Extending the Impacts of Hostile Media Perceptions: Influences on Discussion and Opinion Polarization in the Context of Climate Change

Science Communication

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 506-532

  Hart, P Sol ^a   Feldman, Lauren ^b   Leiserowitz, Anthony ^c   Maibach, Edward ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

climate change; environmental communication; hostile media perceptions; opinion polarization; science communication

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938544510     PISSN: 10755470     EISSN: 15528545     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1075547015592067     Document Type: Article

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