Property rights in firms

Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 210-251

  Milhaupt, Curtis J ^a  

^a The Earth Institute at Columbia University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927043681     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511665905.007     Document Type: Chapter

References (71)

1. Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, pp. 333–39 (1932).
2. Mark J. Roe, “Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,” 102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993).
3. Mark J. Roe, “Foundations of Corporate Finance: The Pacification of the Insurance Industry” 93 Colum. L. Rev. 639-642 (1993).
4. Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, p. ix (1994)
5. Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, “Bank Industry Linkages: Models for Eastern European Economic Restructuring,” New York University Salomon CenterWorking Paper no. S-92-48 (1992).
6. David E. Sanger, “Greenspan Sees Asian Crisis MovingWorld toWestern Capitalism,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1998, at C1
7. Suzanne Berger, “Introduction,” in Suzanne Berger&Ronald Dore, eds., NationalDiversity and Global Capitalism, pp. 1-4 (1996)
8. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,” 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1999).
9. Tom Bethell, “The Law of the Land: Rule of Law as a Precondition of Economic Growth,” The American Spectator, Aug. 1996, at 18
10. Andrzej Rapaczynski, “The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights,” 10 J. Econ. Perspectives (87): 87 (1996).
11. Thrainn Eggertsson, “Economic Perspectives on Property Rights and the Economics of Institutions,” in Paul Foss, ed., Economic Approaches to Organizations and Institutions, pp. 47-48 (1995).
12. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 693–95 (1986).
13. Oliver Hart & John Moore, “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119-1121 (1990)
14. Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights, p. 99 (1989)
15. Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of PropertyRights,” 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347-347 (1967)
16. Svetozar Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights: Towards a Theory of Comparative Systems, p. 4 (1990)
17. Gary Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, p. 1 (1989).
18. Holger Schmeiding, “Property Rights, Institutions, and Market Reform,” in Hendrikus J. Blommenstein & Bernard Steunenberg, eds., Government and Markets: Establishing a Democratic Constitutional Order and a Market Economy in Former Socialist Countries, pp. 159-163 (1994).
19. Douglass C. North, “Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic Performance,” p. 11
20. Rafael La Porta et al., “Law and Finance,” 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998)
21. Rafael La Porta et al., “Legal Determinants of External Finance,” 52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997)
22. Andrei Shleifer, “Establishing Property Rights,” World Bank Research Observer, pp. 93-95
23. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishney, “Politicians and Firms,” 109 Q. J. Econ. 995 (1994).
24. Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, p. 18 (1981).
25. Stewart Macaulay, “Non-contractual Relations in Business:APreliminary Study,” 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963)
26. Eric A. Posner, “The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action,” 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133 (1996)
27. Frances Fukuyama, “Social Capital and the Global Economy,” 74 Foreign Affairs 89-90 (1995).
28. Sung Hee Jwa, “Property Rights and Economic Behaviors: Lessons for Korea’s Economic Reform,” pp. 9–12
29. J. Mark Ramseyer, “Does Corporate Governance Converge? The A-contextual Logic to the Japanese Keiretsu,”
30. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, pp. 80–82 (1990).
31. Brigitte Unger & Frans van Waarden, eds., Convergence orDiversity? Internationalization and EconomicPolicyResponse, p. 3 (1995)
32. Dennis L. McNamara, The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise 1945, pp. 34–65 (1990).
33. Atul Kohli, “Where do High Growth Political Economies Come from? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s ‘Developmental State,’ ” 22 World Development 1269-1270 (1994).
34. Curtis J. Milhaupt, “The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate,” 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 865-866 (1997)
35. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, “Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the ‘Jusen’ Problem,” 29 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1–24 (1997).
36. Sung Hee Jwa, “Globalization and New Industrial Organization: Implications for Structural Adjustment Policies,” in Takatoshi Ito & Anne O. Krueger, eds., 6 NBER-East Asia Seminar on Economics: Regionalism vs. Multilateral Trade Arrangements, pp. 313-322 (1997)
37. Yeon-Ho Lee, The State, Society and Big Business in South Korea, p. 36 (1997).
38. Yoon Je Cho & Joon-Kyung Kim, “Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea,” pp. 40–45
39. Roger L. Janelli, Making Capitalism: The Social and Cultural Construction of a South Korean Conglomerate, p. 63 (1993).
40. James Gwartney et al., Economic Freedom of the World 1975–1995 (1996)
41. Kim R. Holmes et al., 1997 Index of Economic Freedom (1997).
42. Pranab Bardhan, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” 35 J. Econ. Lit. 1320 (1997)
43. Harry Sheiber, “Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History,” 71 Calif. L. Rev. 217-218 (1984).
44. Campbell R. Harvey, “Political Risk, Economic Risk and Financial Risk” (visited May 14, 1998), http://www.duke.edu/charvey/Countryrisk/pol/poltab7a.htm
45. John C. Coffee, Jr., “Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Actions and Derivative Actions,” 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 673 & n.10, 699 & n.83 (1986)
46. Mark D.West, “Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United States,” 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 767 (1999).
47. David J. Vogel, “The Study of Business and Politics,” 38 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 146-152 (1996).
48. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,” 49 J. Econ. Hist. 803 (1989).
49. Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation: Cultural and Political Roots, 1860, pp. 131–45 (1998)
50. Leroy P. Jones & IL Sakong, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case, pp. 120–22 (1980).
51. John Burton, “South Korea’s Chaebol Get Protection from the State,” Fin. Times, Aug. 5, 1993, at 3.
52. Curtis J.Milhaupt, “A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law,” 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. (3): 35–47 (1996).
53. Frank K. Upham, “Privatizing Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in Comparative and International Perspective,” 20 Fordham Int’l L.J. 396 (1996).
54. Hideaki Miyajima, “The Privatization of Ex-Zaibatsu Holding Stocks and the Emergence of Bank-Centered Corporate Groups in Japan,” in Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim, eds., Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies, pp. 361, 362–68 (1995).
55. Richard H. Mitchell, Political Bribery in Japan (1996).
56. Kent E. Calder, “Elites in an Equalizing Role: Ex-bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in the Japanese Government–Business Relationship,” 21 Com. Pol. 379 (1989)
57. Kihwan Kim & Danny M. Leipziger, “Korea:ACase ofGovernment-LedDevelopment,” p. 34
58. William J. Carney, “The ALI’s Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property Rights?” 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 898, 929 (1993).
59. Katherine Bruce, “Seoul Announces Market Reform to Ease Stock Trading,” Reuter Asia-Pacific Business Report, Aug. 22, 1996
60. J. Mark Ramseyer, “Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System,” in Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds., The Japanese Main Bank System, p. 231(1994)
61. Steven N. Kaplan & J. Mark Ramseyer, “Those Japanese Firms with their Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy,” 74 Wash. U. L. Q. 403 (1996).
62. Ronald Dore, “Convergence inWhose Interest?” in Diversity and Capitalism, note 9 above, p. 366.
63. John B. Goodman & LouisW. Pauly, “The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? EconomicManagement in an Age of GlobalMarkets,” 46 World Pol. 50 (1993)
64. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, “CorporateGovernance andCommercial Banking:AComparative Examination ofGermany, Japan, and theUnited States,” 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (1996)
65. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, “The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and FirmPerformance,” in Klaus Hopt et al., eds., Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research (1998).
66. April Klein, “Affiliated Directors: Puppets of Management or Effective Directors?” (Jan. 1998)
67. Jill E. Fisch, “Taking Boards Seriously,” 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 265 (1977).
68. Edward Rubin, “Rational States?” 83 Va. L. Rev. 1433, 1441–42 (1997)
69. Suzanna Fluck, et al., “Privatization with Political Constraints: Auctions versus Private Negotiations,” New York University Salomon CenterWorking Paper no. S-96-26 (1996)
70. Albert Hirschman, “Ideology: Mask, or Nessus Shirt?,” in Alexander Eckstein, ed., Comparison of Economic Systems: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches, pp. 289-294 (1971).
71. Ronald J. Gilson,”Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate Governance through American Eyes,” 1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 203.