Improving air safety through organizational learning: Consequences of a technology-led model

Improving Air Safety Through Organizational Learning: Consequences of a Technology-Led Model

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-180

  Ballesteros, José Sánchez Alarcos ^a  

^a Quasar Aviation   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84937572382     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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