How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator

Consciousness and Cognition

Volumn 37, Issue , 2015, Pages 133-147

  Ataria, Yochai ^a   Dor Ziderman, Yair ^b   Berkovich Ohana, Aviva ^a,c  

^a WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (Israel)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

Author keywords

Mindfulness meditation; Neurophenomenology; Phenomenology; Sense of agency; Sense of boundaries; Sense of ownership

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CASE STUDY; CONSCIOUSNESS; CONTROLLED STUDY; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INTERVIEW; INTROSPECTION; MALE; MEDITATION; MENTAL FUNCTION; MIDDLE AGED; MINDFULNESS; NORMAL HUMAN; PHENOMENOLOGY; SENSE OF AGENCY; SENSE OF BOUNDARIES; SENSE OF CENTER; SENSE OF INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL; SENSE OF LOCATION; SENSE OF OWNERSHIP; SENSE OF SELF; SENSE OF TIME; BUDDHISM; CASE REPORT; CONTROL; EGO; ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM; ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY; MAGNETOENCEPHALOGRAPHY; NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; PHYSIOLOGY; PROPRIOCEPTION; PSYCHOLOGY; TOUCH;

BRAIN WAVES; BUDDHISM; CONSCIOUSNESS; EGO; ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY; HUMANS; INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL; MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; MAGNETOENCEPHALOGRAPHY; MALE; MEDITATION; MIDDLE AGED; MINDFULNESS; PROPRIOCEPTION; TOUCH PERCEPTION;

EID: 84941659149     PISSN: 10538100     EISSN: 10902376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.09.002     Document Type: Article

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