Sensibility Theory and Projectivism

The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages

  D'Arms, Justin ^a   Jacobson, Daniel ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Blackburn; Emotion; Gibbard; McDowell; Moral psychology; Projectivism; Secondary qualities; Sentiment; Sentimentalism; Value

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920015468     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0195147790.003.0008     Document Type: Chapter

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