Negotiation analysis: Between decisions and games

Advances in Decision Analysis: From Foundations to Applications

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 469-488

  Sebenius, James K ^a  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925602920     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511611308.024     Document Type: Chapter

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