Ukraine and the Art of Limited War

Survival

Volumn 56, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 7-38

  Freedman, Lawrence ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920097301     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.985432     Document Type: Article

References (108)

1. Lawrence Freedman, ‘Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2014-4667/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-june-july-2014-3d8b/56-3-02-freedman-6162.
2. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Ukraine: Situation Report No. 15 as of 10 October 2014’, http://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-situation-report-no-15-10-october-2014. These numbers include 298 casualties from Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. They depend on reports from official sources and medical establishments and are likely to be underestimates. Another report attributes civilian deaths to indiscriminate shelling of residential areas by both pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian armed forces.
3. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine’, 16 September 2014, p. 3, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/OHCHR_sixth_report_on_Ukraine.pdf.
4. Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
5. This term was first coined in the late 1940s by the Hungarian communist leader Matyas Rakosi to explain the political process by which the Soviet Union gained control of Eastern Europe. The communists first organised ‘anti-fascist’ governments that would then shut down the parties to the right of them one by one, ’cutting them off like slices of salami’, until only the ‘end-piece’ of the Communist Party was left. It was therefore about the progressive exclusion of opponents. Later in the Cold War the term tended to be used to refer to progressive but incremental victories. There is, however, one continuity here with the current Ukrainian crisis in the liberal use of the ‘fascist’ label to delegitimise all other parties.
6. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965).
7. Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid Warfare and Challenges’, Joint Forces Quarte
8. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (eds), Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
9. Frank Hoffman, ‘On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats’, War on the Rocks, 28 July 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/.
10. This is according to an interview with former Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski.
11. Ben Judah, ‘Putin’s Coup: How the Russian Leader Used the Ukraine Crisis to Consolidate his Dictatorship’, Politico Magazine, 19 October 2014, http://www.politico. com/magazine/story/2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025.html#ixzz3Gh3SNyUQ.
12. Odessa was of obvious importance as a regional capital. On 2 May there was a tragic incident in the city. After violent clashes between pro-Russian demonstrators and pro-unity supporters, the separatists were overwhelmed and retreated to a trade-union building, which was set on fire, possibly as a result of petrol bombs originally used by those inside the building. Thirty-two people died as a result. The incident aggravated already tense relations in southeastern Ukraine.
13. Novorossiya was originally a far larger area than that currently occupied by the separatists. It included what had been Ottoman territory conquered by Catherine the Great, including Odessa.
14. This was another term associated with the Cold War. It referred to the post-war deal with the Soviet Union whereby Finland was able to adopt a democratic system and a market economy in return for remaining friendly to the Soviet Union in its foreign policy. It became a term of abuse, initially in Germany, employed against those who seemed to be ready to give Moscow a veto over foreign policy in return for a quiet life.
15. Richard Milne, ‘“Finlandisation” Makes a Polarising Comeback in Finland’, Financial Times, 24 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cbb17c76-435c-11e4-be3f-00144feabdc0. html#axzz3GsEd4ube.
16. Anna Dolgov, ‘Russia Sees Need to Protect Russian Speakers in NATO Baltic States’, Moscow Times, 16 September 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-sees-need-to-protectrussian-speakers-in-nato-balticstates/507188.html.
17. Justin Huggler, ‘Putin Privately Threatened to Invade Poland, Romania and the Baltic States’, Daily Telegraph, 19 September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11106195/Putin-privately-threatened-to-invade-Poland-Romania-and-the-Balticstates.html.
18. This was a speech of late January 2013 to the annual general meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences on ‘The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the Defense of the Country in Correspondence with the New Statute about the General Staff Confirmed by the President of the Russian Federation’.
19. Sam Jones, ‘Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War’, Financial Times, 28 August 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube
20. Paul Goble, ‘Putin’s Actions in Ukraine Following Script by Russian General Staff a Year Ago’, Interpreter, 20 June 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/putinsactionsinukrainefollowing-script-byrussian-general-staff-a-year-ago/.
21. The referendums were held on 11 May 2014. They took place after Putin had asked that they be postponed. It was claimed that 2,252,867 had voted in favour of self-rule, with 256,040 against, on a turnout of nearly 75%. The 89% ‘yes’ vote was in line with what had apparently been suggested in an intercepted call with the organisers and a Russian politician, but out of line with recent opinion polling in the region.
22. ‘Ukraine Rebels Hold Referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk’, BBC, 11 May 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27360146
23. ‘SBU Audio Links Donetsk Republic to Russian Involvement’, Ukrainian Policy, http://ukrainianpolicy.com/sbu-audio-links-donetsk-republic-torussian-involvement/
24. Mumin Shakirov’s interview with Artur Gasparyan, an Armenian fighting for the separatists: ‘I was a Separatist Fighter in Ukraine’, Guardian, 15 July 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/15/separatist-fighter-russia-eastern-ukraine-interview. According to Gasparyan, only some 20% of the separatist militia were Ukrainian.
25. Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Plenty of Room at the Top of Ukraine’s Fading Rebellion’, New York Times, 19 August 2014, http://www.nytimes. com/2014/08/20/world/europe/plenty-of-room-at-the-top-of-ukrainesfading-rebellion.html.
26. One allegation was that a purpose of the convoy was to extract from Ukraine material from defence plants necessary for Russian defence production.
27. Reuben Johnson, ‘Russian Aid Convoy Committed Wide-scale Looting, Says Ukraine’, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 27 August 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/42444/russian-aid-convoy-committed-widescale-looting-says-ukraine.
28. Adrian Croft, ‘More Than 1,000 Russian Troops Operating in Ukraine: NATO’, Reuters, 28 August 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/28/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUSKBN0GS1D220140828.
29. The prime minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, reported before Russian troops engaged fully that 1,200 fighters had trained in Russia for four months, had crossed into Ukraine and were ready to fight, supported by 30 tanks and 120 armoured vehicles. He later retracted this statement.
30. Roman Olearchyk and Courtney Weaver, ‘Separatist Leader Boasts of Fresh Tanks and Trained Troops from Russia’, Financial Times, 16 August 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/10867312-2560-11e4-af2c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IBpHHde8
31. He told Russian media in late August that among the 3,000–4,000 Russian citizens fighting with the separatists were ‘fighting serving soldiers, who would rather take their vacation not on a beach but with us, among brothers’.
32. ‘Serving Russian Soldiers On Leave Fighting Ukrainian Troops Alongside Rebels, Pro-Russian Separatist Leader Says’, Telegraph, 28 August 2014, http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/angela-merkel/11060559/Serving-Russian-soldiers-on-leavefighting-Ukrainian-troops-alongsiderebels-pro-Russian-separatist-leadersays. html.
33. ‘Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on Ukraine’s Challenges’, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 September 2014, http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/conversation-arseniy-yatsenyuk/p33512?cid.
34. Lucian Kim, ‘Ukraine’s Slow Descent into Madness’, Slate, 23 October 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/10/petro_poroshenko_is_facing_rebels_and_growing_discontent_can_the_ukrainian.html.
35. ‘Ukraine Deal with Pro-Russian Rebels at Minsk Talks’, BBC, 20 September 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29290246.
36. ‘Ukraine Crisis: Nato Sees “Significant” Russian Troop Pullback’, BBC, 24 September 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29342463;
37. Adrian Croft, ‘Russia Still Has Troops in Ukraine, NATO Says’, Reuters, 24 October 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/uk-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUKKCN0ID0V120141024
38. Michael R. Gordon and Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Russia Continues to Train and Equip Ukraine Rebels, NATO Official Says’, New York Times, 3 November 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/world/europe/donestk-luhansk-ukraine-votezakharchenko-plotnitsky.html.
39. ‘Ukraine Says 2,000 Russian Servicemen Killed in Ukraine Conflict’, Reuters, 5 September 2014, http://uk.reuters. com/article/2014/09/05/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-casualtiesidUKKBN0H00VY20140905. This seems too high. There are, for obvious reasons, no authoritative Russian figures.
40. Terrence McCoy, ‘What Does Russia Tell the Mothers of Soldiers Killed in Ukraine? Not Much’, Washington Post, 29 August 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/29/what-does-russia-tell-the-mothers-ofsoldiers-killed-in-ukraine-not-much/.
41. ‘Russian Sanctions Could Be Eased Soon if Ukraine Progress Made: U.S. Adviser’, Reuters, 10 October 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/uk-ukraine-crisisblinken-idUKKCN0HZ1NF20141010. The link with Crimea was less clear.
42. ‘Russia Risks Recession After Economic Sanctions Over Ukraine Crisis’, International Business Times, 26 September 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-risks-recession-after-economicsanctions-over-ukraine-crisis-1695692
43. Paul Roderick Gregory, ‘Western Sanctions And Rising Debts Are Already Strangling the Russian Economy’, Forbes, 28 August 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/08/28/western-sanctions-and-rising-debtsare-already-strangling-the-russianeconomy/.
44. For data on the dependence of individual European countries on Russian energy, see this New York Times chart, updated on 2 September 2014: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/21/world/europe/how-much-europe-depends-on-russian-energy.html?_r=1.
45. The EU brokered a temporary deal between Russia and Ukraine at the end of October 2014.
46. Edward C. Chow, ‘Russia–Ukraine Gas Deal – Another Last-Minute Special’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 October 2014, http://csis.org/publication/russia-ukraine-gas-dealanother-last-minute-special.
47. ‘Crimea Seeks Billions From Moscow to Aid Investment Projects’, Moscow Times, 15 September 2014, http://www. themoscowtimes.com/advertorials/business/Crimea-Seeks-Billions-From-Moscow-to-Aid-Investment-Projects/.
48. ‘Ukraine’s Election: Good Voters, Not Such Good Guys’, Economist, 1 November 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21629375-poll-resultswere-promising-future-ukrainedauntingly-difficult-oodvoters?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07. It is notable that turnout was lower in the east compared with the west (only 32% in the Ukrainiancontrolled areas of the Donbas).
49. ‘Fight Club’, Economist, 11 October 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21623767-after-war-was-notwar-ceasefire-not-ceasefire-fight-club.
50. Roland Oliphant, ‘Ukraine Peace Plan Blow As Rebels Reject Donetsk and Luhansk Autonomy Deal’, Telegraph, 17 October 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11169790/Ukraine-peaceplan-blow-as-rebels-reject-Donetskand-Luhansk-autonomy-deal.html.
51. Zakharchenko observed on 18 October that ‘we can no longer live in one state with Ukraine. Most likely, we will stay unrecognized. One [sic] the one hand, this seems bad. On the other hand, it is very good for the economy. Being unrecognized means more money. This means no international obligations.’
52. ‘Donetsk People’s Republic Likely to Remain Formally Unrecognized: DPR Prime Minister’, RIA Novosti, 18 October 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20141018/194260010/Donetsk-Peoples-Republic-Likely-to-Remain-Formally-Unrecognized.html.
53. ‘Donetsk Forces Plan to Retake Slaviansk, Kramatorsk, Mariupol’, RIA Novosti, 23 October 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20141023/194479030/Donetsk-Forces-Plan-to-Retake-Slaviansk-Kramatorsk-Mariupol.html.
54. This was confirmed by the OSCE, which was supposedly charged with monitoring the implementation of the Minsk agreement. (See OSCE, ‘So-called Elections Not In Line With Minsk Protocol, Says OSCE Chair, Calling for Enhanced Efforts and Dialogue to Implement all Commitments’, 31 October 2014, http://www.osce.org/cio/126242.) But the OSCE did not monitor the elections. Under the aegis of something mischievously described asthe Association of Security and Cooperation in Europe, a number of extremist politicians (from right and left) validated the election. Before they took place, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had declared the results ‘important for legitimizing the authority’ of the separatist governments, and promised to ‘recognize their results’.
55. David M. Herszenhorn and Andrew Roth, ‘Russia Backs Plan by Ukraine Separatists for an Early Election’, New York Times, 20 October 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/world/europe/vote-set-by-ukraine-separatists-wins-russias-support.html?_r=0.
56. ‘Ukraine Crisis: President Poroshenko’s Threat After Rebel Polls’, BBC, 4 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29891556.
57. Lizzy Davies, ‘Vladimir Putin Under Pressure to Denounce Rival Elections in Ukraine’, Guardian, 17 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/17/vladimir-putin-elections-ukraine-eu-leaders-minsk-peace.
58. A poll carried out in September 2014 by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) showed that Ukrainians remained evenly divided on whether a military (40%) or a negotiated solution (41%) was preferable.
59. ‘Ukraine’s Election: Springboard for Change?’, IISS Strategic Comments, 13 October 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2014-a6f5/ukraine--39-s-election--springboard-for-change-98fc.
60. ‘Joint Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the EU–Ukraine AA/DCFTA’, Brussels, 12 September 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_STATEMENT-14-276_en.htm.
61. Peter Spiegel, ‘Putin Demands Reopening of EU Trade Pact with Ukraine’, Financial Times, 25 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4de51ae-44ca-11e4-9a5a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube.
62. In 1787, when Empress Catherine II visited Crimea after a devastating war, the region’s governor, Grigory Potemkin, sought to create an erroneous impression of a vibrant settlement. This was achieved by fabricating villages on the banks of the Dnieper, populated by Potemkin’s men. These would exist for only as long as it took for the empress’s barge to pass by; they would then be dismantled to be reconstructed further down the river. While this story may well be apocryphal, its essence has been a feature of Russian practice, even during the Cold War, to hide weakness by seeking to create an impression of strength.
63. ‘Editorial: Russia’s New Tactics of War Shouldn’t Fool Anyone’, Washington Post, 27 August 2014,http://www. abreakingnews.com/politics/editorial-russias-new-tactics-of-warshouldnt-fool-anyone-h215531.html.
64. Timothy Snyder, ‘To Understand Putin, Read Orwell’, Politico Magazine, 3 September 2014, http://www. politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/to-understand-putin-readorwell-110551.html#ixzz3CRAeoF4D.
65. As Peter Pomerantsev put it, ‘Nobody who lives in that part of the world today ever thought of themselves as living in Novorossiya and bearing allegiance to it – at least until several months ago. Now, Novorossiya is being imagined intobeing: Russian media are showing maps of its “geography,” while Kremlin-backed politicians are writing its “history” into school textbooks.’
66. Peter Pomerantsev, ‘Russia and the Menace of Unreality: How Vladimir Putin is Revolutionizing Information Warfare’, Atlantic, 9 September 2014, http://www.theatlantic. com/international/archive/2014/09/russia-putin-revolutionizing-information-warfare/379880/2/.
67. Max Seddon, ‘Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America’, BuzzFeed News, 2 June 2014, http://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russiastroll-army-hit-america#20lrfq1.
68. The defection of some of RT’s reporters to the West, and the absurd nature of some of its claims, did little for its credibility (although it is important to note that in some parts of Europe, Russian media sources are widely used).
69. In response to the capture of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, the official line was that they were there ‘by accident’. ‘Captured Russian Troops “in Ukraine by Accident”’, BBC News, 26 August 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28934213.
70. Before the crash was announced, separatist leader Igor Girkin claimed ‘we just downed a plane, an AN-26 … We have issued warnings not to fly in our airspace.’ ‘Ukraine Separatist Social Media Site Claims Plane Downing’, Radio Free Europe, 17 July 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-separatist-leaderboasts-downing-plane/25460930.html. (A Ukrainian AN-26 transport had been shot down by a Russian surface-to-air missile on 26 July.)
71. Shortly afterwards, Ukrainian intelligence released a radio intercept of conversations between separatists, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw.
72. On 9 September 2014, the Dutch Safety Board released its report on the downing of the airliner. The report ruled out technical failure, and cited evidence that the aircraft was ‘penetrated by a large number of high-energy objects’ which ‘originated from outside the fuselage’. The report concluded that the aircraft broke up in mid-air; before this happened, there were no communications from the pilot or crew to suggest that there were any problems with the flight. All this accorded with a sudden and catastrophic event, consistent with the jet being destroyed by an advanced surface-to-air missile such as a BUK.
73. Dutch Safety Board, ‘Preliminary Report: Crash Involving Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 Flight MH17, Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014’, September 2014, http://www.onderzoeksraad nl/uploads/phase-docs/701/b3923acad0ceprem-rapport-mh-17-eninteractief.pdf.
74. German intelligence was said to have concluded that the aircraft was shot down by separatists.
75. ‘Deadly Ukraine Crash: German Intelligence Claims Pro-Russian Separatists Downed MH17’, Spiegel Online International, 19 October 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-intelligenceblames-pro-russian-separatists-formh1-downing-a-997972.html#spRedirectedFrom=www&referrrer=http://t.co/2DhGqtZE4J.
76. Thomas Sherlock, ‘Putin’s Public Opinion Challenge’, National Interest, 21 August 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/putins-public-opinionchallenge-11113.
77. Polls showed high support for Putin at 87%, but also wariness about a prolonged conflict in Ukraine and concern about economic prospects. ‘His approval rating rose to 86 percent in September from 65 percent in January, according to pollster Levada Center, which surveyed 1,600 people across Russia over four days.’
78. Judah, ‘Putin’s Coup’.
79. Jeffrey Michaels, Shock and Flawed: The Discourse Trap from the War on Terror to the Surge (London: Palgrave, 2013).
80. Tom Parfitt, ‘Ukraine Crisis: Putin’s Nuclear Threats are a Struggle for Pride and Status’, Telegraph, 29 August 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11064978/Ukrainecrisis-Putins-nuclear-threats-are-astruggle-for-pride-and-status.html.
81. Alexander Goltis, ‘Russia’s Nuclear Euphoria Ignores Reality’, Moscow Times, 6 October 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/advertorials/opinion/Russia-s-Nuclear-Euphoria-Ignores-Reality/.
82. One issue was whether the new doctrine would discuss pre-emptive nuclear strikes.
83. Matthew Bodner, ‘Russia Hardens Military Thinking as NATO Fizzes Over Ukraine’, Moscow Times, 7 September 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-hardens-military-thinking-as-natofizzes-over-ukraine/506570.html.
84. Mark Galeotti, ‘Estonian Kidnap Is Russia’s Latest Provocation’, Moscow Times, 11 September 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/advertorials/opinion/Estonian-Kidnap-Is-Russias-Latest-Provocation/.
85. Ott Ummelas and Bryan Bradley, ‘Lithuania Says Russia Seized Ship as Baltic Tensions Grow’, Bloomberg, 19 September 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-19/lithuania-says-russia-seized-shipas-baltic-tensions-grow.html;
86. ‘Nato Reports Rise in Russia Military Flights Over Europe’, BBC, 29 October 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-29825890. NATO reported that it had intercepted Russian aircraft more than 100 times so far this year – three times more than it did last year.
87. Elizabeth Pond, ‘The End of Deterrence? Ukraine Is At the Mercy of Moscow Now, the West is Watching Helplessly’, IP Journal, 23 September 2014, https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/blog/eye-europe/end-deterrence.
88. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, September–October 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-westsfault
89. Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the November–December issue (‘Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?’, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142260/michael-mcfaul-stephen-sestanovich-john-j-mearsheimer/faulty-powers.)
90. According to Sergey Karaganov, Western strategy misunderstood the extent to which the struggle was about stopping ‘others expanding their sphere of control into territoriesthey believe are vital to Russia’s survival’, and also the extent to which ‘Russia is far stronger, and the west far weaker, than many imagine’.
91. ‘Western Delusions Triggered This Conflict and Russians Will Not Yield’, Financial Times, 14 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/05770494-3a93-11e4-bd08-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube.
92. ‘On May 21, Mr Putin suddenly reversed a decade of resistance and caved in to Chinese demands for a lower gas price, accepting $350 per thousand cubic metres. That is 42 per cent less than the price Lithuania pays – so low that it risks depressing natural gas prices throughout the Far East, including for future Russian sales to Japan.’
93. Matthew Bryza, ‘Call Putin’s Bluff – He Will Not Cut off Europe’s Gas’, Financial Times, 1 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c03b931a-31c6-11e4-a19b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube
94. On Chinese caution when it comes to doing deals with Russia, see Jack Farchy and Kathrin Hille, ‘Chinese Lenders Grow Wary of Russian Embrace’, Financial Times, 13 October 2014. The $25 billion prepayment for gas agreed in May was still said by Gazprom to be ‘hanging in the balance’ as of mid-October.
95. ‘Russia Says Relations with US Need New “Reset”’, Hurriyet Daily News, 28 September 2014, http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-saysrelations-with-us-need-new-reset. aspx?pageID=238&nid=72262.
96. Speaking in Estonia on 3 September, President Obama said: ‘Since ultimately there’s no military solution to this crisis, we will continue to support President Poroshenko’s efforts to achieve peace because, like all independent nations, Ukraine must be free to decide its own destiny.’
97. ‘Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia’, Tallinn, Estonia, 3 September 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-peopleestonia.
98. While supporting sanctions, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Germany ‘will certainly not deliver weapons, as this would give the impression that this is a conflict that can be solved militarily.’
99. Andrew Higgins and Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Ukraine President Says Europe’s Security Depends on Stopping Russia’, New York Times, 30 August 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/europe/russia-pushing-ukraine-conflict-topoint-of-no-return-eu-leader-says.html.
100. Philip Shishkin and Jeffrey Sparshott, ‘Ukraine to Get More U.S. Aid, but Not Weapons’, Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-leader-calls-for-morewestern-military-aid-1411055160.
101. Mark Galeotti, ‘Crime and Crimea: Criminals As Allies and Agents’, RFE/RL, 3 November 2014, http://www. rferl.org/content/crimea-crime-criminals-as-agents-allies/26671923.html.
102. An example here is the paramilitary Azov Battalion, which is linked to the Right Sector in Ukraine and was involved in the defence of Mariupol.
103. Alec Luhn, ‘Preparing for War with Ukraine’s Fascist Defenders of Freedom’, Foreign Policy, 30 August 2014, Http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/30/Preparing_For_War_With_Ukraine_S_Fascist_Defenders_Of_Freedom.
104. Speech by President Vladimir Putin, ‘Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club’, 24 October 2014, http://eng.Kremlin.ru/news/23137
105. On economic sanctions he stated: ‘We know how these decisions were taken and who was applying the pressure. But let me stress that Russia is not going to get all worked up, get offended or come begging at anyone’s door.’
106. On the importance of strengthening Ukraine, including with further cash injections
107. George Soros, ‘Wake Up, Europe’, New York Review of Books, 20 November 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/wake-upeurope/.
108. Steven Mufson, ‘Ukraine’s Economy Choking Under Russian Pressure but Western Help is Scarce’, Washington Post, 15 October 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ukraineseconomy-choking-underrussian-pressure-but-westernhelp-is-scarce/2014/10/15/d983dbfc-4fc6-11e4-babee91da079cb8a_story.html.