Paths of Economic and Political Development

The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Robinson, James A ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Comparative statics; Democracy; Economic development; Political development; Theoretical framework

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925845911     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0037     Document Type: Chapter

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