Demystifying Dilation

Erkenntnis

Volumn 79, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 1305-1342

  Pedersen, Arthur Paul ^a   Wheeler, Gregory ^a,b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84919782199     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9531-7     Document Type: Article

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