A combinatorial exchange for autonomous traders

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2738, Issue , 2003, Pages 26-36

  Tanner, Andreas ^a   Mühl, Gero ^a  

^a TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Combinatorial exchanges

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL;

ALLOCATION ALGORITHM; AUCTION MARKETS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; FAIRNESS PROPERTIES;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84955604768     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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