Conflict Management and the Chemical Weapons Convention

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 81-90

  Kenyon, Ian R ^a   Dunworth, Treasa ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

chemical weapons; dispute resolution; preventive measures; treaty regime; verification

Indexed keywords

EID: 85022776787     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S092215659700006X     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. TKc Convention, note 1, Art. I.
2. The Convention, TKc Convention note 1, Art. VIII(1).
3. The Convention, supm note 1, Art. VIII(4).
4. The activities coming under the Convention's purview include those occurring at military facilities as well as activities at mdustnal facilities which deal with chemicals lifted m the three schedules to the Convention. These chemicals are “dual use”, that is, chemicals with peaceful industrial purposes but with the potential to be used as precursors for chemical weapons, or as chemical weapons themselves.
5. The Convention, The activities coming under the Convention's purview include those occurring at military facilities as well as activities at mdustnal facilities which deal with chemicals lifted m the three schedules to the Convention. These chemicals are “dual use” noie 1, Art. IX(8).
6. The Convention, The Convention note 1, Art. XIV(2).
7. The Convention, The Convention, note 1, Art. XIV(3) and (4).
8. The Convention, The Convention note 1, Art. XIV(5).
9. Art. XIV(6).
10. Tile Convention, Art. XIV(6) note 1, Confidentiality Annex, para. 23.
11. Id., at 409-410.
12. W. Krutzsch & R. Trapp, A Commencary on the Chemical Weapons Convention 234 (1994).
13. E.g., Art. XU(4) provides for the Conference to bring an issue to the attention of the UNGA and LTNSC “in cases of particular gravity.”
14. With the possibility of re-election; see the Convention, provides for the Conference to bring an issue to the attention of the UNGA and LTNSC “in cases of particular gravity.” note 1, Art VIII.
15. The Convention, With the possibility of re-election; see the Convention note 1, Art. VIII(23-36).
16. The Convention, The Convention note 1, Art.
17. The Convention, The Convention note 1, Art. IX(22).
18. T. Kurzidens, Conflict Management and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitts St A. Rosas (Eds.), Chemical Weapuns Disaimauiciii,; Snatcgics and Legal Problems (forthcoming.
19. The Convention, Conflict Management and the Chemical Weapons Convention note 1, Art. IX(8).
20. Which are supplemented by Part X of the Verification Annex.
21. The Convention, Which are supplemented by Part X of the Verification Annex note 1, Art. XII(2) and see also Art. VIII(36), which requires the Executive Council, in cases where there are doubts about compliance to first consult with the states parties involved, then request them to take remedial measures within a specified time and then outlines additional steps if further action is deemed necessary.
22. The Convention, which requires the Executive Council, in cases where there are doubts about compliance to first consult with the states parties involved, then request them to take remedial measures within a specified time and then outlines additional steps if further action is deemed necessary note 1, Art. XII(3).
23. Ian Kenyon is the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Treasa Dunworth is a Researcher with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Warfare Armament and Arms Limitation. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Preparatory Commission or the Harvard Sussex Program.