Family firms, soft information and bank lending in a financial crisis

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 33, Issue , 2015, Pages 279-292

  D'Aurizio, Leandro ^a   Oliviero, Tommaso ^b   Romano, Livio ^c  

^a Department of Economics and Finance Bank of Italy ^*  (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES FEDERICO II   (Italy)

^c Centro Studi Confindustria   (Italy)

Author keywords

Bank lending; D22; Family firms; Financial crisis; G21; G32; Soft information

Indexed keywords

EID: 84943820614     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.002     Document Type: Article

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