A relational theory of Japanese corporate governance: Contract, culture, and the rule of law

Harvard International Law Journal

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 3-

  Milhaupt, Curtis J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041512680     PISSN: 00178063     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (9)

1. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). For a survey of the economic literature, see Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). For perspectives in the legal literature, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) {hereinafter Symposium}. While the contractual approach to the firm is relatively new among Japanese scholars, some view the Japanese firm in essentially contractual terms. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa, Shij̄o ni okeru kyōsō no yakuwari {The Role of Market Competition}, 1050 JURISUTO 94 (1994); NIHON NO KIGYŌ {THE JAPANESE FIRM} (Kenichi Imai & Ryūtarō Omiya eds., 1989). This approach is not without its detractors in the United States or Japan. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing that contractual analysis of shareholder-manager relations is flawed and ideologically driven); Katsuhiko Iwai, Kigyōkeizairon to kaisha tōji kikō {Economic Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance}, 1364 SHŌJI HŌMU 7 (1994) (critical assessment of nexus of contracts approach).
2. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). For a survey of the economic literature, see Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). For perspectives in the legal literature, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) {hereinafter Symposium}. While the contractual approach to the firm is relatively new among Japanese scholars, some view the Japanese firm in essentially contractual terms. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa, Shij̄o ni okeru kyōsō no yakuwari {The Role of Market Competition}, 1050 JURISUTO 94 (1994); NIHON NO KIGYŌ {THE JAPANESE FIRM} (Kenichi Imai & Ryūtarō Omiya eds., 1989). This approach is not without its detractors in the United States or Japan. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing that contractual analysis of shareholder-manager relations is flawed and ideologically driven); Katsuhiko Iwai, Kigyōkeizairon to kaisha tōji kikō {Economic Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance}, 1364 SHŌJI HŌMU 7 (1994) (critical assessment of nexus of contracts approach).
3. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). For a survey of the economic literature, see Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). For perspectives in the legal literature, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) {hereinafter Symposium}. While the contractual approach to the firm is relatively new among Japanese scholars, some view the Japanese firm in essentially contractual terms. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa, Shij̄o ni okeru kyōsō no yakuwari {The Role of Market Competition}, 1050 JURISUTO 94 (1994); NIHON NO KIGYŌ {THE JAPANESE FIRM} (Kenichi Imai & Ryūtarō Omiya eds., 1989). This approach is not without its detractors in the United States or Japan. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing that contractual analysis of shareholder-manager relations is flawed and ideologically driven); Katsuhiko Iwai, Kigyōkeizairon to kaisha tōji kikō {Economic Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance}, 1364 SHŌJI HŌMU 7 (1994) (critical assessment of nexus of contracts approach).
4. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). For a survey of the economic literature, see Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). For perspectives in the legal literature, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) {hereinafter Symposium}. While the contractual approach to the firm is relatively new among Japanese scholars, some view the Japanese firm in essentially contractual terms. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa, Shij̄o ni okeru kyōsō no yakuwari {The Role of Market Competition}, 1050 JURISUTO 94 (1994); NIHON NO KIGYŌ {THE JAPANESE FIRM} (Kenichi Imai & Ryūtarō Omiya eds., 1989). This approach is not without its detractors in the United States or Japan. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing that contractual analysis of shareholder-manager relations is flawed and ideologically driven); Katsuhiko Iwai, Kigyōkeizairon to kaisha tōji kikō {Economic Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance}, 1364 SHŌJI HŌMU 7 (1994) (critical assessment of nexus of contracts approach).
5. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). For a survey of the economic literature, see Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). For perspectives in the legal literature, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) {hereinafter Symposium}. While the contractual approach to the firm is relatively new among Japanese scholars, some view the Japanese firm in essentially contractual terms. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa, Shij̄o ni okeru kyōsō no yakuwari {The Role of Market Competition}, 1050 JURISUTO 94 (1994); NIHON NO KIGYŌ {THE JAPANESE FIRM} (Kenichi Imai & Ryūtarō Omiya eds., 1989). This approach is not without its detractors in the United States or Japan. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing that contractual analysis of shareholder-manager relations is flawed and ideologically driven); Katsuhiko Iwai, Kigyōkeizairon to kaisha tōji kikō {Economic Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance}, 1364 SHŌJI HŌMU 7 (1994) (critical assessment of nexus of contracts approach).
6. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). For a survey of the economic literature, see Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). For perspectives in the legal literature, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) {hereinafter Symposium}. While the contractual approach to the firm is relatively new among Japanese scholars, some view the Japanese firm in essentially contractual terms. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa, Shij̄o ni okeru kyōsō no yakuwari {The Role of Market Competition}, 1050 JURISUTO 94 (1994); NIHON NO KIGYŌ {THE JAPANESE FIRM} (Kenichi Imai & Ryūtarō Omiya eds., 1989). This approach is not without its detractors in the United States or Japan. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing that contractual analysis of shareholder-manager relations is flawed and ideologically driven); Katsuhiko Iwai, Kigyōkeizairon to kaisha tōji kikō {Economic Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance}, 1364 SHŌJI HŌMU 7 (1994) (critical assessment of nexus of contracts approach).
7. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). For a survey of the economic literature, see Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 63 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). For perspectives in the legal literature, see Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) {hereinafter Symposium}. While the contractual approach to the firm is relatively new among Japanese scholars, some view the Japanese firm in essentially contractual terms. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa, Shij̄o ni okeru kyōsō no yakuwari {The Role of Market Competition}, 1050 JURISUTO 94 (1994); NIHON NO KIGYŌ {THE JAPANESE FIRM} (Kenichi Imai & Ryūtarō Omiya eds., 1989). This approach is not without its detractors in the United States or Japan. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) (arguing that contractual analysis of shareholder-manager relations is flawed and ideologically driven); Katsuhiko Iwai, Kigyōkeizairon to kaisha tōji kikō {Economic Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance}, 1364 SHŌJI HŌMU 7 (1994) (critical assessment of nexus of contracts approach).
8. Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1748, 1748-49 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION