Risk analysis of dust explosion scenarios using bayesian networks

Risk Analysis

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 278-291

  Yuan, Zhi ^a   Khakzad, Nima ^a   Khan, Faisal ^a   Amyotte, Paul ^b  

^a MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND   (Canada)

^b DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Bayesian network; Bow tie model; Dust explosion; Risk analysis

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; DUST; PERSONNEL TRAINING; RISK ANALYSIS; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK PERCEPTION;

BOW TIE; COMMON CAUSE FAILURE; CONTRIBUTING FACTOR; DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS; DUST EXPLOSION; DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENTS; LOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS; OXYGEN CONCENTRATIONS;

EXPLOSIONS;

ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION; BAYESIAN ANALYSIS; DUST; EXPLOSION; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 84925257869     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: 15396924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/risa.12283     Document Type: Article

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