An introduction to Gödel’s theorems

An Introduction to Godel's Theorems

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-361

  Smith, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84924003054     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800962     Document Type: Book

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