Moral hazard in health insurance: Do dynamic incentives matter?

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 97, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 725-741

  Aron Dine, Aviva ^a   Einav, Liran ^b   Finkelstein, Amy ^c   Cullen, Mark ^b  

^a Office of Management and Budget   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929686846     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: 15309142     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00518     Document Type: Article

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