Election cycles and electricity provision: Evidence from a quasi-experiment with Indian special elections

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 126, Issue , 2015, Pages 64-73

  Baskaran, Thushyanthan ^a   Min, Brian ^b   Uppal, Yogesh ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

D72; D78; Electoral cycles; Electricity supply; H44; H73; India; Night lights

Indexed keywords

EID: 84946158685     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.011     Document Type: Article

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