Stealthy attacks and observable defenses: A game theoretic model under strict resource constraints

2014 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2014

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 813-817

  Zhang, Ming ^a   Zheng, Zizhan ^a   Shroff, Ness B ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Security games; Stealthy attacks

Indexed keywords

FLOW MEASUREMENT; INFORMATION SCIENCE; MOBILE SECURITY;

CYBER SECURITY; DEFENSE STRATEGY; FEEDBACK STRUCTURE; GAME-THEORETIC MODEL; NASH EQUILIBRIA; RESOURCE CONSTRAINT; SECURITY GAMES; STEALTHY ATTACKS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84949926542     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/GlobalSIP.2014.7032232     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (14)

1. Continuous knapsack problem. http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Continuous knapsack problem.
2. ESET and Sucuri Uncover Linux/Cdorked. A: The Most Sophisticated Apache Backdoor. http://www. eset. com/int/about/press/articles/article/ eset-and-sucuri-uncover-linuxcdorkeda-apache-webserver-backdoor-themost-sophisticated-ever-affecting-thousands-of-web-sites/, 2013.
3. A. Coviello. Open letter to RSA customers, March 17, 2011. http: //www. rsa. com/node. aspx?id=3872.
4. T. AlPCAn and T. Basar. Network Security: A Decision and Game-Theoretic Approach. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
5. B. An, M. Brown, Y. Vorobeychik, and M. Tambe. Security Games with Surveillance Cost and Optimal Timing of Attack Execution. In Proc. of AAMAS, 2013.
6. B. Bencsáth, G. Pék, L. Buttyán, and M. Félegyházi. The Cousins of Stuxnet: Duqu, Flame, and Gauss. Future Internet, 4:971-1003, 2012.
7. A. Gueye, V. Marbukh, and J. C. Walrand. Towards a Metric for Communication Network Vulnerability to Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach. In Proc. of Gamenets, 2012.
8. Kaspersky Lab. Flame. the latest cyber-attack. http://www. kaspersky. com/flame, 2012.
9. H. Kunreuther and G. Heal. Interdependent security. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26(2-3), 2003.
10. A. Laszka, G. Horvath, M. Felegyhazi, and L. Buttyán. Flipthem: Modeling targeted attacks with flipit for multiple resources. Technical report, http://www. crysys. hu/-laszka/papers/laszka2014flipthem. pdf, 2014.
11. A. Laszka, B. Johnson, and J. Grossklags. Mitigating Covert Compromises: A Game-Theoretic Model of Targeted and Non-Targeted Covert Attacks. In Proc. of WINE, 2013.
12. M. Tambe. Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
13. M. van Dijk, A. Juels, A. Oprea, and R. L. Rivest. FlipIt: The Game of "Stealthy Takeover". Journal of Cryptology, 26(4):655-713, 2013.
14. M. Zhang, Z. Zheng, and N. B. Shroff. Stealthy attacks and observable defenses: A game theoretic model under strict resource constraints. Tehnical Report, available online at http://www. cse. ohio-state. edu/-zhanming/StealthyAttackFullVersion. pdf.