Following the script: Narratives of suspicion in terry stops in street policing

University of Chicago Law Review

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 51-88

  Fagan, Jeffrey ^a   Geller, Amanda ^b  

^a The Earth Institute at Columbia University   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925845010     PISSN: 00419494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (121)

1. See Giorgio Agamben, Nudities 43-45 (Stanford 2011) (David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, trans).
2. See John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72 St John's L Rev 749, 839 (1998) (concluding that "[m]any thus think of Terry and the law of 'stop and frisk' as⋯ a sensible balancing of public interests in law enforcement against relatively lesser intrusions on personal freedom").
3. Proactive policing instantiates the notions of criminal archetypes by encouraging police interdiction with persons whom the police decide could be committing a crime, albeit without explicit markers or indicia of suspicion. It anticipates the one-off intervention into a crime in progress in the Terry case. For further descriptions of proactive policing, see, for example, Charis E. Kubrin, et al, Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates across US Cities, 48 Crimin 57, 62 (2010)
4. Jacqueline Cohen and Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in Jens Ludwig and Philip J. Cook, eds, Evaluating Gun Policy: Effects on Crime and Violence 217, 217-18 (Brookings 2003) (discussing "targeted policing programs" designed to proactively deter gun violence)
5. Robert J. Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L & Society Rev 163, 164-66 (1988).
6. For descriptions of order-maintenance activities, see Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum L Rev 551, 558-60 (1997)
7. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 Mich L Rev 291, 298-99 (1998) ("Order-maintenance policing⋯ facilitates the very policy of aggressive arrests for minor disorderly conduct.").
8. See generally Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 335 (2014)
9. David Keenan and Tina M. Thomas, An Offense-Severity Model for Stop-and-Frisks, 123 Yale L J 1448, 1460-62 (2014).
10. For a broader discussion of the costs of aggressive policing of minor offenses, see generally K. Babe Howell, From Page to Practice and Back Again: Broken Windows Policing and the Real Costs to Law-Abiding New Yorkers of Color, 34 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 439 (2010).
11. The Nation, The Hunted and the Hated: An Inside Look at the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk Policy (Oct 9, 2012), online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rWtDMPaRD8 (visited Feb 16, 2015). Cruz also said that he had been stopped many times and was hypervigilant and fearful when he was walking in public and spotted officers. Later on during the encounter, Cruz was asked whether he wanted to go to jail. He responded by asking for the reason why the officers were arresting him. One replied: "For being a fucking mutt!" Id.
12. In New York City, institutional pressures urged officers to increase the number of Terry stops as a prophylactic measure against crime. The pressures included threats of sanctions for officers whose "productivity" was low, based on the evaluations of their supervising sergeants. See Graham A. Rayman, The NYPD Tapes: A Shocking Story of Cops, Cover-Ups, and Courage 43, 64, 182, 236 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) (detailing how police supervisors threatened officers with workplace sanctions if they did not meet quotas for stops and arrests).
13. See also John Del Signore, Police Union Delegate Caught on Tape Demanding Cops Meet Quotas (Gothamist, Mar 19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/66P6-FD4M (citing statements taped at a police precinct by Officer Adil Polanco, who was later the victim of retaliation from his superiors for publicly revealing the quota demands).
14. ∗11-12 (US filed Nov 29, 1967) (available on Westlaw at 1967 WL 93603) (enumerating particular factors that police should consider before conducting a street stop or field interrogation).
15. For discussions of the history and practice of the SQF regime, see generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City "Stop and Frisk", 94 BU L Rev 1495 (2014)
16. Meares, 10 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 335 (cited in note 9)
17. David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate beyond New York City, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 853 (2013).
18. See William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 St John's L Rev 1213, 1213-15, 1217 (1998) (arguing that any attempt to legally regulate street policing is prone to error since courts are incapable of systematically accounting for the realities of why police engage in certain types of behaviors).
19. See, for example, David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45 Demography 55, 73-74 (2008) (showing empirically that social context explains racial and ethnic disparities in arrests and that the race-specific social and political features of neighborhood residential patterns explain variations in criminal outcomes).
20. See Floyd v City of New York, 959 F Supp 2d 540, 580-81 (SDNY 2013).
21. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society 45-47 (John Wiley 1966).
22. Skolnick cites an article by Thomas Adams, a "police expert," that summarizes the characteristics that make persons suspicious enough to merit a field interrogation, including automobiles that do not "look right," persons out of place, known troublemakers, persons who evade or avoid the officer, persons wearing a coat on a hot day, persons near a crime scene, and persons who are visibly rattled by a policeman. See Thomas F. Adams, Field Interrogation, 7 Police 26, 28 (Mar-Apr 1963).
23. John Van Maanen, The Asshole, in Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen, eds, Policing: A View from the Street 221, 223 (Goodyear 1978).
24. See Rod K. Brunson and Ronald Weitzer, Police Relations with Black and White Youths in Different Urban Neighborhoods, 44 Urban Affairs Rev 858, 866-68 (2009) (reporting that White youths who were spotted in certain Black neighborhoods were viewed suspiciously by officers, and that the risk was greatest when the White youths were in mixed-race company or wearing what was deemed racially inappropriate clothing). See also generally Victor M. Rios, Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys (NYU 2011).
25. Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 Am J Sociology 206, 212-13 (1964) (discussing how police officers decide to initiate encounters with juveniles, and describing the factors that motivate those encounters and explain their outcomes).
26. Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L J 543, 557 n 26 (1960), citing NM Stat Ann § 39-1-1 (1954) (emphasis omitted).
27. See Geoffrey P. Alpert, John M. MacDonald, and Roger G. Dunham, Police Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making during Citizen Stops, 43 Crimin 407, 422-23 (2005) (showing that whether a suspect is Black influences an officer's decision to form suspicion based on nonbehavioral versus behavioral cues).
28. Jon B. Gould and Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior under the US Constitution, 3 Crimin & Pub Pol 315, 325, 330, 333, 345-46 (2004) (showing that officers violated Fourth Amendment standards for searches in 46 percent of a sample of 44 searches and 571 encounters, based on ratings of researcher-generated narratives, a sample of which were checked by a panel of defense lawyers, prosecutors, and retired judges, who agreed with 90 percent of the researcher's assessments).
29. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 Crimin & Pub Pol 363, 366-67 (2004) (describing how community policing officers invoked a drug-enforcement rationale to stop a suspect without any indicia of drug use or possession and proceeded to conduct a fruitless cavity search).
30. Id at 124-25 (determining that flight from the police in a "high crime area" could constitute reasonable suspicion for a stop). See also Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U Chi L Rev 809, 862-64 (2011) (using data from studies of street stops to explore the empirical implications of Wardlow).
31. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that "more than mere war stories [from police testimony] are required to establish the existence of a high-crime area" and that courts must "examine with care the specific data underlying any such assertion." United States v Montero-Camargo, 208 F3d 1122, 1139 n 32 (9th Cir 2000).
32. See also United States v Bonner, 363 F3d 213, 218-19 (3d Cir 2004) (Smith concurring) (discussing possible burdens of proof for establishing that an area is "high crime").
33. See Camara v Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 536-37 (1967) ("Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.").
34. In Navarette v California, 134 S Ct 1683 (2014), Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that at least 5, if not 10 percent, of the entire universe of incidents would need to be an accurate "hit" to be indicative of reasonable suspicion. Id at 1695 (Scalia dissenting). According to Scalia, absent such a showing, the basis of suspicion is not reasonable without further information. A similar outcomes test was considered in Floyd to claim that the police were so often wrong in the bases of suspicion for their stops that those bases were faulty. See Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 559, 575 (pointing to the fact that "[t]he rate of arrests arising from stops is low⋯ and the yield of seizures of guns or other contraband is even lower," and noting "that the City's attempt to account for the low rate of arrests and summonses following stops was not persuasive").
35. See Harcourt and Meares, 78 U Chi L Rev at 811 (cited in note 31).
36. See notes 7-9. See also Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop and Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U Chi L Rev 161, 172-76 (2015).
37. See Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Making the "Law of the Land" the Law on the Street: How Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 Emory L J 295, 319-31 (2000).
38. See The Nation, The Hunted and the Hated (cited in note 10). In the video, the sergeant can be heard in the background at several points over the course of the stop escalating the tension by interpreting Alvin's responses as challenging the officer's authority.
39. See George D. Gaskell, Daniel B. Wright, and Colm A. O'Muircheartaigh, Telescoping of Landmark Events: Implications for Survey Research, 64 Pub Op Q 77, 77-87 (2000)
40. David C. Rubin and Alan D. Baddeley, Telescoping Is Not Time Compression: A Model of the Dating of Autobiographical Events, 17 Memory & Cognition 653, 653-55 (1989).
41. See, for example, Modupe Akinola and Wendy Berry Mendes, Stress-Induced Cortisol Facilitates Threat-Related Decision Making among Police Officers, 126 Behavioral Neuroscience 167, 172-73 (2012) (showing that officers' thresholds for shooting at suspects vary according to their biologically measured stress in the immediate situation).
42. See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 Fordham Urban L J 407, 441 (2000). See also note 12.
43. See generally James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic Monthly 29 (Mar 1982) (suggesting that social and physical disorder in neighborhoods is strongly linked to crime rates in those places).
44. See also Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods 65-124 (Free Press 1990).
45. But see Harcourt, 97 Mich L Rev at 302-05 (cited in note 8).
46. See Livingston, 97 Colum L Rev at 562-91 (cited in note 8) (arguing that social disorder such as loud music, boisterous street behavior, and petty criminal activity are signals of more serious crime and should be met by police with street detentions if not arrests).
47. Arrests based on probable cause for minor crimes simplify the task of moreintrusive interactions during these encounters, including searches for weapons or contraband, or warrant checks for scofflaws or fugitives. See generally Brief of Dr. Ian Ayres, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, Dr. Richard Rosenfeld, Anthony Thompson, Dr. Geoffrey Alpert, David Rudovsky, Dr. Andrew Gelman, Dr. Bernard Harcourt, Dr. Robert Crutchfield, Dr. Christopher Winship, Dr. Peter Siegelman, Dr. David Greenberg, Dr. Justin Wolfers, and Tracey Meares as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Faulkner v United States, No 11-235 (US filed Sept 23, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 4479100).
48. See Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frydl, eds, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence 237-40 (National Academies 2004) (describing the nuances that distinguish policing strategies and tactics that focus on specific places).
49. See generally Meares, 82 U Chi L Rev 161 (cited in note 37).
50. The hot spots regime anticipated very small spaces where there would be recurring crime. But these are assessed by its proponents as street segments or intersections. See, for example, David Weisburd, et al, Trajectories of Crime at Places: A Longitudinal Study of Street Segments in the City of Seattle, 42 Crimin 283, 291, 294 (2004) (showing the recurring, disproportionate concentrations of crime in very small areas in Seattle).
51. ∗11, 32 (SDNY filed Oct 15, 2010) ("Fagan Report").
52. See Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren't What They Seem: Context and Cognition in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 Harv L Rev F 97, 99-102 (2012).
53. See also Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 Harv L Rev 1563, 1620-34 (2012).
54. See generally Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment, 27 J Econ Persp 173 (2013)
55. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011)
56. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979).
57. The Stop, Question and Frisk Data (New York City Police Department, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/AKK3-24DN. Original analyses are available from the authors.
58. See Joseph Goldstein, Safer Era Tests Wisdom of "Broken Windows" Focus on Minor Crime, NY Times A1 (July 25, 2014).
59. See also Franklin E. Zimring, The City That Became Safe: New York's Lessons for Urban Crime and Its Control 6-7 (Oxford 2012).
60. See People v De Bour, 352 NE2d 562, 571-72 (NY 1976).
61. In contrast to the two-stage inquiry developed in Terry, De Bour articulates four levels of suspicion correlated with four levels of justified intrusion. See also People v Hollman, 590 NE2d 204, 205 (NY 1992).
62. See generally Robert P. Abelson, Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision Making, in John S. Carroll and John W. Payne, eds, Cognition and Social Behavior 33 (Lawrence Erlbaum 1976).
63. See id at 33-34. See also generally Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept, 36 Am Psychologist 715 (1981).
64. See generally, for example, Abelson, 36 Am Psychologist 715 (cited in note 58). Script theory can explain contagion in several ways. See Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson, and Garth Davies, Social Contagion of Violence, in Daniel Flannery, Alexander T. Vazsonyi, and Irwin D. Waldman, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behavior and Aggression 688, 691 (Cambridge 2007): (1) Scripts are ways of organizing knowledge and behavioral choices; (2) individuals learn behavioral repertoires for different situations; (3) these repertoires are stored in memory as scripts and are elicited when cues are sensed in the environment; (4) the choice of scripts varies among individuals, and some individuals will have limited choices; (5) individuals are more likely to repeat scripted behaviors when the previous experience was considered successful; (6) scripted behavior may become "automatic" without much thought or weighing of consequences; and (7) scripts are acquired through social interactions among social network members. Within structurally equivalent networks, such as professions or unions, similarly situated people are likely to influence or adopt behaviors from one another that can make those people and their ideas more attractive as a source of further relations. See id at 692.
65. See Derek Cornish, The Procedural Analysis of Offending and Its Relevance for Situational Prevention, in Ronald V. Clarke, ed, 3 Crime Prevention Studies 151, 157-59 (Criminal Justice 1994). Cornish's "script" focuses in detail on the step-by-step procedures of committing crime that are learned, stored in memory, and enacted when situational cues are present. See id at 155-59.
66. See Deanna L. Wilkinson and Jeffrey Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence "Scripts": The Dynamics of Gun Events among Adolescent Males, 59 L & Contemp Probs 55, 65 (1996).
67. See also Fagan, Wilkinson, and Davies, Social Contagion of Violence at 691 (cited in note 59).
68. See Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 Am Sociological Rev 699, 703 (1967) (describing the police responsibility to respond to people that they view as "less than fully accountable for their actions").
69. See also generally Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society (Doubleday 1967).
70. ∗1 (2008).
71. See also generally Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley 1954)
72. Gordon W. Allport, The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology, in Gardner Lindzey, ed, 1 Handbook of Social Psychology 3 (Addison-Wesley 1954).
73. For an example on criminal behavior, see generally Shamena Anwar and Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayesian Learning Theory of Deterrence among Serious Juvenile Offenders, 49 Crimin 667 (2011).
74. Van Maanen also suggests what the appropriate responses are to each group. For instance, the "assholes" were worthy of street justice - meaning physical assault - simply to reinforce the power hierarchy of the police in the areas of their routine activity, regardless of whether the "assholes" had broken any laws. See Van Maanen, The Asshole at 224 (cited in note 19).
75. See also John Van Maanen, Observations on the Making of Policemen, 32 Hum Org 407, 407-18 (1973).
76. See generally Jeffrey C. Alexander, Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy, 22 Sociological Theory 527 (2004).
77. See John Beshears, et al, How Are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J Pub Econ 1787, 1787-90 (2008) (showing how actual preferences may differ from what the stated or even best interests of an agent might be).
78. See also generally Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale 2008).
79. See Beshears, et al, 92 J Pub Econ at 1787-89 (cited in note 70).
80. Revealed preferences could be as simple as taste but could also reflect limited experience, decisionmaking errors, proximity, complexity, and "third-party marketing" of available logics. See generally Kahneman and Tversky, 47 Econometrica 263 (cited in note 51) (discussing cognitive errors in decisionmaking that result from external pressures).
81. The NYPD has published downloadable case records annually for all stops from 2003 to 2013. See NYPD, The Stop, Question and Frisk Data (cited in note 52).
82. For the following analysis, we use data from 2004 to 2012 and follow a similar methodology to the analyses in Floyd v City of New York, 959 F Supp 2d 540 (SDNY 2013).
83. ∗8-9 (SDNY filed Dec 31, 2003) ("Daniels Settlement").
84. See Terry, 392 US at 22, 27; People v De Bour, 352 NE2d 562, 568-70 (NY 1976) (articulating the standard for search and seizure under New York common law).
85. See also Meares, 82 U Chi L Rev at 172-74 (cited in note 37) (showing the mismatch between the factors identified by the Terry Court and the factors on the UF-250).
86. An officer cannot stop or frisk an individual simply because the person possesses a "suspicious object" that could either be contraband (including a weapon) or be innocently possessed. See People v Francis, 847 NYS2d 398, 401-02 (NY Sup 2007) (holding that an officer who observed an object that looked like a knife, which was clipped inside a suspect's pocket, did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that the knife was not a permissible knife).
87. ∗5 (NY Crim) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop a man seen walking down the street, pushing a shopping cart with a tire iron protruding, and looking into parked cars).
88. A stop might be justified if there is evidence that the object has just been or is about to be used in a crime. See People v Brown, 297 NE2d 94, 95-96 (NY 1973) (holding that an officer did not have probable cause to arrest a person for possession of a burglar's tool and stolen property, but that the officer could have made an investigatory stop of a man seen exiting a building holding a crowbar and a car battery that had torn cables on it).
89. Reasonable suspicion based on this factor requires a specific description that points to a specific suspect. See People v Thomas, 752 NYS2d 70, 71 (NY App 2002) (holding that a "vague and general description of a Black male wearing black clothing was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that he was the perpetrator").
90. This factor is also vulnerable to broad interpretation and misuse. In Brown v City of Oneonta, 221 F3d 329 (2d Cir 1999), police responded to the victim's description of a "young" "black man" who had cut himself during a struggle over a knife used in a 1992 assault that took place near the local college campus. Id at 334. The police obtained a list of every Black male student at the college and began a sweep that resulted in stops of approximately two hundred students and nonstudents, including at least one woman. Id at 334, 338.
91. "Casing" is a term that can describe a wide range of behaviors, but ascertaining the intent of these behaviors requires a knowledge of the context and persistence of the suspicious behavior. A person looking into car windows might either be casing cars or considering purchasing a similar car. In these instances, the burden falls on the police officer to conduct a lengthy and detailed period of observation to confirm that these are in fact preludes to a potential crime and not incidental or casual activities. See Terry, 392 US at 28 (1968) (upholding a stop-and-frisk when an officer suspected three men of casing a store in preparation for a daytime robbery because the officer observed the suspects for nearly twenty minutes before conducting the stop); United States v Padilla, 548 F3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir 2008) (holding that a detective's observation of two men quietly following another individual into a secluded area while attempting to remain in the dark and out of the individual's peripheral vision "supported the detective's suspicion that the two men might have been targeting the disheveled man for a robbery" and justified a stop-and-frisk)
92. People v Richard, 668 NYS2d 386, 387 (NY App 1998): Reasonable suspicion supporting the forcible detention of defendant was supplied by lengthy police observations of defendant's complex, unusual, and suspicious pattern of "casing" -type behavior, strongly suggestive of a known series of armed robberies in the neighborhood that targeted movie theaters in particular, coupled with the fact that defendant met a general description of one of the robbers.
93. See Wardlow, 528 US at 124. But the Wardlow Court offered no test for what constituted a "high-crime area." See United States v Montero-Camargo, 208 F3d 1122, 1138, 1139 n 32 (9th Cir 2000) (concluding that a suspect's presence in a high-crime area is not enough to support reasonable and particularized suspicion and that the factor must "not [be] used with respect to entire neighborhoods⋯ in which members of minority groups regularly go about their daily business").
94. See also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson and Damien Bernache, The "High-Crime Area" Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am U L Rev 1587, 1588 (2008 (demonstrating that current Supreme Court jurisprudence provides those in "high-crime area[s]" with less-robust Fourth Amendment protections).
95. Chief of Patrol, Police Department, City of New York, Required Activity Log Entries Regarding UF250's (Mar 5, 2013) (requiring officers to provide narrative detail of the specific indicia of suspicion in each stop) (on file with authors).
96. See, for example, United States v Graham, 483 F3d 431, 439 (6th Cir 2007) (upholding a search in part because the suspect's movements were "consistent with an attempt to conceal a firearm").
97. Absent movements indicating that a suspect might be armed, furtive movements cannot give rise to reasonable suspicion. See, for example, People v Powell, 667 NYS2d 725, 727-28 (NY App 1998) (holding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect who responded evasively to questioning and was walking with his arm stiffly against his body in a high-crime area)
98. ∗1-10 (EDNY) (holding that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect who moved his hand "from the center of his stomach to the left side of his waistband" in a manner that the officer claimed was similar to how an officer handles firearms while in plain clothes).
99. See Wardlow, 528 US at 124-25. See also Ferguson and Bernache, 57 Am U L Rev at 1588 (cited in note 85).
100. ∗43 (SDNY filed Dec 15, 2010).
101. See Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows", 67 Soc Psychology Q 319, 330-34 (2004) (showing empirically that perception of disorder in neighborhoods is correlated not only with observation of disorder but also with the racial composition of the neighborhood).
102. NYPD officers are trained to conduct SQF interventions under guidelines articulated in the NYPD Patrol Guide. See New York City Police Department, Patrol Guide Manual (2006 ed.) §§ 211-11, 696-7 (on file with authors).
103. 2, a measure that shows model fit for regressions of events such as police stops. For information on calculating fit in such models, see generally David W. Hosmer and Stanley Lemesbow, Goodness of Fit Tests for the Multiple Logistic Regression Model, 9 Communications in Stats - Theory & Methods 1043 (1980).
104. See generally Gary A. Ballinger, Using Generalized Estimating Equations for Longitudinal Data Analysis, 7 Org Rsrch Methods 127 (2004).
105. See Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies, and Adam Carlis, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 9 J Empirical Legal Stud 697, 716-17 (2012) (showing the heavy spatial concentration of trespass stops in New York City public housing sites from 2004 to 2011).
106. Public housing was a primary target of drug-law enforcement beginning in the 1970s and was declared by definition a high-crime area by the NYPD. See generally Escalera v New York City Housing Authority, 425 F2d 853 (1970) (describing a program of drug arrests and summary evictions of residents in public housing who were accused by NYPD Housing Bureau patrols of drug possession or trafficking)
107. 2 in these two models results primarily from the fit of the location (public housing) and circumstance (drug transactions) to the RS factors, without saying precisely which behaviors other than the offense itself characterize "suspicion." For example, "Actions Indicative Of Engaging In Drug Transaction" predict drug stops, and "High Crime Area" and "Drug Transaction" predict trespass stops (which are concentrated in public housing). Accordingly, the meanings of these suspicion factors with respect to the suspected crime are dictated more by policy than by individualized behavioral descriptions. In the current procedure for recording RS bases of stops, the behavioral meaning of the act is removed from the design of the specific factor that the officer indicates.
108. See Adam Carlis, Note, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 102 Colum L Rev 2002, 2004-11 (2009).
109. ∗3 n 3, 5 (SDNY filed June 2012).
110. See also Davis v City of New York, 902 F Supp 2d 405, 416 n 67; Carlis, 102 Colum L Rev at 2009-11 (cited in note 100)
111. Ligon v City of New York, 925 F Supp 2d 478, 484-85 (SDNY 2013) (noting that police trespass stops in and around high-rise residential buildings lacked individualized and reasonable suspicion).
112. Eliot Spitzer, The New York City Police Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New York from the Office of the Attorney General 132-34 (Civil Rights Bureau 1999).
113. See also Stop-and-Frisk Data (New York Civil Liberties Union, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Z5XK-FXFR.
114. See Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 17-25 (Anchor 1959) (providing professional examples of "the individual's own belief in the impression of reality that he attempts to engender in those among whom he finds himself").
115. See also generally Paul Marsden, Memetics and Social Contagion: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 2 J Memetics-Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission 68 (1998).
116. See generally Marvin B. Scott and Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 Am Sociological Rev 46 (1968).
117. See Hirokawa, 49 Emory L J at 307 (cited in note 38).
118. See generally Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 Am Sociological Rev 273 (1986) (explaining that tool kits include habits, skills, and styles from which individuals select lines of actions).
119. See also Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 Ann Rev Sociology 263, 269 (1997).
120. See Floyd v City of New York, 959 F Supp 2d 540, 573 (SDNY 2013) (noting that police took no further law-enforcement action in about nine out of every ten stops).
121. ∗3 (New York State Office of the Attorney General, Civil Rights Bureau, Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5Z9B-9EVC.