Word and world: Practice and the foundations of language

Word and World: Practice and the Foundations of Language

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-420

  Hanna, Patricia ^a   Harrison, Bernard ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924524194     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511616549     Document Type: Book

References (201)

1. Ryle, Gilbert, Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.
2. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, La Prose du Monde, Paris, 1969. Translated as The Prose of the World, tr. Claude Lefort and John O’Neill. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 115.
3. Frege, Gottlob, Logical Investigations, ed. P. T. Geach, tr. P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, p. 36.
4. Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, Book III, Chapter V, §3.
5. Berkeley, George, “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,” in A New Theory of Vision, and Other Writings. London: J. M. Dent, Everyman, 1910, p. 244.
6. Russell, Bertrand, Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901—1950, ed. Robert Charles Marsh. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956, p. 195.
7. Dummett, Michael, Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978, p. 157.
8. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press, 1912, p. 48.
9. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 58-9.
10. Russell, Bertrand, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1940, p. 66.
11. Russell, Meaning and Truth, p. 65.
12. Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929. All citations from A51/B75.
13. McDowell, John, Mind and World. London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 5.
14. Geach, Peter, Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. See especially §§5-11.
15. McDowell, Mind and World, p. 7.
16. Geach, Mental Acts, p. 40.
17. McDowell, Mind and World, pp. 4-5.
18. Zalabardo, José, “Rules, Communities, and Judgments.” Critica 63 (1989): 33–58.
19. Quine, W. V. O., “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.
20. Quine, W. V. O., Ontological Relativity, and Other Essays. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 75.
21. Quine, W. V. O., Word and Object. New York, London, Cambridge, MA: John Wiley and Sons/MIT Press, 1960, pp. 32–3.
22. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” p. 43.
23. Heal, Jane, Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
24. Harrison, Bernard, “Wittgenstein and Scepticism,” in Klaus Piihl, ed., Meaning- Scepticism. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991, pp. 34-69.
25. Harrison, Bernard, “Truth, Yardsticks and Language- Games,” Philosophical Investigations, 19: 2 (1996): 105-30.
26. Harrison, Bernard, “Criteria and Truth,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1999): 207-35.
27. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, xe.
28. Geach, Peter, and Black, Max, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell, 1966, p. 60.
29. Strawson, P. F., Review of L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Mind LXIII (1954): 70-99.
30. Harrison, “Criteria and Truth,” passim.
31. Martin, Gottfried, Leibniz: Logic and Metaphysics, tr. K. J. Northcott and P. G. Lucas. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964, pp. 57-62.
32. Wilkins, John, An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language. London, 1688.
33. Russell, Bertrand, Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950, ed. Robert Charles Marsh. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956, pp. 197-8.
34. Bachelard, Gaston, Le matérialisme rationnel. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972. See especially Ch. VII, “Le rationalisme de la couleur,” pp. 193–206.
35. Kovesi, Julius, Moral Notions. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, Chapter 1 et seq.
36. Heal, Jane, Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, p. 221.
37. Dummett, Michael, The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
38. Geach, Peter, and Black, Max, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell, 1966, p. 60.
39. Frege, Gottlob, Logical Investigations, ed. P. T. Geach, tr. P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, p. 33.
40. Geach and Black, Translations from Frege, p. 62.
41. Frege, Logical Investigations, p. 4.
42. Geach and Black, Translations from Frege, p. 62.
43. Russell, Bertrand, “On the Nature of Acquaintance,” in Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950, ed. Robert Charles Marsh. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956, p. 130.
44. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press, p. 58.
45. Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference, McDowell, John, ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 44.
46. Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963, p. 28ff.
47. Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 29.
48. Russell, Bertrand, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” in Marsh, Logic and Knowledge, pp. 182-3.
49. Ray Monk, Wittgenstein: the Duty of Genius. London: Jonathan Cape, 1990, p. 41.
50. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Notebooks 1914—16, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, p. v.
51. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 127.
52. Wittgenstein, Notebooks, p. 2e.
53. Davidson, Donald, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” in E. Lepore, ed., Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 443-6.
54. Dummett, Michael, Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth, 1973, p. 140.
55. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, H. xii, p. 230e.
56. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §13.
57. Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic, ratiocinative and inductive. London: Longmans, 1891, Book I, Chapter 2, §5.
58. Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
59. Harrison, Bernard, “Description and Identification.” Mind 91 (1982): 321-38.
60. Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 47.
61. Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, pp. 91-2.
62. Evans, Gareth, “The Causal Theory of Names.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47 (1973): 187-208.
63. Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, Book II, Chapter 1, §1.
64. Searle, John, Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 87.
65. Levi, Primo, If this is a Man. Published in America as Survival in Auschwitz, tr. Stuart Woolf. New York: Touchstone, 1996, p. 27.
66. Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929, A51/B75.
67. Katz, Jerrold J., “Has the description theory of names been refuted?,” in George Boolos, ed., Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 31-2.
68. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969, p. 28e.
69. Dummett, Michael, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” in Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, 1978. p. 171.
70. Quine, W. V. O., Word and Object, London and Cambridge, MA: John Wiley and Sons, MIT Press, 1960, pp. 32-3.
71. Davidson, Donald, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” in E. Lepore, ed., Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p. 446.
72. Dummett, Michael, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson and Hacking,” in E. Lepore, ed., Truth and Interpretation, p. 473.
73. Dummett, Michael, “What do I Know when I Know a Language?,” in The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 94-105.
74. Kripke, Saul, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982.
75. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, p. 81e.
76. Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, p. 15.
77. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 93-4.
78. Putnam, Hilary, The Many Faces of Realism: The Paul Carus Lectures. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987, pp. 14-15.
79. Miller, Alexander, Philosophy of Language. London: UCL Press, 1998, p. 173.
80. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 55.
81. Zalabardo, Jose, “Rules, Communities, and Judgments.” Critica 63 (1989): 33–58.
82. Wright, Crispin, “Kripke’s Account of the Argument against Private Language.” Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984): 759-77.
83. Blackburn, Simon, “The Individual Strikes Back.” Synthese 58 (1984): 281-301.
84. Dummett, Michael, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” in Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978, p. 170.
85. Baker, G. P., and Hacker, P. M. S., Scepticism, Rules andLanguage, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
86. Richard McDonough, “Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Meaning-Scepticism,” in Puhl, Klaus, ed., Meaning Scepticism, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1991, pp. 70-92.
87. Meredith Williams, “Blind Obedience: Rules, Community and the Individual,” in Puhl, Meaning Scepticism, pp. 93-125.
88. Goddard, L., “Counting.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy XXXIX (1961): 223-40.
89. Devitt, Michael, and Sterelny, Kim, Language and Reality, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p. 187.
90. Robinson, Guy, Philosophy and Mystification: a reflection on nonsense and clarity. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
91. Strawson, P. F., “Truth,” in Logico-LinguisticPapers. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1971, p. 197.
92. Frege, Gottlob, “Thoughts,” LogicalInvestigations, ed. P. T. Geach, tr. P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff. Oxford: Blackwell, 1977, p. 4.
93. Quine, W. V. O., From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1953, p. 42.
94. Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 55.
95. Davidson, Donald, “Radical Interpretation,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 125-40.
96. Quine, W. V. O., “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity, and Other Essays. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 75.
97. Davidson, “Radical Interpretation,” p. 135.
98. Quine, W. V. O., Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960, pp. 29-30.
99. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, §28, pp. 13e-14e.
100. Harrison, Bernard, “Meaning, Truth and Negation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volume 1 vii (1983): 179-204.
101. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Remarks. Oxford: Blackwell, 1975, pp. 110–11.
102. Geach, Peter, Mental Acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. p. 40.
103. Austin, J. L., Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962, p. 67.
104. Quine, W. V. O., “Natural Kinds,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 121-2.
105. Strawson, P. F., Individuals. London: Methuen, 1959, p. 208.
106. Evans, Gareth, “Identity and Predication,” in Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
107. Quine, W. V. O., “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 75.
108. Harrison, Bernard, Form and Content. Oxford: Blackwell, 1973.
109. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974, p. 130.
110. Bell, David, Frege’s Theory of Judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 109.
111. Frege, Gottlob, Logical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1977, p. 27.
112. Putnam, Hilary, “The meaning of ‘meaning’,” in Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 219.
113. Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, Book III, V, §3.
114. Putnam, “Meaning of ‘meaning’,” p. 222.
115. Pessin, Andrew, and Goldberg, Sanford, eds., The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam’s “The Meaning of Meaning.” Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
116. Putnam, “Meaning of ‘meaning’,” p. 224.
117. Quine, W. V. O., “Natural Kinds” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 114-38.
118. Putnam, Hilary, The Many Faces of Realism: The Paul Carus Lectures. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1987, p. 16.
119. Wheeler, Samuel C., III, Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 000, p. 120.
120. Chomsky, Noam, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, with an introduction by Smith, Neil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
121. Fodor, J. A., Review of Chomsky. Times Literary Supplement (June 23, 2000), p. 4.
122. Harrison, Bernard, Form and Content. Oxford: Blackwell: 1973, p. 13f.
123. Quine, “Natural Kinds,” pp. 121-2.
124. Berlin, Brent, and Kay, Paul, Basic Color Terms. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969, passim.
125. Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, Book III, §15.
126. Quine, W. V. O., Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 58.
127. Quine, W. V. O., From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1953, p. 43.
128. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961. All citations from p. 29.
129. Diamond, Cora, “Realism and the Realistic Spirit,” in Realism and the Realistic Spirit. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1991, both citations from p. 54.
130. Quine, W. V. O., From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1953, p. 34.
131. Grice, H. P., and Strawson, P. F., “In Defense of a Dogma,” Philosophical Review, LXV (1956): 141-58.
132. Cora Diamond’s Realism and the Realistic Spirit, pp. 47-58, and passim.
133. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Remarks. Oxford: Blackwell, 1975, p. 102 (opening of §74).
134. Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, p. 34, et seq.
135. Mellor, D. H., “Natural Kinds,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 28 (1977): 219-312.
136. Andrew Pessin and Sanford Goldberg, eds., The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam’s “The meaning of ‘meaning’. Amonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
137. Zemach, E., “Putnam’s Theory of the Reference of Substance Terms,” The Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976): 116-27.
138. Forbes, G. “In Defense of Absolute Essentialism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11 (1986): 3-31, passim.
139. Robertson, Teresa, “Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism.” Mind, 107 (October 1998): 729-49.
140. Hawthorne, John and Gendler, Tamar Szabo, “Origin Essentialism: The Arguments Reconsidered,” Mind, 109 (April 2000): 283-98.
141. Robertson, Teresa, “Essentialism: Origin and Order,” Mind, 109 (April 2000): 299-307.
142. Sterelny, Kim, “Natural-Kind Terms,” in Pessin and Goldberg, Twin Earth Chronicles, p. 106.
143. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, §218.
144. Julius Kovesi, Chapter 1 of Moral Notions, London: Routledge; New York: Humanities Press, 1967.
145. Hanna, Patricia, “Translation, Indeterminacy and Triviality,” Philosophia, 14, nos. 3-4 (1984): 341-8.
146. Quine, W. V. O., “Indeterminacy of Translation Again,” The Journal of Philosophy, 84, no. 1 (January 1987).
147. “On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation,” The Journal of Philosophy, 67, no. 6 (1970).
148. “Three Indeterminacies,” in Perspectives on Quine, ed. R. Barrett, and R. Gibson, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990: 1-16.
149. Quine, W. V. O., Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1960.
150. Quine, W. V. O., “Ontological Relativity,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 26-68.
151. Quine, W. V. O., “Speaking of Objects,” in Ontological Relativity, p. 20.
152. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953, §206.
153. Quine, Word and Object, p. 27.
154. Quine, W. V. O, “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World,” Erkenntnis 9 (1975): 313-28, p. 316.
155. Quine, Ontological Relativity, p. 49.
156. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §217.
157. Gareth Evans’s analysis of the “Gavagai” case in “Identity and Predication” (in Collected Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 25-48).
158. Quine, W.V. O., “Perceiving and Learning,” in The Roots of Reference, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1973, pp. 1-32.
159. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §28.
160. Quine, W. V. O., “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity, p. 89.
161. Quine, Ontological Relativity, p. 53.
162. Hanna, Patricia, “Linguistic Competence and Kripke’s Puzzle,” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, vol. 28, nos. 1-4 (2001): 171-89.
163. Kripke, Saul, “A Puzzle About Belief.” Meaning and Use, ed. A. Margalit Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979, pp. 239-83.
164. Kripke, “Puzzle,” pp. 248-50.
165. Kripke, “Puzzle,” pp. 260-1.
166. Kripke, “Puzzle,” pp. 256-7.
167. Kripke, “Puzzle,” p. 260.
168. Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference, ed. John McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 44.
169. Hanna, Patricia, “What Kripke’s Puzzle Doesn’t Tell Us about Language, Meaning or Belief,” submitted to Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel in 2000, to appear in 2003.
170. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Notebooks, 1914–1916, H. G. von Wright, and G. E. M. Anscombe, ed.; Anscombe, G. E. M., tr. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, 29.5.15, p. 52e.
171. Kripke, Saul, “A Puzzle About Belief,” in Meaning and Use, ed. A. Margalit. D. Reidel, 1979, pp. 239-83.
172. Kripke, Saul, Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1980.
173. Kripke, “Puzzle,” p. 270. pp. 249–50.
174. Gareth Evans “Identity and Predication,” Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
175. Heal, Jane, Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
176. Robinson, Guy, Philosophy and Mystification: a reflection on nonsense and clarity. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
177. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G. H. von Wright et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978, p. 325.
178. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, La Prose du Monde. Paris, 1969. Translated as The Prose of the World, tr. Claude Lefort and John O’Neill. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 17.
179. Fodor, J. A., Review of Chomsky. Times Literary Supplement (June 23, 2000): 3-4.
180. Heal, Jane, Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, pp. 13-21.
181. Putnam, Hilary, Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 125.
182. Fales, Evan, “How to be a Metaphysical Realist,” in Peter A. French, Theodore Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XII: Realism and Antirealism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988, pp. 253-74.
183. Putnam, Meaning and Moral Sciences, p. 125.
184. Fales, “Metaphysical Realist,” p. 254.
185. Strawson, P. F., “Truth,” in Logico-Linguistic Papers. London: Methuen, 1971, pp. 190-213.
186. Frassen, Bas van, The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 8.
187. Lepore, Ernest and Lower, Barry, “A Putnam’s Progress,” in P. French et al., Realism and Antirealism, pp. 459-73. The first few paragraphs of this section owe much to Lepore and Loewer’s discussion.
188. Putnam, Hilary, Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 49.
189. Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, p. 125.
190. Lepore and Loewer, “A Putnam’s Progress,” p. 461.
191. Merleau-Ponty, Prose of the World, p. 4.
192. Spinoza, B., Ethics and On the Improvement of the Understanding, ed.James Gutman. New York: Hafner, 1949, 1974, p. 83.
193. Frege, Gottlob, “On Sense and Reference,” in Peter Geach, and Max Black, eds., Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970 p. 63.
194. Diamond, Cora, Realism and the Realistic Spirit. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1991.
195. Diamond, Realistic Spirit, p. 69.
196. Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philsophy. London: Fontana/Collins, p. 138-9.
197. Diamond, Realistic Spirit, p. 69.
198. Stevens, Wallace, The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954, p. 355.
199. Merleau-Ponty, Prose of the World, pp. 11-12.
200. Krausz, Michael, Rightness and Reasons: Interpretation in Cultural Practices. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1993.
201. Harrison, Bernard, Inconvenient Fictions: Literature and the Limits of Theory. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1991.