An allocation game model with reciprocal behavior and its applications in supply chain pricing decisions

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 258, Issue 2, 2017, Pages 347-368

  Zhang, Yan ^a   Li, Juan ^b   Gou, Qinglong ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF CHINA   (China)

^b NANJING UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Fairness concern; Reciprocal behavior; Stackelberg game; Supply chain pricing decision

Indexed keywords

EID: 84961211537     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-016-2165-9     Document Type: Article

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