Crisis-driven regulatory reform: Where in the world is the EU going?

The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-110

  Ferran, Eilís ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928071932     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139175821.002     Document Type: Chapter

References (391)

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2. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (also known as the “Dodd-Frank Act”). See further, J.C. Coffee, Jr., Chapter 4 below.
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4. Mattli and Woods, “In Whose Benefit?,” p. 39.
5. OECD, The Financial Crisis: Reform and Exit Strategies (Paris: OECD, 2009), p. 22.
6. Favoring incremental regulatory adjustments over sweeping regulatory revolution: L.A. Cunningham and D.T. Zaring, “The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response,” George Washington Law Review, 78 (2009), 39-113.
7. R. Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,” Yale Law Journal, 114 (2005), 1521-611, 1523-4; S.M. Bainbridge, “Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II,” Minnesota Law Review, 95 (2011), 1779-821.
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10. Group of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability (Washington DC: G30, 2009), p. 8.
11. J.B. Taylor, “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong,” in A. Turner, A. Haldane, P. Woolley, S. Wadhwani, C. Goodhart, A. Smithers, A. Large, J. Kay, M. Wolf, P. Boone, S. Johnson and R. Layard, The Future of Finance (London: LSE, 2010), pp. 145-63.
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17. European Commission, White Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-2010 (COM(2005) 629), p. 4.
18. European Commission, Driving European Recovery (COM(2009) 114); European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth (COM(2010) 301).
19. J. Faull, Some Legal Challenges of Financial Regulation in the EU (Slynn Foundation, 2011, online: www.slynn-foundation.org/UserFiles/File/Slynn%20Lecture.pdf).
20. European Commission, Reinforcing Sanctioning Regimes in the Financial Services Sector (COM(2010) 716). The proposal for the introduction of a Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse violations marks a significant step forward in this regard: European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (COM(2011) 654).
21. European Commission, An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector (COM(2010) 579); European Commission, Proposal for a Directive Establishing a framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Financial Firms (COM (2012) 280) (Recovery and Resolution Directive (proposed)). Crisis management proposals are discussed further in Parts II-IV below.
22. Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (ESMA Regulation), [2010] OJ L331/84.
23. Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies, [2009] OJ L302/1 (CRA Regulation) (amended by Regulation (EU) No. 513/2011, [2011] OJ L145/30).
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28. “The creation of an integrated European financial market” has been “primarily to the benefit of a new European ‘champions league’ of financial services providers”: D. Miigge, “Reordering the Marketplace: Competition Politics in European Finance,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 44 (2006), 991-1022, 992.
29. A. Demirguc-Kunt and H. Huizinga, “Are Banks Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? International Evidence from Equity Prices and CDs Spreads,” Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. DP7903 (2010)
30. European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, p. 2.
31. Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper, p. 3.
32. E.H.G. Hüpkes, “‘Too Big to Save’ – Towards a Functional Approach to Resolving Crises in Global Financial Institutions,” in D.D. Evanoff and G.G. Kaufman (eds.), Systemic Financial Crisis: Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Publishing, 2005), pp. 193–215.
33. M. Barnier, “Mettre les Marches Financiers au Service de l’economie Reelle” (speech, June 11, 2011, online: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/449&format=HTML&aged=0&language=FR&guiLanguage=fr). A. Turner, “What Do Banks Do? Why Do Credit Booms and Busts Occur and What Can Public Policy Do About It?” in Turner etal., The Future of Finance, pp. 5-86.
34. European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, p. 3.
35. Flagging up the need for the EU policy framework to leave scope for supervisors to make informed judgments: Bank of England and FSA, The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority: Our Approach to Banking Supervision (London: Bank of England & FSA, 2011), p. 20.
36. H. McVea, “The EU Financial Services Action Plan and Its Impact on Corporate Finance,” in D. Prentice and A. Reisberg (eds.), Corporate Finance Law in the UK and EU (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 393-428, p. 426.
37. Faull, Some Legal Challenges.
38. IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Stress and Deleveraging - Macrofinancial Implications and Policy (Washington DC: IMF, October 2008), p. xi.
39. C. Lapavitsas, A. Kaltenbrunner, D. Lindo, J. Michell, J.P. Painceira, E. Pires, J. Powell, A. Stenfors and N. Teles, “Eurozone Crisis: Beggar Thyself and Thy Neighbour,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 12 (2010), 321-73.
40. V.V. Acharya, I. Drechsler and P. Schnabl, “A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk” (August 2011, online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865465).
41. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies (COM(2011) 747); European Commission, Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2009/65/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Funds Managers in respect of the excessive reliance on credit ratings (COM(2011) 746).
42. A temporary European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) were established in May 2010. A new permanent crisis mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was established by treaty to commence originally in mid-2013, but subsequently brought forward to mid-2012.
43. This “six pack” of measures comprises a Regulation on the surveillance of Member States’ budgetary and economic policies (Regulation (EU) No. 1175/20111, [2011] OJ L306/12).
44. A. Merkel and N. Sarkozy, “Letter to President van Rompuy,” (December 7, 2011, online: www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank_objects/111207Lettre_adressee_a_M_Herman_Van_Rompuy.pdf); European Council, Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government (December 9, 2011).
45. J.-C. Juncker and G. Tremonti, “Euro-wide Bonds Would Help to End the Crisis,” Financial Times, December 6, 2010, 13.
46. J.-C. Trichet, “Building Europe, Building Institutions” (speech, June 2, 2011, online: www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110602.en.html).
47. B. Eichengreen, “The Breakup of the Euro Area” in A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi (eds.), Europe and the Euro (University of Chicago Press, 2010) pp. 11-51.
48. C. Giles and G. Parker, “Osborne Warns Eurozone Leaders To ‘Get A Grip’ On Crisis,” Financial Times, July 21, 2011, 4.
49. European Council, Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government (December 9, 2011).
50. A. Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Inter- governmentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1993), 473-524; A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (London: UCL Press, 1998).
51. M. Cini, “Intergovernmentalism” in M. Cini and N. Perez-Solorzano Borragan (eds.), European Union Politics (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn., 2010) pp. 86-103.
52. A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn. 2009).
53. P.A. Hall and D. Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism” in P.A. Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-68.
54. B. Hancke, “Introducing the Debate” in B. Hancke (ed.), Debating Varieties of Capitalism: A Reader (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 1-20, p. 5.
55. Hall and Soskice, “An Introduction.”
56. J. Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth: Finance and the Politics of Industrial Change (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983); F. Allen and D. Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
57. I. Hardie and D. Howarth, “What Varieties of Financial Capitalism? The Financial Crisis and the Move to ‘Market-Based Banking’ in the UK, Germany and France” (PSI, 2010); H. Macartney, Variegated Neoliberalism: EU Varieties of Capitalism and International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 6-9.
58. European Commission, European Financial Integration Report 2007 (SEC(2007) 1696) and London Economics, The Importance of Wholesale Financial Services to the EU Economy 2008 (City of London, July 2008).
59. I. Hardie and D. Howarth, “Die Krise but not La Crise? The Financial Crisis and the Transformation of German and French Banking System,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 47 (2009), 1017-1039; Hardie and Howarth, “What Varieties of Financial Capitalism?”
60. On the growth of investment funds, especially in France: Association Francaise de la Gestion Financiere, The French Asset Management Industry (online: July 2010, www.afg. asso.fr/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc).
61. P.A. Hall, “The Evolution of Varieties of Capitalism in Europe” in B. Hancke, M. Rhodes and M. Thatcher (eds.), Beyond Varieties of Capitalism - Conflict, Contractions and Complementarities in the European Economy (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 39-85.
62. P.A. Hall and K. Thelen, “Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism,” Socio-Economic Review, 7(1) (2009), 7-34.
63. Hall, “The Evolution.”
64. E. Grossman and P. Leblond, “European Financial Integration: Finally the Great Leap Forward?,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 49 (2011) (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 105-60.
65. P.D. Culpepper, “Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Co-ordinated Financial Systems Since 1990,” World Politics, 57 (2005), 173-99.
66. B. Hancke, “Revisiting the French Model: Coordination and Restructuring in French Industry” in Hancke, Rhodes and Thatcher (eds.), Beyond Varieties of Capitalism, pp. 195-219.
67. Macartney, “Variegated Neo-liberalism: Transnationally Oriented Fractions of Capital.”
68. Hall and Soskice, “An Introduction,” p. 52.
69. J. Story and I. Walter, Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems (Manchester University Press, 1997).
70. Grossman and Leblond, “European Financial Integration.”
71. C. Goodhart, P. Hartmann, D. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez and S. Weisbrod, Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 173-81.
72. A public-choice perspective, p. 177.
73. J.R. Macey, “The ‘Demand’ for International Regulatory Cooperation: A Public-Choice Perspective” in G.A. Bermann, M. Herdegen and P.L. Lindseth, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 147-65, p. 152.
74. P. Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,” Comparative Political Studies, 29 (1996), 123-63
75. W. Sandholtz, “Choosing Union: Monetary Policies and Maastricht,” International Organisation, 43 (1993), 1-39.
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77. S. Steinmo, “The New Institutionalism” in P.B. Clark and J. Foweraker (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought (London: Routledge, 2001).
78. M.A. Pollack, “The New Institutionalisms and European Integration” in Wiener and Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory, pp. 125-144.
79. HM Treasury, FSA and Bank of England, Supervising Financial Services in an Integrated European Single Market: A Discussion Paper (London: HM Treasury, FSA and Bank of England, January 2005), p. 6.
80. A. Turner, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (London: FSA, March 2009), p. 102.
81. European Commission, White Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-2010, p. 14.
82. European Commission, Green Paper on the Enhancement of the EU Framework for Investment Funds (COM(2005) 314); European Commission, White Paper on Enhancing the Single Market Framework for Investment Funds (COM(2006) 686).
83. European Commission, Communication on Credit Rating Agencies (2006/C59/02), [2006] OJ C59/2.
84. Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE), European Association of Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (EACH) and European Central Securities Depositories Association (ECSDA), European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement (Brussels: European Commission, November 2006).
85. The UK’s supposedly “light-touch” approach was itself a somewhat exaggerated simplification, Journal of european public policy 31: 455-488.
86. “The eu and financial regulation: Power without purpose?,” E. Posner, journal of european public policy, 17 (2010), 400-15.
87. S. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
88. L. Quaglia, “Completing the Single Market in Financial Services: The Politics of Competing Advocacy Coalitions,” Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (2010), 1007-22.
89. “Europeanization” is a term that can be understood in a variety of ways, but the interpretation adopted here is that it means “the various ways in which institutions, processes and policies emanating from the European level influence policies, politics and polities at the domestic level”: T.A. Borzel and T. Risse, “Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union Politics” in Jorgensen, Pollack and Rosamond (eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics, pp. 483-504.
90. Bank of England and FSA, Joint Implementation Plan for MiFID (London: Bank of England & FSA, 2006) p. 6. Ending gold-plating now represents general UK government policy: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Guiding Principles for EU Legislation (London: BIS, 2010).
91. Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, p. 1014.
92. Buckley and Howarth, “Internal Market: Gesture Politics?”; Macartney, “Variegated Neoliberalism: Transnationally Oriented Fractions of Capital in EU Financial Market Integration.” Generally on the role of private actors in shaping financial regulation: G.R.D. Underhill and X. Zhang, “Setting the Rules: Private Power, Political Underpinnings, and Legitimacy in Global Monetary and Financial Governance,” International Affairs, 84 (2008), 535-54.
93. Grossman and Leblond, “European Financial Integration.”
94. — 2004/39/EC, [2004] OJ L145/1.
95. N. Aubry and M. McKee, “MiFID: Where Did It Come From, Where Is It Taking Us?,” Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 22 (2007), 177-186 (Germany tended to be somewhere in the middle with its own specific issues, which meant that it tended to be a “swing vote” within the Council on some issues).
96. Buckley and Howarth, “Internal Market: Gesture Politics?,” 127.
97. E. Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 120-1
98. Transnationally Oriented Fractions of Capital in EU Financial Market Integration, p. 90.
99. Macartney, “Variegated Neo-Liberalism: Transnationally Oriented Fractions of Capital in EU Financial Market Integration.”
100. L. Quaglia, E. Posner, “Is a European Approach to Financial Regulation Emerging from the Crisis?” in E. Helleiner, S. Pagliari and H. Zimmermann (eds.), Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 108-20.
101. CRA Regulation (as amended); EMIR (market infrastructure).
102. B. Hall, Q. Peel and N. Tait, “US, Germany and France Turn on Rating Agencies,” Financial Times, May 7, 2010, 8.
103. Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers [2011] OJ L174/1 (AIFMD). Analysed in detail in E. Ferran, “After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU,” European Business Organization Law Review, 12 (2011), 379-414.
104. Analyzed in detail in E. Ferran, “New Regulation of Remuneration in the Financial Sector in the EU,” European Company and Financial Law Review, (2012), 1-34.
105. Ferran, “After the Crisis”.
106. H. Plumridge, “Hedge Funds Win Big in Brussels,” The Wall Street Journal Online, October 20, 2010.
107. European Commission, Impact Assessment (SEC(2009) 576), pp. 12-13.
108. Zimmermann, “Varieties of Global Financial Governance,” pp. 129-131.
109. Buckley and Howarth, “Internal Market: Gesture Politics?”
110. A. Turner, “Speech at the City of London Corporation’s Annual Reception for the City Office” (October 6, 2009, online: www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/1006_at.shtml).
111. Conservative Party, From Crisis to Confidence: Plan for Sound Banking (London: Conservative Party, 2009), p. 39.
112. Annexed Declarations, pp. 100-104.
113. TFEU, art. 2(2); Lisbon Treaty, Annexed Declarations, Declaration 17.
114. Turner, The Turner Review, pp. 100-102.
115. L.W. Pauly, “The Old and the New Politics of International Financial Stability,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 47 (2009), 955-75, 970.
116. G. Osborne, “Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London” June 15, 2011, online: www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_58_11.htm.
117. P.-H. Verdier, “Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits,” Yale Journal of International Law, 34 (2009), 113-172.
118. H. Sants, “UK Financial Regulation: After the Crisis” (speech, March 12, 2010, online: www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2010/0312_hs.shtml)
119. M. Hoban, “Speech at Reform” (December 1, 2010, online: www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/speech_fst_011210.htm).
120. European Commission, State Aid: Overview of National Rescue Measures and Deposit Guarantee Schemes (MEMO/08/619, October 14, 2008).
121. ECOFIN, Council Conclusions on Immediate Responses to Financial Turmoil (13930/08, October 7, 2008).
122. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (COM(2010) 482), p. 2.
123. Buckley and Howarth, “Internal Market: Gesture Politics?.”
124. HM Treasury and FSA, Reforming OTC Derivative Markets: A UK Perspective (London: HM Treasury and FSA, December 2009).
125. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (COM(2010) 484).
126. J. Grant, “EC Official Urges OTC Derivatives Reform,” Financial Times, March 1, 2011 (online: ft.com).
127. EMIR, art. 7.
128. EMIR, art. 8.
129. J. Grant, “Quick View: UK Gets Best of Compromise on EMIR,” Financial Times, October 4, 2011 (online: ft.com).
130. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling.
131. The General Approach text adopted by ECOFIN (May 17, 2011) reflected this view.
132. ECON, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (A7-0055/2011, Rapporteur: Pascal Canfin).
133. Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps [2012] OJ L(86/1).
134. Annexed Declarations., art. 14(2).
135. H. Ebrahimi, “Blow to UK as EU Bans Sovereign CDS,” The Daily Telegraph, October 19, 2011, 1.
136. ISDA, Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A - Update (July 25, 2011, online: www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/isda-greek-sovereign-debt-qanda-update/).
137. Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), Interim Report: Consultation on Reform Options (London: ICB, April 2011); ICB, Final Report: Recommendations (London: ICB, September 2011).
138. EBA Recommendation on the Creation and Supervisory Oversight of Temporary Capital Buffers to Restore Market Confidence (EBA/REC/2011/1).
139. P. Jenkins, “SocGen Rules Out Basel Rights Issue,” Financial Times, November 4, 2010, 19.
140. J. de Larosiere, “Don’t Punish the Banks that Performed Best,” Financial Times, March 4, 2011, 9.
141. But the merits of structural reform are gaining ground in Switzerland, a country that, like the UK, has a small number of super-size banks. The rogue trading scandal that hit UBS in September 2011 and which could cost it up to $2.3bn has galvanized the Swiss debate.
142. Attributing Continental European mistrust of capital markets to the Mississippi Bubble of the early eighteenth century: Allen and Gale, Comparing Financial Systems, p. 310.
143. J. Lynton Jones, “Big Bang and the Stock Exchange,” Company Lawyer, 7 (1986), 99-103.
144. Breaking up the banks (i.e. establishing a clear separation between low-risk retail banking and high-risk investment banking) was included in the manifesto of the Liberal Democrat Party (Lib Dems) for the 2010 election.
145. ICB, Interim Report, pp. 27-49.
146. Interesting captive slogan, but notes that it does not respond to a precise legal definition, p. 22.
147. Proposal for a Regulation on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, pp. 23-24.
148. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms (COM(2011) 452), pp. 10-11.
149. E. Wymeersch, “Europe’s New Financial Regulatory Bodies,” Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 11 (2011) 443-462, 453-454 describes the European rulebook as an “interesting captive slogan,” but notes that it does not respond to a precise legal definition.
150. Faull, Some Legal Challenges.
151. European Commission, The ECOFIN general approach on CRD IV Regulation (proposed) and CRD IV Directive (proposed) was agreed May 15, 2012.
152. The significance of path dependencies in national corporate governance systems is well known: L.A. Bebchuk and M.J. Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership,” Stanford Law Review, 52 (1999), 127-70.
153. This example is taken from K.J. Hopt, “Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation,” American Journal of Comparative Law, 59 (2011), 1-73, 18.
154. P.O. Miilbert, “Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis - Theory, Evidence, Reforms,” ECGI Law Working Paper No. 130/2009 (April 2010, online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448118).
155. M. Barnier, “Repenser le Droit des Societes” (speech, May 16, 2011, online: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/barnier/docs/speeches/20110516/s11_fr.pdf).
156. European Commission, The EU Corporate Governance Framework (COM(2011) 164).
157. European Commission, Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies (COM(2010) 284).
158. Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 on European Union Macro-prudential Oversight of the Financial System and Establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, [2010] OJ L331/1 (ESRB Regulation). 521-533.
159. ESMA Regulation, arts. 17-20.
160. The framework for the operation of cross-border supervision has been reinforced: Directive 2009/111/EC amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, [2009] L302/97 (CRD II).
161. CRD IV Directive (proposed), arts. 7-8.
162. ESMA Regulation, art. 38.
163. Buckley and Howarth, “Internal Market: Gesture Politics?,” 127.
164. One reason for the ECB figuring prominently in banking union proposals as the potential bank supervisor is that this possibility is already envisaged by TFEU, art. 127(b), putting the ECB outside the constitutional restrictions that apply to the ESAs.
165. Regulation (EU) No. 513/2011, amending the CRA Regulation.
166. Regulation (EU) No. 513/2011, rec. 22.
167. EMIR, arts. 55-74.
168. EMIR, art. 25.
169. EMIR, art. 5.
170. EMIR, arts. 17-21.
171. Short Selling Regulation, art. 27.
172. Short Selling Regulation, art. 28.
173. European Commission, Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) (Public Consultation, December 8, 2010), pp. 12-13.
174. MiFIR, art. 31.
175. Ferran, “Understanding the Institutional Architecture.”
176. ESMA Regulation, arts. 40-44.
177. ESMA Regulation, arts. 62-66.
178. ESMA Regulation, art. 3.
179. ESMA Regulation, art. 81.
180. Wymeersch, “Europe’s New Financial Regulatory Bodies.”
181. ESMA Regulation, art. 48. 190 ESMA Regulation, art. 51.
182. ESMA Regulation, arts. 1, 42, 46, 49 and 52.
183. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on OTC Derivatives, p. 11.
184. L. Cunningham, “A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of ‘Principles-Based Systems’ in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting,” Vanderbilt Law Review, 60 (2007), 1411-93.
185. Intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, March 2, 2012.
186. Quaglia, “Completing the Single Market in Financial Services.”
187. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, March 23/24, 2000.
188. European Commission. Communication concerning the review of Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee schemes (COM(2006) 729).
189. European Commission (COM(2006) 729), p. 3.
190. European Parliament, Resolution on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (T6-0626/2007).
191. W. Miinchau, “Like a Fish, Europe is Rotting from the Head,” Financial Times, May 11, 2009, 9; T. Barber, “In EU Game of Poker Barroso is Player 0thers Allow to Stay In,” Financial Times, May 29, 2009, 2.
192. Member States’ interventions are summarized in European Commission, State Aid: Overview of National Rescue Measures and Deposit Guarantee Schemes (MEM0/08/619, October 14, 2008).
193. Quaglia, Governing Financial Services in the European Union, p. 160.
194. Editorial Comments, “Weathering Through the Credit Crisis: Is the Community Equipped to Cope with It?,” Common Market Law Review, 46 (2009), 3-12, 12. Also Editorial Comments, “From Rescue to Restructuring: The Role of State Aid Control for the Financial Sector,” Common Market Law Review, 47 (2010), 313-18.
195. TEU, art. 17. 206 COM(2009) 114. 207 COM(2009) 252.
196. Namely, rating agencies, capital adequacy, deposit guarantees and accounting rules.
197. European Commission, Driving European Recovery, p. 3. See further Part V below.
198. European Commission, From Financial Crisis to Recovery: A European Framework for Action (C0M(2008) 706) was the Commission’s early contribution to the debate.
199. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, March 13/14, 2008, “An Ever Mighty European Council - Some Recent Institutional Developments,” Common Market Law Review, 46 (2009), 1383-93.
200. J. Pisani-Ferry and A. Sapir, “Banking Crisis Management in the EU: An Interim Assessment,” Bruegel Working Paper No. 359 (December 2009, online: www.bruegel.org/download/parent/359-banking-crisis-management-in-the-eu-an-interim-assessment/file/835-banking-crisis-management-in-the-eu-an-interim-assessment-english/).
201. Moloney, “EU Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis,” 1336-1337.
202. European Commission, An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (COM(2009) 561), p. 13.
203. ECOFIN, February 12, 2008; Immediate Responses to Financial Turmoil (13930/08), adopted ECOFIN, October 7, 2008.
204. European Parliament, Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on Lamfa-lussy Follow-up: Future Structure of Supervision (T6-0476/2008).
205. European Commission, Driving European Recovery, p. 19.
206. European Commission, “Commission Proposes Revision of Bank Capital Requirements Rules to Reinforce Financial Stability” (Press Release, October 1, 2008).
207. Nugent, The European Commission, p. 214.
208. TFEU, art. 134. The Economic and Financial Committee’s webpage explains its role: http://europa.eu/efc/index_en.htm.
209. European Commission, From Financial Crisis to Recovery, p. 4.
210. The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report (Brussels: February 2009) (de Larosiere Report).
211. ECOFIN, Main Results of the Council (16231/1/08, December 2, 2008).
212. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 18/19 2009 (11225/2/09), p. 7.
213. EU “led the way” with respect to reforms on remuneration, but even there the Commission’s policy owed much to the work already done at national level in certain Member States: Ferran, “New Regulation.”
214. Generally on the proportion of Commission proposals that are amended before adoption: Nugent, The European Commission, pp. 259-260.
215. The Commission has summarized progress: European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth; European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth - Progress Report (February 2011).
216. Directive 2009/14/EC, [2009] OJ L68/3, making emergency repairs to the deposit guarantee framework.
217. “EU Financial Market Regulation After the Financial Crisis,” 1339-1340 (highlighting short consultation periods).
218. Highlighting short consultation periods, 1338-1339.
219. Utilising European Parliament Rules of Procedure for the postponement of votes (Rule 57.2).
220. M. Barnier, “Rapport d’Etape sur la Mise en Oeuvre de la Reglementation Financiere” (speech, November 22, 2011, online: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/bar- nier/docs/speeches/20111122/speech_fr.pdf).
221. N. Veron and M. Goldstein, “The European Union Should Start a Debate on Too-big- to-fail,” VOX, April 14, 2011 (online: www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6346).
222. P.O. Miilbert and A. Wilhelm, “Reforms of EU Banking and Securities Regulation after the Financial Crisis,” Banking & Finance Law Review, 26 (2011), 187-232, 230.
223. M. Goldstein and N. Veron, “Too Big to Fail: The Transatlantic Debate,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 11-2, January 2011.
224. M.S. Barr and G.P. Miller, “Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel,” European Journal of International Law, 15 (2006), 15-46.
225. One factor is that nine EU Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) are members of the Basel Committee, giving rise to a particularly strong need for EU obligations to dovetail with international commitments.
226. G. Bertezzolo, “The European Union Facing the Global Arena: Standard-setting Bodies and Financial Regulation,” European Law Review, 34 (2009), 257-280.
227. L. Ng, “Changes to Basel II and the EU Capital Requirements Directive: Implications for Securitisation,” Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 25 (2010), 265-74.
228. IMF, United Kingdom: 2011 Article IV Consultation (IMF Country Report No. 11/225, July 2011), supplementary information, p. 3.
229. CRD IV Regulation (proposed); CRD IV Directive (proposed).
230. Remarks by Jonathan Faull, Director General, Internal Markets and Services, European Commission, reported in M. Cameron, “CRD IV Proposals Do Not Deviate Markedly From Basel III,” Risk Magazine, September 15, 2011 (online: www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2109521/crd-iv-proposals-deviate-markedly-basel-iii-ecs-faull).
231. European Parliament, Resolution on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis (T7-0331/2011).
232. See further, Coffee Jr., Chapter 4 below.
233. M. Barnier, “Informal Remarks - Restoring Confidence in Financial Markets” (speech, March 1, 2010, online: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/52&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en).
234. European Commission, “Commissioner Barnier Appoints Members of a High-level Expert Group on Possible Reforms to the Structure of the EU Banking Sector” (MEMO/12/129, February 22, 2012).
235. D.A. Skeel, “The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem,” Oregon Law Review, 89 (2011), 951-1057.
236. H.-J. Kim, “Toward Transatlantic Convergence in Financial Regulation,” University of Michigan Law & Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No. 11–004 April 18, 2011, online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1814122.
237. European Commission, An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (COM(2009) 561); European Commission, Innovative Financing
238. European Commission, Bank Resolution Funds (COM(2010) 254); European Commission, An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector (COM(2010) 579).
239. FSB, Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important Financial Institutions: FSB Recommendations and Time Lines (Basel: October 2010), p. 3.
240. H. Scott, The Global Financial Crisis (New York: Foundation Press, 2009), pp. 58-61.
241. European Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Report, p. 18.
242. European Commission, An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, p. 16.
243. Global Financial Stability Report: Durable Financial Stability - Getting There From Here, p. 15.
244. The IMF has called for this: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Durable Financial Stability - Getting There From Here, p. 51.
245. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 17, 2010 (EUCO 13/10), p. 6.
246. European Commission, An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, p. 15; Recovery and Resolution Directive (proposed), arts. 90-99.
247. EFC, Report to the Ecofin on Financial Levies and Taxes - State of Play (9918/11).
248. G.A. Ferrarini and F. Chiodini, “Nationally Fragmented Supervision over Multinational Banks as a Source of Global Systemic Risk: A Critical Analysis of Recent EU Reforms” (September 2011, online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923756).
249. European Commission, An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector, p. 12; Recovery and Resolution Directive (proposed), arts. 11-12 and arts. 80-83.
250. Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, “Banking Crisis Management in the EU”; de Larosiere Report, pp. 12, 33-34, 76; European Commission, An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, p. 13.
251. P. Jenkins, “Super Mario’s Bank Funding Scheme is no Panacea,” Financial Times, January 31, 2012, 20 (reporting the provision by the ECB at the end of 2011 of €489bn of new three-year money).
252. And the ambitious banking union plans emerging in Spring 2012 envisage the possibility of the ESM being used for direct bank recapitalization.
253. European Commission, European Financial Supervision, p. 16.
254. M. Barnier, “L’avenir de la Regulation et de la Supervision Financieres” (speech May 2, 2011, online: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/297&format=HTML&aged=0&language=FR&guiLanguage=en).
255. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) (COM(2009) 506), p. 6.
256. ESMA Regulation, art. 18.
257. ECON, Report on Proposal for a Regulation on ESMA (A7-0169/2010, Rapporteur: Sven Giegold).
258. ESMA Regulation, rec. 5 and art. 38.
259. European Commission, European Financial Supervision, p. 12.
260. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 18/19, 2009 (11225/2/09), p. 8.
261. ECON, Report on Proposal for a Regulation on ESMA; European Parliament, Resolution on the Establishment of ESMA (T7-0270/2010) (partial vote).
262. ESMA Regulation, arts. 10-15. Some of the refinements introduced during the legislative process reflected the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and were not driven by considerations pertaining exclusively to financial services regulation.
263. Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1958] ECR 11.
264. With a back-up power for the Commission to step in should an ESA fail to deliver.
265. ESMA Regulation, arts. 10, 15. 279 ESMA Regulation, rec. 23.
266. ESMA Regulation, arts. 10, 14, 15.
267. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing ESMA, p. 5.
268. E. Chiti, “An Important Part of the EU’s Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies,” Common Market Law Review, 46 (2009), 1395-442, 1405, n. 31.
269. European Union Select Committee, The EU Financial Supervisory Framework: an update (online: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldeucom/181/18104.htm#n6), para. 6.
270. Moloney, “EU Financial Market Regulation After the Financial Crisis,” 1351-2; N. Moloney, “The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market - A Tale of Two Competences: Part (1) Rule-Making,” European Business Organization Law Review, 12 (2011), 41-86, 73-78; Wymeersch, “Europe’s New Financial Regulatory Bodies,” 456.
271. European Commission, European Agencies - The Way Forward (COM(2008) 135), p. 5.
272. EMIR, arts. 64-70, not following the Commission’s initial draft (COM(2010) 484).
273. EMIR, rec. 16 and art. 5
274. External relations is another area where similar tensions could arise. See Part V below.
275. Moloney, “EU Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis,” 1338, 1351.
276. European Parliament, Resolution on the Establishment of ESMA (T7-0270/2010) (partial vote).
277. ESMA Regulation, art. 48.
278. ESMA Regulation, art. 55.
279. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing ESMA, p. 9.
280. ESMA Regulation, art. 45.
281. ESMA Regulation, art. 40.
282. ESMA Regulation, art. 55 and art. 57.
283. ESMA Regulation, art. 1 (Authority independence); art. 42.
284. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing ESMA, p. 4.
285. Chiti, “An Important Part,” 1399-1400.
286. M. Barnier, “The New European Securities and Markets Authority: Helping Enhance the Resilience of Financial Markets” (speech at ESMA, July 11, 2011, online: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/514&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en).
287. European Commission, European Agencies - The Way Forward (COM(2008) 135), p. 5.
288. Generally on Commission resource constraints with respect to supervising front-line implementation: Nugent, The European Commission, pp. 276-280.
289. Chiti, “An Important Part,” 1428.
290. ESMA Regulation, art. 62.
291. Moloney, “EU Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis,” 1353-1354.
292. European Parliament, Resolution on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis (T7-0331/2011).
293. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms (COM(2011) 452), p. 15 (Part I) and pp. 211-29 (Part III).
294. Dinan, “Institutions and Governance,” 109.
295. J. Chaffin, “Fighting Talk: Barroso Demands Bigger Role for Commission,” Financial Times, September 29, 2011, 3.
296. European Commission A Banking Union for Europe (June 26, 2012).
297. Jean-Baptiste de Franssu of EFAMA, quoted in R. Milne, “Investors Alarmed Over EU Reform Process,” ft.com, March 21, 2011.
298. European Commission, Financial Services Policy 2005-2010, p. 3.
299. European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth - Progress Report, p. 11.
300. N. Tait, “Barnier Warns of Complacency as Reform Fatigue Starts to Loom,” Financial Times, March 21, 2011, 18.
301. European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth - Progress Report, p. 8; European Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Report 2010, p. 53.
302. See text accompanying nn. 158-159 above.
303. Posner, “Is a European Approach to Financial Regulation Emerging from the Crisis?,” 111.
304. B. Horl, A. Warntjen and A. Wonka, “Built On Quicksand? A Decade of Procedural Spatial Models on EU Legislative Decision-Making,” Journal of European Public Policy, 12 (2005), 592-606.
305. European Parliament, Resolution on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis (T7-0331/2011).
306. Ferran, “After the Crisis.”
307. Regulation (EU) No. 513/2011, amending the CRA Regulation. For background on the MEPs’ view: ECON, Report on Credit Rating Agencies (A6-0191/2009, Rapporteur: Jean-Paul Gauzes).
308. ESMA Regulation, art. 9.
309. Short Selling Regulation, art. 28. See also Moloney, Chapter 2 below.
310. Art. 14.
311. ECON, Report on Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a European Banking Authority (A7-0166/2010, Rapporteur: Jose Manuel Garcla-Margallo y Marfil); European Parliament, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a European Banking Authority (T7-0272/2010, (partial vote)).
312. ECON, Report on Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a European Banking Authority; European Parliament, Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on CrossBorder Crisis Management in the Banking Sector.
313. European Commission, Public Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies (November 2010), p. 19
314. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies (COM(2011) 747), pp. 11-12.
315. ESMA Regulation, art. 81.
316. However, the IMF has doubted whether it is well suited to these aims: IMF, A Fair And Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector: Final Report for the G-20 (June 2010), pp. 19-21.
317. European Commission, Innovative Financing at a Global Level (SEC (2010) 409) was the Commission’s response to a call from the European Council in October 2009 for the Commission to examine innovative financing at a global level; European Commission, (p. 8).
318. European Parliament, Resolution on Innovative Financing at Global and European Level (T7-0080/2011); European Parliament, Resolution on Financial Transaction Taxes - Making Them Work (T7-0056/2010).
319. European Commission, A Budget for Europe 2020 (COM(2011) 500), p. 7.
320. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial Transaction Tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC (COM(2011) 594).
321. Chancellor of Exchequer, European Commission Written Ministerial Statement, June 22, 2012.
322. S. Pignal, “Trichet Urges EU to Drop Tobin Tax Plan,” Financial Times, July 1, 2011, 3.
323. The Commission’s early suggestion that an EU FTT tax could be used to raise funds for the EU budget raised hackles.
324. The legal basis would be TFEU, art. 113 (indirect taxation).
325. Moloney, “EU Financial Market Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis,” 1338.
326. G. McElroy, “Legislative Politics” in Jorgensen, Pollack and Rosamond (eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics, pp. 175-94, p. 177.
327. Dinan, “Institutions and Governance,” 104.
328. S. Hix, “The 2009 European Parliament Elections: A Disaster for Social Democrats,” EUSA Review, 22 (2009), 2-5.
329. E. Sundstrom, “The Next Left: Thoughts on the European Elections 2009” in E. Stetter, K. Duffek and A. Skrzypek (eds.), Renewing Social Democracy: Contributions to a European- wide Debate (Belgium: The Foundation of European Progressive Studies, 2009), pp. 123-8.
330. Hix, “The 2009 European Parliament Elections.”
331. For a general review of the EU’s role as a promoter of its own standards and values abroad: R. Petrov, “Exporting the Acquis Communautaire into the Legal Systems of Third Countries,” European Foreign Affairs Review, 13 (2008), 33-52.
332. C.J. Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule-Making in the Twenty- First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and in particular ch. 6 for its detailed analysis of clashes between US and European authorities on post-crisis regulatory design issues.
333. European Commission, Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, p. 3.
334. FTT discussed in Part IV above, where both versions of the argument have been used.
335. House of Commons Treasury Committee, Financial Regulation: A Preliminary Consideration of the Government’s Proposals (HC 430-I), 55.
336. e.g., European Council, Presidency Conclusions, September 16, 2010 (EUCO 21/1/10), p. 4. Generally on Basel II and the United States. R.J. Herring, “The Rocky Road to Implementation of Basel II in the United States,” Atlantic Economic Journal, 35 (2007), 411-29.
337. European Commission, CRD IV - Frequently Asked Questions (MEMO/11/527, July 20, 2011). An intention to monitor other countries performance in meeting international commitments has also been declared in the derivatives context: EMIR, rec. 6.
338. Discussed in Ferran, “Capital Market Openness after Financial Turmoil,” in P. Koutra- kos and M. Evans (eds), Beyond the Established Orders (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 68-70.
339. C. McCreevy, Press Conference on Credit Rating Agencies, Brussels, November 12, 2008 online: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=SPEECH/08/605&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
340. For one account of how this came about, see G. Brown, Beyond the Crash: Overcoming the First Crisis of Globalisation (New York; Simon & Schuster, 2010), pp. 117-18.
341. G20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24/25, 2009.
342. L. Mosley and D.A. Singer, “The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and Opportunities for International Political Economy,” International Interactions, 35 (2009), 420-9.
343. IMF, World Economic Outlook: Tensions from the Two-Speed Recovery (Washington DC: IMF, 2011), p. 171. online: www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/pdf/world-in-2050-jan-2011.pdf.
344. B. Simmons, “The International Politics of Harmonization: the Case of Capital Market Regulation,” International Organization, 55 (2001), 589-620.
345. PwC, The World in 2050.
346. D. McMahon, “Global Finance: China Seeks Global Finance Pact,” The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2010, C3.
347. C. Giles, “Sarkozy tells G20 ‘Dare to Dream’ or Else Lose Relevance,” Financial Times, January 28, 2011, 4.
348. D.A. Singer, “Uncertain Leadership: The US Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis” in Helleiner, Pagliari and Zimmermann, Global Finance in Crisis, pp. 93-107.
349. Posner, “Is a European Approach?,” p. 118.
350. Ferran, “New Regulation.”
351. S. Pagliari, “Building a Wall Around Europe. The European Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis and the Turn in Transatlantic Relations” (online: www.stefano-pagliari.net/SP/Home.html).
352. ECON, Report on Basel II and Revision of the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD IV) (A7-0251/2010, Rapporteur: Othmar Karas); European Parliament, Resolution on Basel II and Revision of the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD IV) (T7-0354/2010).
353. “Europe on the Road to Irrelevance; Unless the EU Gets its Act Together, It Will Pay a High Price,” Financial Times, June 18, 2011, 6 (Leader Column).
354. e.g., Oxford Economics, Global Outlook: Will the Eurozone Crisis Sink the Global Economy? (December 20, 2011, online: www.oxfordeconomics.com/FREE/PDFS/WEP-SAMPLEDEC11.PDF).
355. Examining the efforts by Member States to coordinate responses ahead of G20 meetings: D. Hodson, “The Paradox of EMU’s External Representation: The Case of the G20 and the IMF” (March 2011, online: http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/6e_hodson.pdf).
356. Ferran, “New Regulation.”
357. The Commission likes to claim that it is influential: European Commission, European Financial Stability and Integration Report 2010 (SEC(2011) 489), p. 6.
358. D.L. Miigge, “The European Presence in Global Financial Governance: a Principal- Agent Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (2011), 383-402.
359. D. Enrich and D. Cimilluca, “International Finance: Most Banks Seem Set on Basel Rules - For Lenders that Need More Capital, ‘Generous’ Deadline Works in their Favor,” The Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2010, C2.
360. Representation at recent G20 finance ministers’ meetings has been organized on a rather ad hoc basis: M. Emerson, R. Balfour, T. Corthaut, J Wouters, P. MaciejKaczynski and T. Renardeu, Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy (Brussels: CEPS, 2011), pp. 106-8.
361. ESMA Regulation, art. 18; S. Maijoor, “Speech” (July 5, 2011, online: www.astrid-online.it/Regolazion/Studiric/ESMA_Speech-Maijoor_05_07_11.pdf), in which the ESMA chair called for ESMA to have a seat on the IASB Monitoring Board along with the European Commission.
362. ECON, Report on Basel II and Revision of the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD IV); European Parliament, Resolution on Basel II and Revision of the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD IV).
363. de Larosiere Report, p. 67.
364. Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor, pp. 106-108
365. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, September 16, 2010 (EUCO 21/1/10).
366. European Parliament, Resolution on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis (T7-0331/2011), paras. 27-8.
367. P.H. Verdier, “Mutual Recognition in International Finance,” Harvard International Law Journal, 52 (2011), 55-108.
368. E.J. Pan, “A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets,” Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, 2 (2007), 133-66, 138-9.
369. The development of the transatlantic dialogue in financial crisis in the decade up to the financial crisis is discussed in Ferran, “Capital Market Openness.” See also Schammo, EU Prospectus Law, pp. 142-190.
370. ESMA then establishes a cooperation arrangement with the third country supervisor (art. 75(3)); and finally ESMA recognizes the third country trade repository (art. 77), pp. 240-246.
371. — 2002/87/EC.
372. H. Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), pp. 66-70.
373. R.S. Karmel, “The EU Challenge to the SEC,” Fordham International Law Journal, 31 (2008), 1692-1712; Ferran, “Capital Market Openness.”
374. Posner and Veron, “The EU and Financial Regulation.”
375. EMIR, art. 25(6) (equivalence-based system for recognition of third country CCPs, including a requirement that the legal framework of the third country must provide for an effective equivalent recognition of third-country-authorized CCPs).
376. European Commission, Formal Request to ESMA for Technical Advice on Possible Delegated Acts Concerning the Amended Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC) (Ares(2011)56961 - 19/01/2011).
377. M. Barnier, “The Shape of E.U. Financial Regulation and its Impact on the United States and Europe” (speech, June 3, 2011, online: www.eurunion.org/eu/images/stories/broo- kingsprog-barnier-6-3-11.doc).
378. European Parliament, Role and Methods of Rating Agencies (A5-0040/2004).
379. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies, p. 5.
380. CRA Regulation (as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 513/2011), arts. 4-5.
381. ESMA, Guidelines on the Application of the Endorsement Regime under Article 4(3) of the Credit Rating Regulation 1060/2009 (ESMA/2011/97, March 2011). ESMA’s interpretation, in effect, conflates the two formulations. Compare European Parliament, Resolution on Credit Rating Agencies: Future Perspectives (T7-0258/2011), para. 14.
382. Pagliari, “Building a Wall.”
383. — 403 Ferran, “After the Crisis.”
384. ESMA, Guidelines on the Application of the Endorsement Regime.
385. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (COM 2010) 301, p. 3.
386. J. Grant and T. Braithwaite, “Geithner Urges EU to Fall in Line with Derivatives Rules,” Financial Times, June 9, 2011, 12.
387. EMIR, rec. 6. EMIR art. 13 provides for the Commission and ESMA to monitor international developments, including potential duplicative or conflicting requirements and to recommend possible actions.
388. J. Grant, “Avalanche of Rulemaking Blocks Road to OTC Clarity,” Financial Times, August 1, 2011, (Surveys), 13.
389. FSB, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Progress Report on Implementation (October 2011), p. 21.
390. European Parliament, Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012 (T7-0327/2011).
391. K. Hopt, “European Company and Financial Law: Observations on European Politics, Protectionism, and the Financial Crisis” in U. Bernitz and W.G. Ringe, Company Law and Economic Protectionism: New Challenges to European Integration (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 13-31, p. 31.