Peer-to-Peer Crowdfunding: Information and the Potential for Disruption in Consumer Lending

Annual Review of Financial Economics

Volumn 7, Issue , 2015, Pages 463-482

  Morse, Adair ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Crowdfunding; Disintermediation; Marketplace finance; Peer to peer lending; Screening; Social finance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84949494169     PISSN: 19411367     EISSN: 19411375     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-financial-111914-041939     Document Type: Article

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