Simulating protection rackets: a case study of the Sicilian Mafia

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Volumn 30, Issue 6, 2016, Pages 1117-1147

  Nardin, Luis G ^a   Andrighetto, Giulia ^a,b   Conte, Rosaria ^a   Székely, Áron ^a   Anzola, David ^d   Elsenbroich, Corinna ^d   Lotzmann, Ulf ^c   Neumann, Martin ^c   Punzo, Valentina ^e   Troitzsch, Klaus G ^c  

^a INSTITUTE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGIES   (Italy)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^c Universität Koblenz Landau ^*  (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

^e UNIVERSITY OF PALERMO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Normative agent architecture; Norms; Protection rackets; Sicilian Mafia

Indexed keywords

DYNAMICS;

AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODELS; APPLICATION-ORIENTED; DRIVING BEHAVIOUR; NORMATIVE AGENTS; NORMS; PROTECTION RACKETS; SICILIAN MAFIA; SOCIAL NORM;

ARCHITECTURE;

EID: 84961197188     PISSN: 13872532     EISSN: 15737454     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-016-9330-z     Document Type: Article

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