Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology

Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-240

  Kennett, Jeanette ^a  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Better judgement; Compulsion; Evil; Moral agency; Moral failure; Moral responsibility; Recklessness; Value; Virtue; Weakness of will

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920556872     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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