Knowing That I Am Thinking

Self-Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages

  Byrne, Alex ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Epistemic rules; Imagination; Inner sense; Inner speech; Introspection; Knowledge; Mckinsey paradox; Privileged access; Proprioception; Self knowledge; Thinking

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921550926     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0006     Document Type: Chapter

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