Constructive cryptography – a new paradigm for security definitions and proofs

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6993, Issue , 2015, Pages 33-56

  Maurer, Ueli ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION PROGRAMS; FORMAL METHODS; PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY;

AUTHENTICATED CHANNEL; CONSTRUCTIVE CRYPTOGRAPHIES; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCHEMES; DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEMES; KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL; MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES; PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION;

AUTHENTICATION;

EID: 84946414653     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-27375-9_3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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