The use and disruption of familiarity in intuitive judgments

Intuition: In Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 295-307

  Catty, Steve ^a   Halberstadt, Jamin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920842204     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203838099     Document Type: Chapter

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