A more systematic approach to biological risk:Management of emerging risks in life science and technology requires new leadership and a sober assessment of the legacy of Asilomar

Science

Volumn 350, Issue 6267, 2015, Pages 1471-1473

  Palmer, Megan J ^a   Fukuyama, Francis ^a   Relman, David A ^a,b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

RECOMBINANT DNA;

LEADERSHIP; RISK ASSESSMENT;

ARTICLE; BIOMEDICINE; BIOSAFETY; BIOTECHNOLOGY; HUMAN; LEADERSHIP; MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY; NUCLEAR ENERGY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RISK MANAGEMENT; SCIENTIST; UNITED STATES; BIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; PREVENTION AND CONTROL; PROCEDURES; RISK; SAFETY; TRENDS;

BIOHAZARD RELEASE; BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINES; BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY; HUMANS; RISK; SAFETY; SAFETY MANAGEMENT; SECURITY MEASURES; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84950276621     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: 10959203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.aad8849     Document Type: Article

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