Restitution's Realism

Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Dagan, Hanoch ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Corrective justice; Empiricism; Jurisprudence; Legal determinacy; Legal realism; Mistakes; Restitution; Rules; Unjust enrichment; Value pluralism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921591487     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567751.003.0003     Document Type: Chapter

References (131)

1. Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
2. Emily Sherwin, 'Rule-Oriented Realism' (2005) 103 Michigan Law Review 1578;
3. Ernest A Weinrib, 'Reviving Restitution' (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 861;
4. Mark P Gergen, 'A Thoroughly Modern Theory of Restitution' (2005) 84 Texas Law Review 173;
5. Kit Barker, 'Theorising Unjust Enrichment: Being Realist(ic)?' (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 609;
6. Dennis Klimchuk, 'Restitution and Realism' (2007) 20 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 225;
7. Katrina M Wyman, 'Is Formalism Inevitable?' (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 685;
8. Duncan Sheehan, Book Review (2005) 34 Common Law World Review 195;
9. Prince Saprai, Book Review (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 521;
10. Robin Evans-Jones, Book Review (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 484;
11. Andrew Tettenborn, Book Review (2005) 13 Restitution Law Review 245;
12. Eoin O'Dell, Book Review (2005) 27 Dublin University Law Journal 424;
13. Jacques du Plessis, Book Review (2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 941;
14. James Edelman, Book Review (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 131;
15. Amy Goymour, Book Review (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 456;
16. Peter Jaffey, Book Review (2007) 3 International Journal of Law in Context 73;
17. Book Note (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1094.
18. This section summarizes my account in Hanoch Dagan, 'The Realist Conception of Law' (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 607.
19. See H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961) 123, 141-2, 144.
20. Karl L Llewellyn, 'Some Realism about Realism', in Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and in Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) 42, 58, 70;
21. Felix S Cohen, 'The Problems of Functional Jurisprudence', in Lucy Kramer Cohen (ed), The Legal Conscience: Selected Papers of Felix S Cohen (New Haven: Yale University Press 1960) 77, 83;
22. Karl L Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America, Paul Gewirtz, ed; Michael Alsandi, trans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933, 1989) 25, 45, 51;
23. Karl L Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1960) 77-91;
24. Karl L Llewellyn, 'Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed' (1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395.
25. See Anthony T Kronman, 'Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism' (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 335, 335-6.
26. See Fred Rodell, Woe Unto you, Lawyers! (New York: Pageant Press, 1939) 3-4, 6-7, 153, 157-8, 186, 189, 196, 198.
27. See Oliver W Holmes, 'The Path of the Law', in Collected Legal Papers (New York: Harcourt Brace & Howe, 1920) 167.
28. See Felix S Cohen, 'Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach' (1935) 35 Columbian Law Review 809, 811-12, 820-1, 827-9;
29. John Dewey, 'Logical Method and Law', in William W Fisher III, Morton
30. J. Horowitz, and Thomas Reed (eds), American Legal Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 185, 191, 193;
31. Oliver W Holmes, 'Law in Science and Science in Law', in Collected Legal Papers, above n 8, at 210, 230, 232, 238-9.
32. See also eg Robert Cover, 'Violence and the Word', in Martha Minow Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat (eds), Narrative, Violence, and the Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) 203.
33. See eg Robert W Gordon, 'Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law' (1987) 15 Florida State University Law Review 195, 212-14.
34. See eg Cohen, above n 9, at 814-18, 840;
35. Louis L Jaffe, 'Law Making by Private Groups' (1937) 51 Harvard Law Review 212.
36. See K N Llewellyn, 'The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method' (1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1355, 1362-5, 1367-8, 1370, 1381-3, 1387.
37. See also eg Thomas W Bechtler, 'American Legal Realism Revaluated', in Thomas W Bechtler (ed), Law in Social Context: Liber Amicorum Honouring Professor Lon L. Fuller (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1978) 3, 20-1;
38. Harry W Jones, 'Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism' (1961) 61 Columbia Law Review 799, 801, 809;
39. Hessel E Yntema, 'The Rational Basis of Legal Science' (1931) 31 Columbia Law Review 295, 255.
40. See Holmes, above n 8, at 181;
41. Llewellyn, 'On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law', in Jurisprudence, above n 5, at 167, 211-12;
42. Hessel E Yntema, 'Jurisprudence on Parade' (1941) 39 Michigan Law Review 1154, 1169.
43. See respectively eg Joseph W Bingham, 'What is the Law?' (1912) 11 Michigan Law Review 1, 17;
44. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Legal Science (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995) chs 2 and 4;
45. Benjamin N Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) 105-6, 108.
46. See Felix S Cohen, 'Modern Ethics and the Law' 4 Brooklyn Law Review (1934) 33, 45;
47. Cohen, above n 9, at 75-6;
48. William Twining, 'The Idea of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn' (1993) 48 University of Miami Law Review 119, 151-2.
49. Felix S Cohen, 'Field Theory and Judicial Logic', in The Legal Conscience, above n 5, at 121, 125-6.
50. See also eg Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, above n 5, at 46-7, 132;
51. Llewellyn, 'American Common Law Tradition and American Democracy', in Jurisprudence, above n 5, at 282, 308-10.
52. Herman Oliphant, 'A Return to Stare Decisis', 14 American Bar Association Journal 71, 73-4, 159 (1928).
53. See also eg Llewellyn, 'A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step', in Jurisprudence, above n 5, at 3, 27-8, 32;
54. Walter Wheeler Cook, 'Scientific Method and the Law', in American Legal Realism, above n 9, at 242, 246.
55. See respectively John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, HLA Hart, ed (New York: Noonday Press, 1954; 1st ed, 1832) 14;
56. Hart, above n 4, at 107.
57. See also Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1979) 40.
58. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, above n 5, at 36, 38, 190-1, 217, 222-3;
59. Llewellyn, Case Law, above n 5, at 77;
60. Llewellyn, 'Law and the Social Sciences', in Jurisprudence, above n 5, at 357, 361-2;
61. Llewellyn, 'The Normative', above n 12, at 1385.
62. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, above n 5, at 37-8.
63. See also Cardozo, above n 14, at 179;
64. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986) 400-13.
65. On this tripartite distinction, see Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987) 1-32.
66. See Llewellyn, 'On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law', in Jurisprudence, above n 5, at 167, 211-12;
67. Edward A Purcell, Jr, The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1973) 41-2.
68. See Cohen, above n 9, at 820-1, 827-9.
69. Llewellyn, 'A Realistic Jurisprudence', above n 17, at 27-8, 32;
70. Llewellyn, 'Some Realism', above n 5, at 59-60.
71. See Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) 63-82.
72. See eg Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983);
73. Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993);
74. Elizabeth Anderson, 'Pragmatism, Science, and Moral Inquiry', in Richard Wightman Fox and Robert B Westbrook (eds), In the Face of Facts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 10, 17.
75. Oliphant, above n 17, at 73-4, 159.
76. See also William W Fisher III, 'The Development of American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights', in Michael J Lacey and Knud Haakonssen (eds), A Culture of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 266, 272-3, 275.
77. See Raz, above n 18, at 183-97.
78. Weinrib, above n 2, at 863, 868.
79. See eg Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995) 3-14, 212, 214;
80. Ernest J Weinrib, 'Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice' (1999) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1, 3-5, 37.
81. See also Klimchuk, above n 2, at 240
82. Edward L Rubin, 'Punitive Damages: Reconceptualizing the Runcible Remedies of Common Law' (1998) Wisconsin Law Review 131, 154.
83. See eg Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 6th ed (Aspen, Colo: Aspen Law and Business, 2003) 383-5.
84. See Hanoch Dagan, 'Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings' (2000) 99 Michigan Law Review 134, 148-52.
85. Cf. James Gordley, Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 11;
86. Peter Cane, 'Distributive Justice and Tort Law' (2001) New Zealand Law Review 401.
87. See Ernest J Weinrib, 'Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights' (2003) 78 Notre Dame Law Review 795.
88. Weinrib, above n 34, at 124.
89. Weinrib, above n 2, at 874.
90. Ernest J Weinrib, 'Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies' (2003) 78 Chicago-Kent Law Review 55, 90-1.
91. As the text implies, I am not claiming that no such reasons could be adduced. See eg Dan M Kahan, 'Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Law Enforcement in the Inner City' (1999) 46 UCLA Law Review 1859.
92. See eg Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment, Henry Paolucci, trans (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963; 1st ed, 1764) 58
93. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) 138
94. See generally Hanoch Dagan, 'The Limited Autonomy of Private Law' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 809.
95. Dennis Klimchuk, 'The Normative Foundations of Unjust Enrichment' (in this volume, at 97).
96. Ernest J Weinrib, 'The Normative Structure of Unjust Enrichment', in Charles Rickett and Ross Grantham (eds), Structure and Justification in Private Law: Essays for Peter Birks (Oxford: Hart, 2008) 21, 43.
97. See Steven J Burton, Judging in Good Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 19-21.
98. See eg John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 31-4, 118-38;
99. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) 1-19;
100. Isaiah Berlin, 'The Pursuit of the Ideal', in Henry Hardy (ed), The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 1, 11;
101. William A Galston, 'The Legal and Political Implications of Value Pluralism' 57 Maryland Law Review (1998) 236, 241.
102. See generally Hanoch Dagan, 'Legal Realism and The Taxonomy of Private Law', in Structure and Justification in Private Law, above n 53, at 147.
103. See Edelman, above n 2, at 134.
104. See Joseph William Singer, 'Property Norms: Reflections on the Externalities of Ownership', in Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver (eds), Property and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
105. Cf James Gordley, 'The State's Private Law and Legal Academia' (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 809.
106. Cf Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) 76-86 (responding to the challenge of 'external critique').
107. Barker, above n 2, at 614-15.
108. See also Goymour, above n 2, at 458.
109. Weinrib, above n 2, at 866-7, 877.
110. See Hanoch Dagan, 'The Craft of Property', 92 California Law Review 1517, 1527-32 (2003).
111. Klimchuk, above n 2, at 230, 232.
112. Barker, above n 2, at 617.
113. See also eg Saprai, above n 2, at 524.
114. Barker, above n 2, at 613, 616, 617.
115. See Goymour, above n 2, at 458.
116. Sherwin, above n 2, at 1579, 1588.
117. See eg Rodell, above n 7, at 169-74, 201-2.
118. See eg Andrew Altman, 'The Legacy of Legal Realism' (1986) 10 Legal Studies Forum 167, 171-2;
119. Todd D Rakoff, 'The Implied Terms of Contract: Of "Default Rules" and "Situation Sense" ', in Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon)
120. Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin, The Rule of Rules (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001) 12-15.
121. See also eg Frederick Schauer, 'The Generality of Law' (2004) 107 West Virginia Law Review 217, 224-34.
122. As Sherwin herself notes, Karl Llewellyn, the most important legal realist, 'was the principal draftsman of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code'.
123. Sherwin, above n 2, at 1589.
124. See Alexander and Sherwin, above n 77, at 32-4.
125. Sherwin, above n 2, at 1591-4.
126. Wyman, above n 2, at 688 n 7.
127. Alan Schwartz, 'Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory', in Jody S Kraus and Steven D Walt (eds), The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 12, 53 n 147.
128. Wyman, above n 2, at 686, 703-4.
129. See Dagan, above n 48, at 34-5.
130. Wyman, above n 2, at 700-2.
131. Cf Carolyn J Frantz and Hanoch Dagan, 'Properties of Marriage' (2004) 104 Columbia Law Review 75, 97-8.