What makes us conscious of our own agency? And why the conscious versus unconscious representation distinction matters

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Volumn 8, Issue JUNE, 2014, Pages

  Carruthers, Glenn ^a  

^a MACQUARIE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Functionalism; Hard question; Self consciousness; Sense of agency (SoA); Vehicle theory

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ATTENTION; COGNITION; CONSCIOUSNESS; DELUSION; EGO DEVELOPMENT; EXPERIENCE; HUMAN; INTROSPECTION; MOTOR CONTROL; NONHUMAN; SCHIZOPHRENIA; SELF CONCEPT; SENSE OF AGENCY; SENSORY FEEDBACK; VERBAL BEHAVIOR; VISUAL DISCRIMINATION;

EID: 84940363625     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16625161     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00434     Document Type: Article

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