Gain-of-function experiments: Time for a real debate

Nature Reviews Microbiology

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 58-64

  Duprex, W Paul ^a   Fouchier, Ron A M ^b   Imperiale, Michael J ^c   Lipsitch, Marc ^d   Relman, David A ^e,f  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

^b ERASMUS MEDICAL CENTER   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^d HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH   (United States)

^e STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^f VA PALO ALTO HEALTH CARE SYSTEM   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT; MICRORNA; RECOMBINANT DNA; VIRUS VACCINE;

AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUS; BIOSAFETY; GAIN OF FUNCTION MUTATION; GENOTYPE; HOST PATHOGEN INTERACTION; HOST RANGE; HUMAN; MEDICAL RESEARCH; NONHUMAN; PANDEMIC; PHENOTYPE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REVIEW; VACCINE PRODUCTION; VIRUS GENOME; VIRUS TRANSMISSION; VIRUS VIRULENCE; ETHICS; INFLUENZA; METHODOLOGY; ORTHOMYXOVIRUS; PANDEMICS; PATHOGENICITY; PROCEDURES; RISK ASSESSMENT;

ORTHOMYXOVIRIDAE;

BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH; HUMANS; INFLUENZA, HUMAN; ORTHOMYXOVIRIDAE; PANDEMICS; PHENOTYPE; RESEARCH DESIGN; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 84924124300     PISSN: 17401526     EISSN: 17401534     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/nrmicro3405     Document Type: Review

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