Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management

Survival

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 7-42

  Freedman, Lawrence ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84901400862     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.920143     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. The only source for this is Coral Bell, Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). I have never found any other corroboration, but it sounds like the sort of thing McNamara might well have said.
2. See Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (London: Martin Robertson, 1976).
3. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
4. Ariel Alexovich, 'Clinton's National Security Ad', New York Times, 29 February 2008, http://thecaucus.blogs. nytimes.com/2008/02/29/clintonsnational-security-ad. Interestingly, when news first came through that missile sites had been detected in Cuba, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy decided it was better for President Kennedy to get a good night's sleep so that he could deal with the problem fresh in the morning.
5. White House, 'Remarks by the President at the New Economic School Graduation', 7 July 2009, http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ remarks-president-new-economicschool-graduation.
6. Dmitry Kiselyov, at the head of a Kremlin-backed news agency, observed on his TV programme that 'Russia is the only country that could really turn the U.S. into radioactive ashes', against the backdrop of a mushroom cloud on a screen behind him. Anna Dolgov, 'Russia Could Turn U.S. into "Radioactive Ashes", State TV Anchor Says', Moscow Times, 18 March 2014, http://www. themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ russia-could-turn-us-into-radioactiveashes-state-tv-anchor-says/496253. html.
7. US Department of State, 'Remarks on Ukraine', 24 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/ remarks/2014/04/225166.htm.
8. For the distinction between deterrence and compellence, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).
9. For more on coercive diplomacy, see Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (eds), The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
10. Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
11. James Shepley, 'How Dulles Averted War', Life, 16 January 1956.
12. The term may well have been inspired by Stephen Potter's humorous book, The Theory and Practice of Gamesmanship, or the Art of Winning Games Without Actually Cheating (1947).
13. Hugh Rawson and Margaret Miner (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of American Quotations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 269.
14. In 1965 P.G. Wodehouse published The Brinkmanship of Galahad Threepwood. The term is still used, including in connection with the Ukraine crisis, for example in an editorial in the London Times published on 11 April 2014.
15. A memorandum prepared by the National Security Council on 26 October 1962 described one of the purposes of negotiations to be 'to afford the Soviets face-saving cover, if they wish, for a withdrawal of their offensive weapons from Cuba'. US National Security Council, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis', 26 October 1962, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ msc_cuba089.asp. In retrospect, 50 years after the crisis, a key element in its resolution was described as 'the willingness of each side to allow the other a face-saving way out'. Bruce W. MacDonald, 'Looking Back on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 50 Years Later', United States Institute of Peace, 19 October 2012, http://www.usip.org/ publications/looking-back-the-cubanmissile-crisis-50-years-later.
16. I deal with this in Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
17. Richard Holbrooke, 'Real W.M.D.'s', New York Times, 22 June 2008, http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/books/ review/Holbrooke-t.html.
18. It had taken an inordinately long time to receive and decode Khrushchev's message to President Kennedy on 26 October 1962. The 'Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link' was signed by the two sides on 20 June 1963.
19. In 1963 diplomat Harlan Cleveland observed: 'you will have to live with the institutions you create. The law you make may be your own.' The other lessons he identified were: 'Keep Your Objectives Limited'; 'Decide How Far You Would Go'; 'Creep Up Carefully on the Use of Force'; and 'Widen the Community of the Concerned'. On the character issue, he observed: 'it takes no courage to bluster; it takes some to stand up to a mortal threat that plainly has to be faced. But what takes the most gumption is to persevere in a decision that takes months or years to prove itself.' Harlan Cleveland, 'Crisis Diplomacy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 41, no. 4, July 1963, http://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/23522/harlan-cleveland/ crisis-diplomacy.
20. US Department of State, 'Press Availability in London', 14 March 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/ remarks/2014/03/223523.htm.
21. Amy Knight, 'Obama's Putin Delusion', New York Review of Books, 29 March 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/ nyrblog/2014/mar/29/obamas-putindelusion/.
22. Marc A. Thiessen, 'Obama's Weakness Emboldens Putin', Washington Post, 3 March 2014, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ marc-thiessen-obamas-weaknessemboldens-putin/2014/03/03/28def926-a 2e2-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html.
23. Malcolm Rifkind, former British foreign secretary, stated: 'on the basis of the measures announced so far by both the US and the EU, on visa controls and asset freezes internationally, I say with great sadness that is a pathetic and feeble response that does not match the seriousness which those implementing these responses have themselves acknowledged we face at the present time.' Nicholas Watt, 'Ukraine: UK to Push for Tougher Sanctions Against Russia over Crimea', Guardian, 18 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/mar/18/ukraine-uk-pushsanctions-russia-crimea.
24. Stephen F. Cohen, 'Distorting Russia', Nation, 3 March 2014, http:// www.thenation.com/article/178344/ distorting-russia#.
25. Mark Kramer, 'The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia', Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 2, April 2009, https://csis.org/files/ publication/twq09aprilkramer.pdf.
26. Kremlin, 'Diplomacy and External Affairs', 10 February 2007, http://archive.kremlin.ru/ eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_ type82912type82914type82917type84779_ 118123.shtml.
27. Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Color Revolutions (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).
28. Jeanne L. Wilson, 'Coloured Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 25, no. 2-3, 2009.
29. Bush stated that 'I strongly believe that Ukraine and Georgia should be given MAP [Membership Action Plans], and there are no tradeoffs-period.' Moscow immediately responded that this would upset the region's 'strategic stability'. Luke Harding, 'Bush Backs Ukraine and Georgia for Nato Membership', Guardian, 1 April 2008, http://www. theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/01/ nato.georgia.
30. 'A Cyber-riot', Economist, 10 May 2007, http://www.economist.com/ node/9163598.
31. Matthew Crandall, 'Soft Security Threats and Small States: The Case of Estonia', Defence Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, March 2014.
32. Simon Tilford, 'Poland and Ukraine: A Tale of Two Economies', Centre for European Reform, 31 March 2014, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/ default/files/publications/attachments/ pdf/2014/bulletin_95_st_article1-8624. pdf.
33. Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskiy note that the six had little in common other than that they were 'all but Russia', with the three South Caucasus countries not even sharing a border with an EU member state. Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskiy, 'Russia, the West and the Integration Dilemma', Survival, vol. 55, no. 6, December 2013-January 2014, p. 53.
34. EU Council, 'Eastern Partnership: The Way Ahead', 29 November 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/ foraff/139765.pdf.
35. Putin insisted that this would not be incompatible with close ties with the EU, and was not about 'any kind of revival of the Soviet Union'. Vladimir Putin, 'A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making', Izvestia, 3 October 2011, http://www.russianmission.eu/en/ news/article-prime-minister-vladimirputin-new-integration-project-eurasiafuture-making-izvestia-3-.
36. For a translation, see 'On Set of Measures, Aimed at Involving Ukraine into EurAsian Integration Process', Zerkalo Nedeli, 16 August 2013, http:// saryusz-wolski.pl/aktualnosci/ zobacz/721/on_set_of_measures_ aimed_at_involving_ukraine_into_eurasian_ integration_process.
37. Amanda Paul, 'Russia Cranks Up Pressure on Ukraine', EUobserver, 2 September 2013, http://blogs. euobserver.com/paul/2013/09/02/ russia-cranks-up-pressure-on-ukraine/.
38. The European Parliament passed a resolution complaining of Russian pressure. European Parliament, 'European Parliament Resolution of 12 September 2013 on the Pressure Exerted by Russia on Eastern Partnership Countries (in the Context of the Upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius)', 12 September 2013, http://www. europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0383&language=EN.
39. Charap and Troitskiy, 'Russia, the West and the Integration Dilemma', p. 55.
40. 'Russia Threatens Moldova Over Its EU Relations', EurActiv, 3 September 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/ europes-east/russia-keeps-threatening-neighbo-news-530198.
41. 'Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine', 21 February 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ cae/servlet/contentblob/671350/ publicationFile/190051/140221-UKR_ Erklaerung.pdf.
42. For a clear presentation of Moscow's view, which stops short of actual endorsement, see Dmitri Trenin, 'The Crisis in Crimea Could Lead the World into a Second Cold War', Observer, 2 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2014/mar/02/ crimea-crisis-russia-ukraine-cold-war.
43. On 4 March, Putin was asked: 'how do you see the future of Crimea? Do you consider the possibility of it joining Russia?' He replied, 'no, we do not'. Kremlin, 'Vladimir Putin Answered Journalists' Questions on the Situation in Ukraine', 4 March 2014, http://eng. kremlin.ru/news/6763.
44. On 1 March, Russia's upper house of parliament approved President Putin's request for Russian forces to be used in Ukraine 'until the normalisation of the political situation in the country'. 'Russian Parliament Approves Troop Deployment in Ukraine', BBC, 1 March 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-europe-26400035.
45. Kremlin, 'Address by President of the Russian Federation', 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889.
46. Nick Thompson, 'Fighter Jets, Special Forces: Photos "Show Russian Military Buildup" Near Ukraine', CNN, 15 April 2014, http://edition. cnn.com/2014/04/11/world/europe/ nato-satellite-images-russia/.
47. Lavrov discussed these proposals on Russia's state-television programme 'Sunday Times' on 30 March. The response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine was posted on its website on 30 March. Official Public Relations Secretariat for the Headquarters of the National Resistance in Kyiv, Ukraine, 'Ukraine's Foreign Ministry Responds to Russia's Demands for Federalization', 30 March 2014, http:// euromaidanpr.com/2014/03/30/ ukraines-foreign-ministry-respondsto-russias-demands-for-federalization/.
48. According to a poll, '18.1% of Donetsk and 24.2% of Luhansk support the recent armed seizures of administrative buildings in the Donbas region, while surrounding provinces overwhelmingly disapprove of the current situation. 72% of Donetsk and 58.3% of Luhansk residents disapprove of the current actions. Roughly 25% in the Donbas region said they would attend secessionist rallies in favor of joining Russia.' Support for closer ties with Russia had gone down from pre-crisis levels. Mat Babiak, 'Southeast Statistics: A Report on KIIS Polling Data from April 8-16, 2014', Ukrainian Policy, 16 April 2014, http:// ukrainianpolicy.com/southeast-statistics-of-ukraine-april-2014/.
49. Neil MacFarquhar, 'Under Russia, Life in Crimea Grows Chaotic', New York Times, 21 April 2014, http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/world/ europe/under-russia-life-in-crimeagrows-chaotic.html.
50. Of particular concern was a water shortage which threatened Crimea's harvest. See 'Russia Fears Crimea Water Shortage as Supply Drops', BBC, 25 April 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-europe-27155885.
51. On 18 March, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, acting Ukrainian prime minister, said that 'strictly with a view to maintaining Ukraine's unity, the question of joining NATO is not on the agenda.' Pavel Polityuk, 'PM Tells Ukrainians: No NATO Membership, Armed Groups to Disarm', Reuters, 18 March 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/ article/2014/03/18/uk-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUKBREA2H0DO20140318.
52. In 2013 Ukraine was ranked 144th out of the 176 countries investigated in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Russia was ranked 127th. Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index', http://cpi.transparency.org/ cpi2013/.
53. Kenneth Rapoza, 'Russia Helped Ukraine, But Now Ukraine Needs More, IMF's Lagarde Says', Forbes, 3 April 2014, http://www.forbes.com/ sites/kenrapoza/2014/04/03/russiahelped-ukraine-but-now-ukraineneeds-more-imfs-lagarde-says/.
54. This required respect for Ukraine's borders, in line with the principles of the 1975 'Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe'; abstention from the use or threat of force against Ukraine; support, should Ukraine be threatened by economic coercion; and agreement to bring any incident of aggression by a nuclear power before the UN Security Council. These were no more than assurances, although Ukraine refers to them as guarantees. France and China added their support. On the background to the nuclear deal, and why it made sense, see Tom Nichols, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Ukraine Crisis', War Room, 19 March 2014, http://tomnichols.net/blog/2014/03/19/ nuclear-weapons-and-the-ukrainecrisis/.
55. The treaty also referred to 'the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious originality of national minorities on their territory', and the creation of 'conditions for the encouragement of that originality'. Spencer Kimball, 'Bound by Treaty: Russia, Ukraine and Crimea', Deutsche Welle, 11 March 2014, http://www.dw.de/ bound-by-treaty-russia-ukraine-andcrimea/ a-17487632.
56. The draft resolution reaffirmed Ukraine's 'sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity', and denied the validity of the referendum that led to Crimea's break with Ukraine. A non-binding resolution was passed in the General Assembly that dismissed the Crimean vote as 'having no validity, (and) cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the City of Sevastopol'. It was passed with 100 votes in favour, 11 against and 58 abstentions. UN, 'UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked', 15 March 2014, https://www.un.org/apps/ news//story.asp?NewsID=47362&Cr =Ukraine&Cr1=
57. Louis Charbonneau, 'Ukraine Asks U.N. Assembly to Declare Crimea Secession Invalid', Reuters, 24 March 2014, http://www. reuters.com/article/2014/03/24/ us-ukraine-crisis-un-resolution-idUSBREA2N1T720140324.
58. Colum Lynch, 'Exclusive: U.N. Hints Russia and Its Allies Rigged Crimea's Secession Vote', Foreign Policy, 10 April 2014, http://thecable. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/04/10/ un_hints_russia_and_its_allies_ rigged_crimeas_secession_vote.
59. The official result from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was a 96.77% vote for integration of the region into the Russian Federation with an 83.1% turnout. Carol Morello, Will Englund and Griff Witte, 'Crimea's Parliament Votes to Join Russia', Washington Post, 17 March 2014, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/ crimeas-parliament-votes-to-joinrussia/ 2014/03/17/5c3b96ca-adba-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html.
60. 'Ukraine Crisis: EU and US Impose Sanctions Over Crimea', BBC, 17 March 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-europe-26613567
61. White House, 'FACT SHEET: Ukraine-Related Sanctions', 17 March 2014, http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2014/03/17/ fact-sheet-ukraine-related-sanctions.
62. EU Council, 'Council Conclusions on Ukraine', 17 March 2014.
63. The Russians remained actively engaged in the discussions with Iran on its nuclear programme, although their ability to exercise leverage here was limited because lifting UN sanctions required unanimity on the Security Council.
64. 'NATO Flexes Its Muscle in Response to Crimea Crisis', EurActiv, 2 April 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/ sections/global-europe/nato-flexes-itsmuscle-response-crimea-crisis-301302.
65. Obama stated: 'we are not going to be getting into a military excursion in Ukraine'. Michael D. Shear, 'Obama Rules Out Military Force Over Ukraine', New York Times, 20 March 2014, http://www.nytimes. com/2014/03/21/world/europe/obamaukraine. html.
66. Kiran Stacey, George Parker and Christian Oliver, 'Business Frustrates Sanctions Push', Financial Times, 17 April 2014.
67. Kissinger wrote: 'the West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country.' Henry A. Kissinger, 'How the Ukraine Crisis Ends', Washington Post, 5 March 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settlethe-ukraine-crisis-start-at-theend/ 2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html.
68. Carol E. Lee, 'Obama, Merkel Share "Grave" Concern Over Russia', Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2014, http:// blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/03/07/ obama-merkel-share-grave-concernover-russia/.
69. 'Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine from April 17: The Full Text', Washington Post, 17 April 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/joint-geneva-statement-onukraine-from-april-17-the-fulltext/ 2014/04/17/89bd0ac2-c654-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html.
70. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 'OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine', http://www.osce.org/ ukraine-smm/. A number of observers from Western countries acting in support of the organisation were taken hostage by separatists in late April.
71. The political section of the planned Association Agreement was signed on 21 March 2014. The remaining sections, notably the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, were scheduled to be signed after Ukraine's presidential elections. European External Action Service, 'Ukraine', http://eeas.europa. eu/ukraine/index_en.htm.
72. See 'IMF Approves $17bn Ukraine Bailout Package', BBC, 1 May 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27233152. The IMF loan would unlock further funds worth $15bn from other donors, including the World Bank, the EU, Canada and Japan.
73. Secretary Kerry stated: 'we have to make it absolutely clear to the Kremlin that NATO territory is inviolable. We will defend every single piece of it.' David Brunnstrom, 'Kerry: NATO Territory Inviolable-"We Will Defend Every Single Piece"', Reuters, 29 April 2014, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/04/29/us-ukraine-crisiskerry-idUSBREA3S0X520140429.
74. Paul Belkin, Derek E. Mix and Steven Woehrel, 'NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe', Congressional Research Service, 16 April 2014, http://www.fas. org/sgp/crs/row/R43478.pdf.
75. A late-April poll found broad support for President Obama's approach. There was majority support across party lines for increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia, by 53%-36%, but also opposition to sending weapons to Ukraine, by 62%-30%. Susan Page and Kendall Breitman, 'Poll: Americans Support Sanctions, Not Arms for Ukraine', USA Today, 28 April 2014.
76. Moldova is scheduled to sign major agreements with the EU in June 2014. Robert Coalson, 'Moldova's Separatist Conundrum', Atlantic, 23 April 2014, http://www.theatlantic. com/international/archive/2014/04/ moldova-separatist-transdniestria/361138/.
77. See also Linda Kinstler, 'Which Former Soviet State Could Be the Next Ukraine?', New Republic, 21 April 2014, http://www.newrepublic. com/article/117440/which-formersoviet-state-could-be-next-ukraine.
78. World Bank, 'Infographic: Confidence Crisis Exposes Economic Weakness in Russia', 26 March 2014, http:// www.worldbank.org/en/news/ feature/2014/03/26/infographic-rer31-confidence-crisis
79. Will Englund, 'Crimea as Consolation Prize: Russia Faces Some Big Costs Over Ukrainian Region', Washington Post, 15 March 2014, http://www.washingtonpost. com/world/europe/crimea-as-consolation-prize-russia-faces-some-big-costsover-ukrainian-region/2014/03/15/ a807ea20-230e-4f08-8d39-a8f090eb3fba_story.html.
80. Andrew Osborn and Lina Kushch, 'West Prepares Sanctions as Russia Presses on with Crimea Takeover', Reuters, 14 March 2014, http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/03/14/us-ukraine-crisisidUSBREA1Q1E820140314.
81. On gas markets, see Simon Pirani et al., 'What the Ukraine Crisis Means for Gas Markets', Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March 2014, http://www. oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/ uploads/2014/03/What-the-Ukrainecrisis-means-for-gas-markets-GPC-3. pdf.
82. Anders Aslund, 'Russia Is in No Economic Shape to Fight a War', Moscow Times, 22 April 2014, http:// www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/ article/russia-is-in-no-economicshape-to-fight-a-war/498728.html.
83. NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove commented upon the military training and equipment of these pro-Russian 'activists', their weapon-handling discipline, coordinated use of tear gas and stun grenades against targeted buildings, speed in establishing roadblocks and barricades in the surrounding area, and professional manning of checkpoints. Kirit Radia, 'NATO Commander Offers Evidence of Russian Troops in Ukraine', ABC, 17 April 2014, http://abcnews. go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/04/ nato-commander-offers-evidence-ofrussian-troops-in-ukraine/.
84. Having first denied direct involvement of Russian forces in Crimea, Putin eventually admitted their role: 'our soldiers, of course, stood behind the self-defense forces of Crimea. They acted very civilly, and as I said, decisively and professionally. It otherwise wouldn't have been possible to hold an open, honest and dignified referendum and help people to express their opinion.' Paul Sonne, '5 Things Putin Had to Say About Ukraine', Wall Street Journal, 17 April 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/ five-things/2014/04/17/5-things-putinhad-to-say-about-ukraine/.
85. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the US Department of State both issued direct refutations of Russian claims, as did NATO. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'In Response to President Putin's Address to the Russian Parliament', 21 March 2014, https:// www.gov.uk/government/news/ in-response-to-president-putinsaddress-to-the-russian-parliament
86. US Department of State, 'Russian Fiction the Sequel: 10 More False Claims About Ukraine', 13 April 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ prs/ps/2014/04/224759.htm
87. NATO, 'Russia's Accusations-Setting the Record Straight', April 2014, http:// www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/ pdf_2014/20140411_140411-factsheet_ russia_en.pdf.
88. Samantha Power, US ambassador to the UN, stated: 'the government of Ukraine has acted with restraint in the face of repeated provocations'. US Mission to the UN, 'Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Stakeout on Ukraine, March 15, 2014', 15 March 2014, http://usun.state.gov/ briefing/statements/223543.htm.