Linguistic competence and Kripke's puzzle

Philosophia (United States)

Volumn 28, Issue 1-4, 2001, Pages 171-189

  Hanna, Patricia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84897931343     PISSN: 00483893     EISSN: 15749274     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02379774     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. A Puzzle About Belief, in Meaning and Use, A. Margalit (ed.), D. Reidel (1979), pp. 239-283. Hereafter, PB. Unless indicated, all page references are to PB.
2. Naming and Necessity, in Semantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson and G. Harman (ed.), D. Reidel (1972).
3. The same holds for objects that are taken in at a glance (e.g., the referents of 'Cicero' and 'Tully'); but for my purposes this needn't be argued at length here.
4. This can, of course, be generalized for sentences in other languages. Such generalization wilt be assumed throughout the paper.
5. This is similar to Kripke's statement on p. 255, cited earlier. However, there are important differences between the two. (i)-(iii) omit all reference to any actual city; thus, the conditions given here make no mention of the world, as Kripke's statement may easily be taken as doing, and are restricted to the purely linguistic.
6. Looked at in another way, we might say that for Kripke there is simply one community of language users and speaking any language makes one automatically a member of that larger community; from this larger community we can be shuffled off into smaller subsets and be held to the very same standards that the speakers of these specific tongues are held to.
7. The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans, Oxford: The Clarendon Press (1982).
8. W. Whisner, "Self-Deception and Other-Person Deception: A New Conceptualization of One Central Type of Self-Deception, " Philosophia, 22 (3-4), December 1993, pp. 223-240. Further references to this paper will appear in the text as parenthetical page numbers.