Getting the Government America Deserves: How Ethics Reform Can Make a Difference

Getting the Government America Deserves: How Ethics Reform Can Make a Difference

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-301

  Painter, Richard W ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Federal employees; Federal ethics law; Federal government; Interest groups; Lobbyists; Personal finance; Political activity; Systematic corruption

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929265440     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378719.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (169)

1. See LLOYD H. MEYER, What is this 'Lobbying' that We are so Worried About? YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW, Vol. 26, 2008. Available at SSRN.
2. See Stephen Kinzer OVERTHROW (2006).
3. See generally SCOTT M. CUTLIP, THE UNSEEN POWER: PUBLIC RELATIONS, A HISTORY (1994)
4. ROBERT HUGHES, Dismantling an Opulent Fossil, TIME, Monday February 12, 1979
5. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, The Road to Riches is Called K Street, WASHINGTON POST, June 22, 2005, at A1, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/21/AR2005062101632.html.
6. Center For Responsive Politics-Lobbyists www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists.
7. PETER H. STONE & BARA VAIDA, Good Times, Bad Times, NATIONAL JOURNAL, March 22, 2008 at 14.
8. See STEPHANIE KIRCHGAESSNER, "One Big Country Club" How a marketing business from Britain leads the field in Washington's power game, FINANCIAL TIMES, Tuesday November 27, 2007 at A-11.
9. For an account of how personal connections are used in a city where the personal and the professional are intertwined, see CHARLES PETERS, HOW WASHINGTON REALLY WORKS, Chapter 2 ("LOBBIES") (1993) (describing a "survival network" that includes both former government officials turned lobbyists and current government officials who know that someday they too may become lobbyists in order to keep a career in Washington after leaving office).
10. See ALAN K. OTA, Democratic Foot In Revolving Door, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, June 25, 2007. http://public.cq.com/docs/cqw/weeklyreport110-000002538605.html.
11. Center for Responsive Politics www.opensecrets.org/revolving/top.php?display=G.
12. See CHARLOTTE HAYS and JONATHAN ROWE, Reporters: The New Washington Elite, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, July 1, 1985
13. See MAUREEN ORTH, When Washington Was Fun. The grand hostesses are history, the president would rather be in bed, and there's a price tag on every evening these days. Who killed Washington society? Ask a few of the local experts, VANITY FAIR, December 2007.
14. BARBARA GAMAREKIAN, Washington Talk; Who's Who at Parties? (Nobody Is Just Nobody), NEW YORK TIMES, June 5, 1989.
15. See DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK, Congress Finds Ways to Avoid Lobbyist Limit, NEW YORK TIMES, February 11, 2007
16. See DONNA M. NAGY, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005)
17. See SUSAN SCHMIDT and JAMES V. GRIMALDI, Abramoff Pleads Guilty to 3 Counts; Lobbyist to Testify About Lawmakers In Corruption Probe, WASHINGTON POST, January 4, 2006 at A01.
18. See European Public Affairs Consultancies' Association Response to the Draft European Commission Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives, February 15, 2008, posted at: http://www.epaca.org/policy/documents/EPACA%20response%20to%20EC%20draft%20Code%20of%20Conduct_final.pdf.
19. See Government Accountability Office, Conversions of Employees, from Noncareer to Career Positions May 2001-April 2005 (May 1, 2006) (GAO-6-381) (investigating records surrounding 144 conversions and finding procedural irregularity in 18 of them).
20. See NINA A. MENDELSON, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. LAW REV. (2007)
21. Noreen Johnson, Reforming the Gift Rules as a Way to Better Government (paper on file with author).
22. William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1 (2003).
23. RICHARD L. HASEN, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1067 (2008).
24. See S. ISSACHAROFF and P. S. KARLAN, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1705 (1999).
25. http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.asp?ind=D&cycle=2008.
26. See DAVID M. HERZSENHORN, McCain Advisors Lobbied for Europeans to Win Air Force Tanker Deal, NEW YORK TIMES, March 12, 2008.
27. RICHARD L. HASEN, Political Equality, the Internet, and Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 THE FORUM, Issue 1, Article 7 (2008). Available at: http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol6/iss1/art7.
28. RONALD BROWNSTEIN, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: HOW EXTREME PARTISANSHIP HAS PARALYZED WASHINGTON AND POLARIZED AMERICA (2007).
29. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 Washington U. Law. Rev. No. 5 (2008).
30. DAN FROOMKIN, Abramoff's In the House, WASHINGTON POST, Thursday, November 1, 2007 (recounting testimony in House investigation).
31. See JOHN DANFORTH, FAITH AND POLITICS: HOW THE "MORAL VALUES" DEBATE DIVIDES AMERICA AND HOW TO MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER (2006).
32. See MICHAEL ISIKOFF, Challenging Cheney, an interview with ISOO Director William Leonard, NEWSWEEK, December 24, 2007
33. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN and AMOS TVERSKY, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, ECONOMETRICA, XLVII (1979), 263-291.
34. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1399 (June 2000).
35. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a Closing in Arthur Solmssen's The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 101 (2000).
36. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, Contracting Around Conflicts in a Family Business: Louis Brandeis and the Warren Trust, 9 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 1 (2001).
37. See TRACIEL V. REID, PAC Participation in North Carolina Supreme Court Elections, 80 JUDICATURE 21 (1996);
38. ROY A. SCHOTLAND, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 MICH, ST. U. DET. COLL. L. LAW REV. 849.
39. STEPHEN GILLERS, "If Elected, I Promise []"-What Should Judicial Candidates Be Allowed to Say? 35 IND. L. REV. 735 (2002).
40. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Justice for Sale: How Special-interest money threatens the integrity of our courts, WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 15, 2007.
41. For further discussion of New Institutional Economics, see RONALD COASE, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 229-31 (1984);
42. TERENCE W. HUTCHISON, Institutional Economics Old and New, 140 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 20, 20-29 (1984);
43. DOUGLAS C. NORTH, The New Institutional Economics, 142 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 230, 230-37 (1986);
44. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions Of Capitalism (New York 1985);
45. CHRISTIAN. KIRCHNER, Formen innerstaatlicher Interaktionsregeln für wirtschaftliche Prozesse, in KORFF, W. et al. (ed.), HANDBUCH DER WIRTSCHAFTSETHIK, Bd. 2, at 127-85 (1999);
46. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 6 (Ann Arbor 1997).
47. Andrew H. Card, Jr., White House Chief of Staff, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, January 6, 2004
48. See STEPHEN LABATON, Candidate to Lead Consumer Agency Withdraws, NEW YORK TIMES, May 24, 2007, at A-1
49. See generally, Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet? note 18 above at 63, 79
50. See Richard W. Painter, Ethics and Corruption in Business and Government: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble and the Bank of the United States (published by the University of Chicago Law School).
51. See ARTHUR LEVITT, Take on the Street (2001), discussed in the Introduction to this book.
52. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, The Dubious History and Psychology of Clubs as Self Regulatory Organizations in AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, Corporate Governance Symposium; republished in JAY LORSCH, LESLIE BERKOWITZ AND ANDY ZELLEKE, RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICA'S BUSINESS (MIT Press 2004).
53. See DAVID JOHNSTON AND DAVID M. HERSZENHORN, Senator Charged in Scheme to Hide Gift from Oil Firm, NEW YORK TIMES July 20, 2008 at A-1.
54. See ADAM NOSSITER AND DAVID M. HERSZENHORN, Mississippi's Lott to Leave Senate, NEW YORK TIMES, November 27, 2007.
55. See ELIZABETH DREW, Selling Washington, 52 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, No. 11, June 23, 2005
56. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, Democrats' Stock is Rising on K Street: Firms Anticipate a Shift in Power, WASHINGTON POST, August 17, 2006, at A-01.
57. See JEFF ZELENY, As Guard Changes in Congress, Lobbyists Scramble, NEW YORK TIMES, November 15, 2006 at A-1
58. There is no standard definition of an earmark. See Sandy Streeter, Earmarks and Limitations in Appropriations Bills, Congressional Research Service Report 98-518, December 7, 2004, http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-518.pdf.
59. See JAMES D. SAVAGE, FUNDING SCIENCE IN AMERICA: CONGRESS, UNIVERSITIES AND THE POLITICS OF THE ACADEMIC PORK BARREL, (1999)
60. John M.P. De Figueiredo and Brian S. Silverman, Academic Earmarks and the Return to Lobbying, MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4245-02 (2002)
61. See http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070717103004.pdf.
62. See THOMAS B. EDSALL, Lobbyists Emergence Reflects Shift in Capitol Culture, WASHINGTON POST, January 12, 2006 at A01.
63. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. LAW REVIEW 665 (2001).
64. See James Madison, Federalist No. 10 (1787)
65. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1840)
66. See Gary Becker, A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence, 98 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 371 (1983).
67. Jonathan R. Macey, "Some Causes and Consequences of the Bifurcated Treatment of Economic Rights and 'Other' Rights under the United States Constitution," in PAUL, E.F.; MILLER, F.D., JR.; and PAUL, J. (EDS.) ECONOMIC RIGHTS, 141-70. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press (1992).
68. For discussion of how think tanks should function to shape policy, see JAMES G. MCGANN and ERIK C. JOHNSON, COMPARATIVE THINK TANKS, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY, (Edward Elgar Pub, 2006).
69. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1840)
70. This trend was well underway in the early 1980s and has expanded since then. See KAREN O'CONNOR and LEE EPSTEIN, The Rise of Conservative Interest Group Litigation, 45 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 479 (1983).
71. For a positive portrayal of these groups, see LEE EDWARDS, BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE: THE STORY OF THE FREEDOM BASED PUBLIC LAW MOVEMENT (2004).
72. See generally KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING AND PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA at 1 (1999).
73. See PHILIP SHENON, U.S. Says Hussein Spy Agency and Iraqi-American Arranged'02 Trip by Lawmakers, NEW YORK TIMES, March 27, 2008.
74. See Top Clinton Aide Leaving His Post Under Pressure, NEW YORK TIMES, April 7, 2008.
75. http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070601-Fri.html;
76. Stephen Jen, How Big Could Sovereign Wealth Funds be by 2015?, MS Global Economic Forum, May 4, 2007, http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070504-Fri.html.
77. See JOHN MEARSHEIMER AND STEPHEN WALT, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND US FOREIGN POLICY (2006).
78. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL (2003).
79. See VICTORIA CLARK, ALLIES FOR ARMAGEDDON: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN ZIONISM (2007).
80. www.jstreet.org.
81. GAINES M. FOSTER, MORAL RECONSTRUCTION: CHRISTIAN LOBBYISTS AND THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF MORALITY, 1865-1920 (2002).
82. Joseph Cook's Censorship; The Boston Preacher Explaining the Signs of the Time, NEW YORK TIMES, December 20, 1882.
83. Foster, above at 3.
84. For a detailed discussion of these groups, see MATT GROSSMANN. THE ORGANIZED REPRESENTATION OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS GROUPS: RELIGIOUS MOBILIZATION OR INTEREST GROUP POLITICS? (2005).
85. http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/president-initiative.html.
86. See BRANDON WU, PAYING TO POLLUTE: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND LOBBYING EXPENDITURES BY POLLUTERS WORKING TO WEAKEN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS, US PIRG Education Fund (April 2004) at 5.
87. http://www.dol-union-reports.gov.
88. See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN: THE MCCLELLAN COMMITTEE'S CRUSADE AGAINST JIMMY HOFFA AND CORRUPT LABOR UNIONS (1960).
89. JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS: THE MAFIA AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 238 (2006)
90. See CLYDE SUMMERS, Union Trusteeships & Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 689 (1991).
91. Drowning in Special-Interest Money, Editorial, NEW YORK TIMES, January 2, 2008 at page A18, citing an analysis of 527s by the Wall Street Journal.
92. http://publicintegrity.org/527/db.aspx?act=main
93. LESLIE WAYNE, Clinton Aide's Private Databank Venture Breaks Ground in Politicking, NEW YORK TIMES, April 12, 2008 at A12.
94. See JILL ABRAMSON, The Religious Right v. John McCain, NEW YORK TIMES, March 5, 2000
95. For one of many examples of this phenomenon, see RICHARD W. PAINTER, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1 (1998)
96. An Ethics Guide for Consultants and Advisory Committee Members at the Department of Defense, http://www.DOD.mil/DODgc/defense_ethics/resource:library/SGE_REVIEW_GUIDE_2006.doc.
97. DAVID BARSTOW, Pentagon Suspends Briefings for Analysts, NEW YORK TIMES, April 26, 2008 at A-11.
98. THOM SHANKER AND STEVEN LEE MYERS, U.S. Asking Iraq for Wide Rights on War, NEW YORK TIMES, January 25, 2008.
99. See US House of Rep. Comm. On Gov't Reform-Minority Staff Special Investigations Div., Dollars, Not Sense: Government Contracting under the Bush Administration 6 (2006).
100. See Government Accountability Office (GAO), Defense Contracting: Additional Personal Conflict of Interest Safeguards Needed for Certain DOD Contractor Employees (March 2008).
101. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, in 1960-1961 Public Papers, paragraph 421, page 1035, 1038 (January 17, 1961).
102. Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org.
103. See JON D. MICHAELS, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY 1001. 1127 (2004).
104. Alexander Volokh, Privatization, Free Riding, and Industry-Expanding Lobbying, Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 969789, May 8, 2007;
105. ALEXANDER VOLOKH, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197 (2008)
106. Volokh, Privatization, Free Riding, at 4.
107. Volokh, Privatization 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, n. 104.
108. See HOLLY BAILEY, White House Staffers Accepted $130,000 in free trips, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 2006 (detailing trips by Karl Rove, Barry Jackson, Tim Goeglein, and others).
109. BAYLESS MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW, Harvard University Press (1964) p. 75.
110. OGE, Report to Congress: Evaluating the Financial Disclosure Process for Employees of the Executive Branch, and Recommending Improvements to It (March 2005) at 2, citing Senate Report No. 95-170, at 21-22, reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 4237-4238.
111. OGE, Report to Congress above, note 59.
112. OGE, Letter to a Designated Agency Ethics Official (March 17, 1992).
113. Stephen Labaton, Democrats Want Change at the SEC, NEW YORK TIMES, October 10, 2002
114. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
115. Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Official From Enron in Hot Seat, WASHINGTON POST, January 27 2002, at A8
116. ERIC PIANIN, Official's Lobbying Ties Decried: Interior's Griles Defends Meetings as Social, Informational, WASHINGTON POST, September 25, 2002, at A1
117. See Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Taking Our Government Back, Manchester, NH, June 22, 2007
118. See generally HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005);
119. SAIKRISHNA PRAKASH, Regulating Presidential Power, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2005) (book review of same).
120. For the legal documentation of this arrangement see http://www.factcheck.org/UploadedFiles/Cheney_Gift_Trust_Agreement.pdf.
121. See CCH Federal Ethics Report, Vol. 14, Issue 6, June 2007.
122. See TAMAR FRANKEL, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983).
123. ADOLF BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
124. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J. CORP. LAW 737 (2001)
125. MICHAEL JENSEN AND WILLIAM MECKLING, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS, AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, Vol.3, No. 4 (1976).
126. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD (2006)
127. KATHLEEN CLARK, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57 (1996).
128. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
129. See Issacharoff and Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, above note 11.
130. LOUIS KAPLOW, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
131. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995);
132. RUSSELL B. KOROBKIN, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 27-28 (2000);
133. THOMAS W. MERRILL, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807 (2002).
134. See Christine Hurt, The Under-Civilization of Corporate Law 33 J. CORP. L 361 (2008).
135. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 Washington U. Law. Rev. No. 5 (2008).
136. DAN FROOMKIN, Abramoff's In the House, WASHINGTON POST, Thursday, November 1, 2007
137. See JOHN DANFORTH, FAITH AND POLITICS: HOW THE "MORAL VALUES" DEBATE DIVIDES AMERICA AND HOW TO MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER (2006).
138. See MICHAEL ISIKOFF, Challenging Cheney, an interview with ISOO Director William Leonard, NEWSWEEK, December 24, 2007
139. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN and AMOS TVERSKY, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, ECONOMETRICA, XLVII (1979), 263-291.
140. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1399 (June 2000).
141. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a Closing in Arthur Solmssen's The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 101 (2000).
142. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, Contracting Around Conflicts in a Family Business: Louis Brandeis and the Warren Trust, 9 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 1 (2001).
143. See TRACIEL V. REID, PAC Participation in North Carolina Supreme Court Elections, 80 JUDICATURE 21 (1996);
144. ROY A. SCHOTLAND, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 MICH, ST. U. DET. COLL. L. LAW REV. 849.
145. STEPHEN GILLERS, "If Elected, I Promise []"-What Should Judicial Candidates Be Allowed to Say? 35 IND. L. REV. 735 (2002).
146. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Justice for Sale: How Special-interest money threatens the integrity of our courts, WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 15, 2007.
147. RICHARD W. PAINTER, ETHICS AND CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT: LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
148. See "Guilty Plea Entered by Ex-FBI Agent," AP, June 24, 2005.
149. See Rich Allen, US Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service, Safeguarding America's Agricultural Statistics: A Century of Successful and Secure Procedures, 1905-2005 (2007).
150. See BRODY MULLINS, Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading by Lawmakers and Their Aids, WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 28, 2006.
151. STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, Insiders on the Hill, TCS DAILY, March 30, 2006, posted at http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=033006D.
152. See JOSEPH J. KALO, Deterring Misuse of Confidential Government Information: A Proposed Citizens' Action, 72 MICHIGAN LAW REV. 1577 (1974).
153. A. ZIOBROWSKI, P. CHENG, J. W. BOYD, and B.J. ZIOBROWSKI, Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of Members of the United States Senate, 39 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661 (2004).
154. See FLOYD NORRIS, What did Bill Frist Know and How? NEW YORK TIMES, September 28, 2005
155. See ROGER C. CRAMTON, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991).
156. See STEVEN K. BERENSON, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest? 41 B.C. L. REV. 789 (2000).
157. See GEOFFREY P. MILLER, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1987)
158. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, Washington U. Law. Rev. (2008)
159. Note: Government Counsel and Their Obligations, 121 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1409 (2008)
160. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION at 10 (2007).
161. STEPHEN GILLERS, The Torture Memo, THE NATION, April 28, 2008.
162. KATHLEEN CLARK, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. LAW & POL'Y 455 (2005).
163. See NANCY BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 1789-1990
164. Randolph Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 Adm. L. R. 1303, 1309 (2000)
165. JOHN MCGINNIS, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: a Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 434 (1993)
166. HAROLD HONGJU, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself. 15 CARDOZO LAW REV, 513 (1993).
167. Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (2004), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/2004%20programs_OLC%20principles_white%20paper.pdf.
168. BRUCE A. GREEN, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created? 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996).
169. See Report of the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General, July 28, 2008, posted at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf