Swing voters, core voters, and distributive politics

Political Representation

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 342-357

  Cox, Gary W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925634954     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511813146.015     Document Type: Chapter

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