On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics

How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Rubinfeld, Daniel L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust law; Antitrust policy; Conservative economics; Economic analysis

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920751238     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372823.003.0006     Document Type: Chapter

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