What drives households to buy flood insurance? New evidence from Georgia

Ecological Economics

Volumn 117, Issue , 2015, Pages 153-161

  Atreya, Ajita ^a   Ferreira, Susana ^b   Michel Kerjan, Erwann ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Disaster insurance; Floods; Georgia; NFIP; Race

Indexed keywords

AFRICAN AMERICAN; EDUCATION; FLOOD; FLOODPLAIN; HOUSEHOLD SURVEY; INSURANCE INDUSTRY; NATIONAL PLANNING; RESIDENT POPULATION; SPATIOTEMPORAL ANALYSIS;

GEORGIA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84936873127     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.06.024     Document Type: Article

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