RSA speedup with residue number system immune against hardware fault cryptanalysis

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2288, Issue , 2002, Pages 397-413

  Yen, Sung Ming ^a   Kim, Seungjoo ^b   Lim, Seongan ^b   Moon, Sangjae ^c  

^a NATIONAL CENTRAL UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b Korea Internet and Security Agency   (South Korea)

^c Kyungpook National University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Chinese remainder theorem (CRT); Cryptography; Factorization; Fault detection; Fault infective CRT; Fault tolerance; Hardware fault cryptanalysis; Physical cryptanalysis; Residue number system; Side channel attack

Indexed keywords

AUTHENTICATION; COMPUTATION THEORY; COMPUTER HARDWARE; CRYPTOGRAPHY; FACTORIZATION; FAULT DETECTION; FAULT TOLERANCE; HARDWARE; HARDWARE SECURITY; NUMBERING SYSTEMS; SECURITY OF DATA;

CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM; HARDWARE FAULTS; PARAMETER SETTING; PHYSICAL CRYPTANALYSIS; RESIDUE NUMBER SYSTEM; RSA SIGNATURES; RSA SYSTEMS; SECURE PROTOCOLS;

SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK;

EID: 84949936541     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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