Examining the asymptote in safety progress: A literature Review

International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 57-65

  Dekker, Sidney ^a,b   Pitzer, Corrie ^c  

^a GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

^c Safemap International ^*  (Canada)

Author keywords

Accidents; Asymptote; Behavioral safety; Resilience; Safety bureaucracy; Vision zero

Indexed keywords

ACCIDENTS, OCCUPATIONAL; HUMAN; OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH; ORGANIZATION; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; PRACTICE GUIDELINE; PROTOCOL COMPLIANCE; SAFETY; STANDARDS;

ACCIDENTS, OCCUPATIONAL; GUIDELINE ADHERENCE; GUIDELINES AS TOPIC; HUMANS; OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH; ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE; SAFETY MANAGEMENT;

EID: 84964063173     PISSN: 10803548     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10803548.2015.1112104     Document Type: Review

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