 1.
19. CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, para. 16.
20. CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, para. 22.
21. CWC, Confidentiality Annex, subpara. 2(b)(i).
22. Lawand, CWC note 27, at 11.
23. CWC, VA, Part III, para. 1.
24. CWC, VA, Part III, paras. 3-4.
25. Comparable verification procedures included in earlier agreements are: “unannounced inspections” in the control regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); inspections in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); “short-notice inspections” in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; and “inspections on suspicion” in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. W. Krutzsch & R. Trapp, A Commentary to the Chemical Weapons Convention 175 (1994).
26. UNIDIR, The Projected Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament 175 (1989).
27. The three Schedules in the Annex on Chemicals list chemicals according to the potential risk they pose to the object and purpose of the Convention. The concept of “risk” combines the “hazards” of a particular chemical (toxicity criterion) and the “purpose” for which it could be used (purpose criterion). Another criterion is the assessment of how the inclusion of a chemical in a particular Schedule would affect current peaceful activities. Schedule 1 chemicals pose the greatest risk, Schedule 2 chemicals still pose a significant risk, and Schedule 3 the least risk, although they are widely used for peaceful purposes. UNIDIR, id., at 120.
28. B. Kellman (et al), Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention 20 (1993).
29. Krutzsch & Trapp, Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention note 36, at 201.
30. CWC, Art, X, para. 7.
31. Krutzsch & Trapp, CWC note 36, at 203.
32. UNIDIR at 187.
33. Id.
34. Confidentiality Annex, Part A, subpara, 2(c).
35. Confidentiality Annex, Part B, para. 9.
36. Confidentiality Annex, Part A, para. 4.
37. Confidentiality Annex, Part D, para. 22.
38. In accordance with para. 22 of the Confidentiality Annex, a “Commission for the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality” to deal with cases of breaches involving both a State Party and the Organisation, shall be set up as a subsidiary organ of the Conference.
39. Krutzsch & Trapp, accordance with para. 22 of the Confidentiality Annex, a “Commission for the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality” to deal with cases of breaches involving both a State Party and the Organisation, shall be set up as a subsidiary organ of the Conference. note 36, at 214.
40. E.g. the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD).
41. F. Calderon, Obligations and Rights of States Parties under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Basic Course for National Authority Personnel, PTS Occasional Paper 6, Preparatory Commission for the OPCW (1994).
42. Krutzsch & Trapp, Obligations and Rights of States Parties under the Chemical Weapons Convention note 36, at 108.
43. J. Rautenbach, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Something old, something new, something borrowed, something intrusive, in ASIL/NVIR Proceedings 1991 (1997).
44. The Convention does not contain provisions on appropriate regulations for legal assistance. As it stands now, States Parties would have to draw on existing international agreements on legal assistance and related domestic legislation; OPCW document C-III/DG., 11 June 1998.
45. Kellman, The Convention does not contain provisions on appropriate regulations for legal assistance. note 39, at 128.
46. CWC, Article VII, para. 5.
47. Survey of National Implementing Legislation, OPCW document S/85/98, 17 November 1998.
48. For a detailed discussion of the structure, power and role of National Authorities in the implementation of the Convention, see Kellman, Survey of National Implementing Legislation note 39, at 14-19.
49. CWC, Article VII, para. 7.
50. T. Dunworth & I. Kenyon, Conflict Managemenl and the Chemical Weapons Convention, 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 89 (1997).
51. Dunworth &Kenyon, Conflict Managemenl and the Chemical Weapons Convention note 63, at 84.
52. The proliferation of intergovernmental Organisations has been remarkable, particularly since World War II. Their number has grown as follows: 1909, 37; 1956, 132; 1960, 154; 1964, 179; 1968, 229; 1972, 280; 1976, 252; 1981, 337; 1984,365; 1987, 311; 1990, 293; and 1991, 297. UNESCO, Yearbook of International Organisations, Vol. 1,1625 (1994/95).