Drift and conversion: Hidden faces of institutional change

Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 180-208

  Hacker, Jacob S ^a   Pierson, Paul ^b   Thelen, Kathleen ^c  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84954225382     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781316273104.008     Document Type: Chapter

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