In the forest of value: Why moral intuitions are different from other kinds

Intuition: In Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 209-229

  Haidt, Jonathan ^a   Kesebir, Selin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920829533     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203838099     Document Type: Chapter

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