Néopatrimonialisme et développement : Le rôle de pilote des poches d'efficacité

Revue Internationale de Politique Comparee

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 79-96

  Hout, Wil ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940252130     PISSN: 13700731     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/ripc.203.0079     Document Type: Article

References (55)

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